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Abstract
The global Cold War is used frequently by historians to frame the context of
political, economic, social, military, and geographical history of the 20th century. This is
often the case in Africa as well. This thesis set out to explore U.S.- South African
relations during the 1960s. After conducting research in the State Department Records
(Record Group 59) of the National Archives from 1967-1973 three case studies emerged
that suggested that reexamination of how historians traditionally view U.S.-South African
relations during this time period is necessary. The three case studies include U.S. use of
naval ports in South Africa, the strategic geographic location of South Africa and its
importance to NASA’s satellite and missile tracking stations, and the policy of selling of
weapons to South Africa by the U.S. While this is by no means an exhaustive study of
this time period due to limited time in the National Archives, it does offer promise for
more research involving this topic.
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“The story of the defeated is part of the truth and texture of those harried years.” Piero
Gleijeses
Introduction
The Cold War was permeated with many interactions between the U.S. and the
international community, particularly with what was then called the Third World. South
Africa would be no different. However, rather than reacting to the direct threat of Soviet
or communist influence, the U.S. government saw South Africa an essential launch point
for its Navy and for its space program making the United States act sympathetically
towards the white apartheid government. During the 1960s and early 1970s there are
three episodes that provide for a revealing examination of the U.S. government’s foreign
policy towards South Africa in the context of the global Cold War. These three episodes
include the docking of the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1967, the use of satellite
and missile tracking stations in Johannesburg by NASA from 1960-1973 and the arms
embargo as instituted by Kennedy and carried out by Johnson and Nixon from 19631970. These case studies, as examined in the U.S. National Archives, suggest that a
reexamination of how the U.S. government made decisions in relation to the South
African government, particularly in the context of the global Cold War and in the face of
apartheid, is necessary in order to accurately appreciate the dynamic factors shaping how
the United States interacted with the international community during this important
chapter in World History.
The South African government was not the perfect ally in the global Cold War.
Their implementation of apartheid was a risk for the U.S. government because they could
be accused of having friendly relations towards a government that employed such an
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abhorrent method of controlling its population. However, largely because of its colonial
history and geographical location, South Africa possessed technologically developed
ports for space and sea that were of high importance to the U.S. Therefore, the U.S.
government, specifically the Executive branch, was repeatedly forced to evaluate what
type of relationship they wanted with the South African government and how best to
achieve a delicate equilibrium both domestically and internationally.
The global Cold War was a complex and dynamic era for the United States. It
was a war of two political and ideological systems. It was an economic war against
socialism and communism. It was a political endeavor to keep dominoes from falling. It
was a nuclear, military, and scientific development race against the Soviets. It was a
geographic race for who could dominate non-aligned states economically and politically.
The global Cold War was not always a reaction to the fear of Soviet influence; rather, the
U.S. did act on the fear of communism spreading, such as in South East Asia. This is an
important distinction to make because in the case of South Africa, the U.S. government
was more concerned about communist influence, rather than Soviet influence
domestically, and used South Africa as a base to fight Soviet influence in other arenas,
such as the space race. For the purposes of this paper, most of these aspects will be
looked at, however the space race, intervention geographically and economically of
newly independent states, and the fear of the spread of communism, rather than the
Soviet influence, will be focused on when proving the thesis that U.S. relations with
South Africa were driven by the global Cold War, but not necessarily from fear of
immanent Soviet intervention in the area.
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Within the vast scholarship on U.S.-South African relations during the Cold War,
the three case studies examined for this thesis are only briefly mentioned. Although far
greater attention has been given to apartheid, only a handful of scholars have specifically
looked at the implications of apartheid on U.S.-South African relations during the
presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. Thus this
thesis fills a significant gap in the historiography on U.S. foreign policy toward South
Africa during this period of the global Cold War. Rather than fitting U.S.-South African
relations into the mold of a traditional Cold War definition, as previous historians on the
subject have done, this thesis examines three significant events in U.S.-South African
history that illustrate the complexities of foreign policy decisions the U.S. government,
the Executive branch specifically, made in context to South Africa, their government, and
the global Cold War. It illuminates the dynamic layers that allowed these decisions by
the U.S. Executive branch to happen and permits the influence of geographical, political,
and economic considerations, along with media perception and complexities between the
different branches of the U.S. government to play a role in understanding the complex
relationship between the U.S. and South African governments.
Thomas Borstelmann focused largely on the U.S. government’s relationship with
apartheid. Borstelmann’s early work primarily attended to the early years of the Cold
War and the effect of the National Party coming to party in 1948 on U.S. diplomacy
towards South Africa. He synthesized the cohesion of economic and strategic interests
the U.S. government had towards South Africa with the onslaught of the Cold War and
the start of the Civil Rights movement. Borstelmann argued:
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An examination of American support for the white minority government of South
Africa and for the colonial rulers of the rest of southern Africa offers a window on
the complicated interplay of two major themes of twentieth-century American
history: racism and anticommunism.1
According to Borstelmann, southern Africa became a testing ground for the U.S. to see if
it could create a multiracial alliance with the then-called Third World against the Soviet
bloc. Borstelmann stated:
In its pursuit of the preoccupying goals of containing communism and preserving
the ‘free world,’ the Truman administration provided critical assistance to the
reassertion of white authority in southern Africa after World War II. The United
States acted, in sum, as a reluctant uncle- or godparent- at the baptism of
apartheid.2
Borstelmann argued that the Truman administration did not trust the black South Africans
to maintain a Soviet-free zone in South Africa, which was essential to the U.S. for a
variety of reasons, most notably for the amount of raw resources they had. Borstelmann
argued that Truman’s racism did not help matters, especially when Afrikaner nationalists
freely lumped all serious opponents of apartheid together as “communists” because
Truman did not think to question the claim seriously.3 In sum, Truman felt his options
were limited in who to support in South Africa against the spread of Soviet influence and
therefore went with the option that he felt was the best for the U.S. at that time.
Borstelmann also confronted the cohesion of U.S. racial politics with its
diplomatic relations with a special emphasis on southern Africa; however his later work
covered 1945-1990 globally, rather than just the early Cold War in southern Africa.
Borstelmann focused on the effect of racial policies in the U.S. with the concern that
1

Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.
2
Ibid, 197.
3
Ibid, 201.
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“Soviet leaders had begun to show greater interest in expanding their influence south of
the Mediterranean. The [U.S.] concluded that any encouragement of racial strife ‘would
enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc opportunity in Africa.’”4 Kennedy was of special concern to
Borstelmann. He found that Kennedy’s policies towards South Africa would remain in
place through Johnson and Nixon’s presidencies. His main policy consisted of choosing
“staunchly anti-Communist white rulers” over the ANC or PAC, despite fears of how the
U.S. civil rights movement might react.5
Borstelmann was not alone in assuming that U.S.- South African relations during
the 1960s and 1970s was largely driven by fear of Soviet influence and communism
spreading to a strategic ally in southern Africa. Robert Kinlock Massie approached the
U.S.-South African relationship in the context of how apartheid impacted U.S.
organizations with ties to South Africa, such as churches, universities, private businesses,
civil rights leaders, and various leaders within the U.S. government. For the purposes of
this thesis, his research on U.S. government policy was most intriguing. He portrayed the
government as one that was divided: U.S. presidents were too concerned with the
implication of the importance of South Africa as an ally during the Cold War to make any
significant changes of policy towards apartheid. More specifically, he argued:
…the Americans also became convinced that a revolution would open the door
for a Communist takeover or a superpower confrontation over the southern sea
lanes and the world’s largest supply of gold. They read with alarm the CIA
reports that Communists had infiltrated the African National Congress…. The
lens of the cold war thus altered- and sometimes distorted every intelligence or

4

Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001),136.
5
Ibid, 170.
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policy analysis, casting suspicion on all acts of resistance against colonialism or
apartheid.6
While Massie’s focus is not necessarily on why the U.S. Executive branch conducted
governmental relations with South Africa in the manner it did, he does presume that
communist expansionism, led by the Soviets, in South Africa was the framework for
governmental decisions and therefore acted as a catalyst towards positive change in favor
of black South Africans.
Massie is not alone in his assumption that the Cold War was the rationale behind
decisions being made in Washington. Christian M. De Vos was a bit more moderate on
the influence of the Cold War on U.S. presidents, Kennedy in particular. He argued,
“…Kennedy simultaneously affirmed the legitimacy of the apartheid government, not
because the Cold War left him no other choice but because that was the only choice his
administration was willing to see.”7 De Vos structured his historical analysis of U.S.
decisions being guided by the overblown assumption that the apartheid government was
the only choice for an ally in the Cold War among rival South African political parties
because they were the safest choice in the ideological war against the spread of
communism.
J.E. Spence adjusted the lens and looked at the overall role of South Africa to the
west throughout the Cold War arguing their importance to thwarting communism:
Yet ultimately, South Africa’s projected image as the ‘bastion of the free world’
failed to convince Western policy makers. Their skepticism was based on the
argument that what the Soviets sought by projecting naval power in distant waters
6

Robert Kinlock Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years
(New York: Doubleday, 1997), 128.
7
Christian M. De Vos, “Balancing Acts: John Kennedy, The Cold War and The African National
Congress,” Politikon 32, no. 1 (May 2005), 119.
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was political influence rather than the means to provoke military confrontation
with the West…. Western governments recognized that in the improbable event
of a shoot-out in the southern oceans, the Republic’s anti-Communist posture
would leave it little choice but to place its ports, harbours, and military facilities at
the West’s disposal.8
Spence’s claims approached a much more accurate depiction of the rationale behind
maintaining a working relationship with the South African government in stating its
importance to the U.S. militarily and geographically. However, he failed to develop a
historical narrative that supported his assertions, leaving his rationale open for further
investigation.
There was clearly a tendency in the literature dealing with U.S.- South African
relations during this time period to emphasize the role of either the communist threat
(often embodied in opposition parties to apartheid) or the fear of the spread of Soviet
influence. Historians have not devoted much, if any, time on the specifics that created
this historical context. Too little investigation has been done on the papers, speeches, and
communiques in the Executive branch that would explain why this assumption is correct.
There is a much smaller collection of literature about Soviet- South African
relations during the Cold War. Much of the work done on Soviet-South African relations
during the Cold War is minimal and speculative due to documentation limitations.
However, Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew did a significant amount of historical
research using archival materials snuck out of the former Soviet Union by Soviet
archivist Mitrokhin. Focusing on the push to engage Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold
War, Andrew and Mitrokhin paint a picture of a cash-strapped Soviet Union attempting
to stay ahead of the curve as former African colonies gained independence. A major tool
8

J.E. Spence, “Southern Africa in the Cold War,” History Today 49, no. 2 (Feb 1999), 46.
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of the Soviet Union was to engage in distributing forged letters to African leaders that
were “designed to strengthen their suspicion of the United States and their trust in the
Soviet Union.”9
Andrew and Mitrokhin did look briefly at the Soviet’s interaction with the ANC
and SACP. More specifically, even though Moscow had “only modest expectations of
the prospect of national liberation movements” in South Africa, they did feel that it was
important to maintain relations with the groups that opposed apartheid and might
ultimately come to power should there be a revolution. Regardless of giving the ANC
and SACP modest funding ($300,000 a year to the ANC), Andrew and Mitrokhin argued
that “the first fifteen years of Umkhonto operations posed no significant threat to South
African apartheid regime.” This was largely due to the mass exile and imprisonment of
ANC and SACP leadership.10
Vladamir Shubin analyzed the causes of armed conflict in Southern Africa during
the Cold War. While most of his work focused on Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and
Namibia, he has produced a minimal amount of scholarship on South Africa. His
research drew from ANC archives and interviews with both Soviets and South Africans.
Shubin offered more depth in the Soviet involvement with the ANC and SACP than
Andrew and Mitrokhin. Via interviews with men involved, Shubin retold how 328
Umkohonto fighters were trained by the Soviets in Odessa from 1963-1965. The Soviets
attempted to teach them guerilla tactics that might be useful should they rise up against
apartheid. Training continued for the next two decades, but was spotty and
9

Christopher Andrew and VasiliMitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB Battle for the Third
World (New York: Basic Books), 438.
10
Ibid, 443.
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unsustainable, as the Soviets could not get the ANC supplies needed should an armed
uprising happen. They also could not get the fighters back into South Africa.11 Much of
the rest of the work offered by Shubin focused on post-1976 Soviet-ANC relations.
However, his book did offer a much more detailed relationship between the Soviets and
the ANC and SACP.
What is concerning about the work conducted on Soviet- South African relations
during the time period is that much of the work focuses either on pre-WWII or post-1976
relations between the Soviets and various political parties in the South Africa. What does
exist during the time period of this thesis is information that is often contested by
scholarship done in the area, as demonstrated by Shubin and Mitrokhin and Andrew’s
work. Theses authors have similar research stated but drastically different interpretations
of events. Scholarship tends to be minimal in this realm because of the limitations on
resources available, as stated by both sets of authors in their work.
Soviet involvement in South Africa was further complicated by Cuban interaction
with sub-Saharan Africa, thus illustrating that the communist front was not always united
during the Cold War. Andrew and Mitrokhin only briefly mentioned Cuba by saying that
their government saw that region as “‘imperialism’s weakest link.’” 12 Cuba clearly had
an interest in emerging governments after colonialism began collapsing, thus begging the
questions of whether or not they were influential in South Africa and if so, to what extent.
Piero Gleijeses offered answers to this. While much of his work focused on Algeria, the
Congo, and Angola, he did spend some time examining South Africa. While this thesis
11

Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 244245.
12
Andrew and Mitrokhin, 433.
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does not emphasize Cuba’s role in South Africa, they are pertinent to the conversation
because they help frame the context to which the Soviets were involved with South
African politics. Using a variety of archival work from the U.S., Cuba, Belgium, and the
U.K., Gleijses argued that it was Cuba’s interest in spreading a revolution throughout
Africa that was far more concerning to the U.S. government than Soviet intentions.13
Although he offered little insight to U.S.- South African governmental relations prior to
1976, it did offer a different view of the Soviet Union in Africa. There was an attempt to
spark a leftist revolution, but it was led by Cuba, not the Soviet Union, and it happened
not in South Africa, but in Angola, the Congo, and other former Portuguese and Belgian
colonies.
There are a significant amount of scholarship that offers comprehensive histories
of the Union of South Africa and South Africa. Leonard interpreted events involving
South Africa on the world stage during the time period of this thesis. Drawing from a
wide array of South African historiography that embodied post-Cold War and postapartheid perspectives, Thompson set out to reexamine major historical themes in South
African history that may be more pertinent and inclusive of voices that were largely
quieted by apartheid.14 Although his work was largely a domestic history of South
Africa, he did contextualize historical events in relation to the Cold War. Thompson
argued that South Africa was never a high priority for the Soviets. Proof for Thompson
was that top leaders of the ANC- Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo- were not

13

Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 8-9.
14
Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), xiixiii.
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communists and therefore were never seriously courted by the Soviets. For Thompson, a
more important relationship was that of the U.S. and Great Britain with the South African
government because they wanted to invest in mineral resources and open trade.
Thompson did not connect this interest to the Cold War context.15
Sue Onslow and John Daniel made strong arguments about U.S.- South African
relations during the Cold War that resonate throughout this thesis. Onslow edited a
collection of works by various authors, including Shubin, Onslow, and Daniel. Onslow’s
intent was to allow for a more complex and holistic picture of South Africa during the
Cold War to emerge via recent studies conducted. She argued that the Cold War was not
a bipolar contest between the U.S. and the USSR. Rather:
The region therefore must be seen as an integral part of the ‘international civil
war’ of the twentieth century, as the battle between ‘centre-right and left’
interacted with the politics and militarization of the struggle in Southern African
region, as the discourse of liberalism and arguments for evolutionary, socioeconomic change were effectively sidelined.16
Onslow argued that South African politics during the Cold War cannot be oversimplified
by fitting it into a traditional definition of the Cold War. By incorporating chapters on
U.S. nuclear aspirations and Soviet military involvement, Onslow established the
importance of South Africa and its government to the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, the
Soviet Union during the Cold War.
John Daniel, who was featured in Onslow’s work, had a similar argument to
Onslow. He argued:

15

Ibid, 216-217.
Sue Onslow, “Introduction,” Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, ed. Sue
Onslow (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-2.
16
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Similarly misguided was the enveloping of apartheid’s mission in the Cold War
cloak. At the end of the day, the Cold War paradigm was a myth. This is not to
suggest that its arch-advocates like Botha and Malan did not sincerely believe in it
and that they were fighting the West’s good fight. They did. However, wrapped
up as they were in this profound misconception, it blinkered them from the
realities of the South African struggle. For the apartheid regime, the Soviet Union
was never the real problem.17
There is proof in documents and press clippings that showed they fully believed that they
were essential to the west’s military and political strategies against the threat of Soviet
aggression. Much like Spence, Onslow and Daniel do not spend a significant amount of
time in their work developing the actual history that guided their arguments about U.S.South African relations during the Cold War during the time period reflected in this
thesis. This thesis seeks to fill that hole in the scholarship.
The scholarship available on U.S.-South African relations from Kennedy to Nixon
is often minimal and presumptuous, frequently used to paint a larger picture of the Cold
War in Africa. To my knowledge, there is no literature that hones in on smaller events
that shape a more detailed understanding of U.S. relations with the South African
government in an effort to define how South African history fits into the global Cold War
particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s. Rather, specified history embodying
South African- U.S. governmental relations during the Cold War tend to emphasize
historical chapters such as mineral security and the proliferation of nuclear knowledge.
The history of port usage for ships, space stations, and weapons sales begs us to admit to
the historiographical account another means of inquiry that will further clarify South
Africa’s position in the global Cold War.

17

John Daniel, “Racism, the Cold War and South Africa’s Regional Security Strategies 1948-1990,” Cold
War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, 51.
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This thesis is based on previously unavailable and unconsidered primary sources
from the U.S. National Archives Record Group 59, records of the State Department. This
record group was selected because of its preeminence in secondary literature consulted
prior to a visit to the U.S. Archives in Maryland. More specifically, files from the broad
categories of Communism, Defense, and Political Affairs and Relations from 1967-1969
and 1970-1973 were consulted. In addition to these materials, the primary source series
Foreign Relations of the United States, the analyst papers of the CIA, and the
Congressional Record were all consulted for further information. From these collections,
the three case studies emerged as the pre-eminent issues concerning the U.S. Executive
branch as they appeared often in the document collections for both the Executive and
Legislative branches. They also drew a significant amount of attention from the media
when searched in the New York Times and London Times historical databases.
Presidential policy between the 1960s and the 1970s was largely favorable to the
South African government. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all dealt with various crises
that challenged their international image thanks to allying themselves economically and
politically with South Africa. Despite the potential for bad press and backlash from the
Civil Rights community in the United States, they all felt it necessary, if not vital, to stay
aligned with the South African government, as they were invested deeply economically,
scientifically, and militarily. Arms embargoes were put into place and broken with
conventional weapons continuing to be sold thanks to loop holes in the embargoes. Port
policies were established, scrutinized, and ultimately disregarded in an effort to maintain
access to air and naval ports. Even NASA was brought under the microscope because
their policies upheld apartheid policy in order to keep access to satellite and missile
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tracking stations essential to landing men on the moon. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all
legitimized their actions by claiming that keeping South Africa close politically would
allow for some sort of influence on their apartheid policy. Whether or not they actually
believed this is debatable.
There is no doubt that global Cold War politics did heavily influence major
foreign policy decisions for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. But, to what extent did it
influence policy choices towards South Africa? This paper will argue that the global
Cold War did provide a back drop to decisions made, although it was not to fight the
direct threat of the Soviet influence within South Africa’s borders. Access to minerals,
ports, and tracking stations were vital to global Cold War efforts. Also, selling weapons
to beef up the South African Defense Force’s capabilities can be contextualized in the
global Cold War framework. However, the U.S. did not decide upon such actions to keep
the Soviets at bay in South Africa. Also, the U.S. did not base their policies towards
South Africa on the fear of South Africa becoming communist via banned groups such as
the ANC and PAC, as was argued at the time.
Onslow and Daniel both suggested in their work that the way in which historians
look at relations during this time period should be re-examined, but then do not offer
specifics to support this idea. The three case studies that emerged from doing research in
Record Group 59 allow for the actual re-examination to occur. These case studies are
broken up and examined within the pages of this thesis. Chapter one, while serving
largely to contextualize South Africa in the global Cold War context, will introduce the
importance of South Africa on the stage of the larger global Cold War. This chapter will
focus on Cuban- African relations during the 1960s and spread of communist influence
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within domestic South African opposition parties, such as the ANC. Chapter two looks at
the first case study involving port usage by U.S. naval ships in South Africa and the
difficulty the various branches of the U.S. government had in making a cohesive port
policy in the face of the global Cold War and apartheid. Chapter three discusses the
impact of the port policies that emerged during the 1960s on NASA’s use of bases in
South Africa to support a man landing on the moon. Chapter four analyzes the decisionmaking process and the importance surrounding the sale of U.S. weapons to South Africa
in the face of growing aggressive apartheid policies. It is through these three case studies
that a common theme of apprehension and lack of clarity emerges, thus bringing to
question the manner in which historians have previously looked at U.S.-South African
relations via the global Cold War lens.
Because U.S. policy was often contested between Congress and the White House,
it is historically significant to separate the decisions, statements, and opinions of the
various branches of government. Even within branches, such as the Executive branch,
there is discussion and disagreement about the way in which to proceed when making
policy. This illustrates the curious advance of a dynamic policy between major
government players within branches and between the branches.

16

Chapter One: Cold War Context
There is deeper historical context that must be explored when looking at South
Africa and the U.S. during the global Cold War. Decisions made by the Executive
branch of the U.S. government were undoubtedly influenced by the global Cold War
pertaining to South Africa, but South African policy was more complex than the
simplistic east versus west struggle. This chapter will look at the traditional view of
South Africa being a territory where the U.S. battled the Soviet Union economically and
politically and expand the view to that of the global Cold War. South Africa was a naval
region with ports to fight the global war elsewhere, such as in Vietnam but also in outer
space.
There are three major historical camps concerning communism in South Africa.
The first camp argues that communism did not exist in South Africa or if it did that it was
irrelevant. The second argues that communism did it exist and its importance is of
relevance when studying domestic and international South African history. The third
argues that communism’s presence is of great importance and overshadows much of how
South African domestic and international interactions are viewed. I am of the second
camp. While communism did exist and was definitely of concern for the apartheid
government, especially communism’s connections to major opposition parties such as the
ANC, it should not overshadow how all South African history is viewed from 1958-1973.

U.S. and the Global Arena:

17

In Europe in the post- World War II setting, Greece and Turkey both threatened to
become communist and possibly under the guise of the Soviets during their civil wars.18
This resulted in the U.S Executive and Legislative branches declaring and passing the
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. For that purpose they promised diplomatic and
economic aid to countries that could potentially fall to communist governments, not
necessarily to Soviet influence.
In 1950, there were major revolutions in Guatemala and Cuba. The CIA and
Executive branch, reacted with intensity using assassination attempts and attempted
coups. In 1954, Guatemala endured “Operation Success”: the U.S. army deployed
propaganda such as strategically placed pamphlets, along with diplomatic pressure, that
forced Jacobo Arbénz Guzmán out of power. His policy of reclaiming unused land by
the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation, and giving it to the landless population
was not tolerated. After a successful revolution in Cuba, the Soviet Union placed and
activated nuclear weapons on Cuba and pointed them at the U.S., resulting in the Cuban
Missile Crisis. After the removal of the missiles, the U.S. Executive branch made it a
priority to eliminate Fidel Castro from power, but ultimately failed to do so.
Within this context, it is necessary to mention the Bandung Conference and the
challenge of nationalist rejection of an emerging bi-polar world order. To simplify the
global Cold War as such would be to ignore the split that happened in April 1955 at the
Bandung Conference. This meeting was the first time that the decolonizing world,
namely those in Africa and Asia, came together to attempt an establishment of a unified

18

William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World and Beyond, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 239-240.
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voice that would transcend nationalistic categorizations.19 Its purpose was to confront
anticolonialism, disarmament, and development despite Cold War developments in
Southeast Asia.20 This acted almost as a tertiary element that complicated the idea of
east-west relations because, despite China’s attendance (the Soviet Union did not attend),
there is a veritable split between what the U.S. viewed as allied states in the global Cold
War. The Bandung Conference is significant because not all perceived eastern states
were aligned in the context of the global Cold War; rather they made their own political
attempts at creating a unity for themselves despite China and the Soviet Union.
Most notably, the U.S. then expanded activity to with the former French colony
Vietnam, after it earned independence in 1954. Vietnam’s independence coincided with
the Chinese communist revolution and the Korean War. Upon Vietnam’s independence
and the popularity of socialist- oriented Ho Chi Minh, the U.S. became increasingly
concerned that the conversion of governments to communism was a trend, rather than
isolated incidents; thus, the domino theory was born. All branches of the U.S.
government vehemently opposed the spreading of communism in Southeast Asia and
began investing itself politically, economically, and militarily as early as Truman’s
administration. It joined British and French efforts as global Cold War allies.
Kennedy and Johnson’s military intervention in Vietnam no doubt cast a shadow
on major international decisions elsewhere in the world, including those made towards
South Africa. In that global strategic concept port availability in South Africa was
crucial for troop and material movement to and from Vietnam. It is in that context that
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troops aboard the USS Franking Delano Roosevelt returned from Vietnam in February
1967 and needed to refuel and allow the troops leave time for their sound mind. The
policy originated out of a naval policy context, not a political context. There was little
concern in the Executive branch that the South African government, or Africa in general,
was going to fall like dominoes to communist or socialist governments as it was feared in
Asia. Also, the number of countries gaining independence in the 1960s from colonial
rule in Africa was not a motivating factor.
The Middle East was also an area of concern for the U.S. and the Soviets. In
relation to the thesis of this paper, the Suez Canal crisis would be cause for concern by
the U.S., particularly in relation to their ability to ship goods and move military should
they need to do so. The leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, envisioned a Pan-Arab
empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his leadership. In pursuit of this goal,
Nasser understood the importance of working within the confines of the global Cold War.
Therefore, he took to playing the U.S. and Soviet Union off of one another to create a
more viable economic and political empire in the Middle East. In 1955, he secured a
pledge of military supplies from the Communist bloc to help equip the Egyptian army.
From the U.S. and Great Britain, he received financial assistance amounting to $70
million for his construction of a new dam at Aswan which would allow for land
cultivation and the production of hydro-electric power.21
On July 20, the U.S. government, who had becoming increasingly agitated with
the reliance of Nasser on military aid from the Soviet bloc and their anti-Israeli
sentiments towards the recently formed state, withdrew their offer to help build the
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Aswan Dam. This ultimately led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which had just
recently come under their full military control with the relinquishing of British military
protection on June 13, 1956.22
The Soviets were not very active with the region until the 1970s; however, they
did interact in the context of the various Arab-Israeli wars. Egypt, while not communist,
courted the Soviet influence heavily for arms, particularly during the 1967 and 1973 wars
with Israel. The scramble for what was then called the Third World was in full effect by
the U.S. and, to not as intense of a degree, the Soviets and Chinese. Africa was no
different.

U.S.-South African Relations 1949-1960:
In a CIA political assessment written on January 31, 1949, it is evident that the
U.S. regarded relations with South Africa to be vital, but not because of the global Cold
War. In fact, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a strong dislike for apartheid as
established by Jan Smuts and expanded by Daniel F. Malan. “In the wider field of
international affairs South African intransigence on the racial issue and on the control of
colonial areas has provoked criticism from non-Soviet as well as from Soviet sources,
and has made the country something of a propaganda liability to the US and the Western
bloc.”23 The reality was that South Africa was vital to the U.S. because of its
geographical position and it possession of key minerals vital to the Cold War effort. The
CIA felt that supporting the South African government was important because it
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contributed to “order and stability in the whole of Africa.” In addition, it had a naval
base that was strategic for travel to Asia, as proven by use of the Cape Route during
WWII. It also had an untold amount of industrial potential that could be beneficial to
U.S. private industry.24
Maintaining access and positive political relations with the South African
government, in theory, should not have been a problem for the U.S. As the CIA noted,
“Politically, the Union’s orientation is unquestionably toward the West.”25 Competition
from the USSR should have been minimal to non-existent. The white-dominated
government was fully on the West’s side. However, the nine million “non-Europeans”
who were repressed by apartheid served as a possible inroad for communists:
The genuineness of many of the native grievances provides an excellent
opportunity for Communist agitation…. Though the failure of the natives up to
now to develop any effective indigenous leadership or to come together in trade
unions indicates that the political danger point is still some distance off, continued
Communist failure to acquire significant influence can by no means be assumed.26
In a thirteen page report addressing the concerns, assumptions, and predictions about the
future of South Africa, only one paragraph is spent on the threat of communist expansion
into the country. This is an important indicator as to the concern for communist
expansionism, as 1949 was the start of the red threat with over bloated McCarthyism and
the discovery of the Venona Cables in the U.S. with realpolitik guiding many policy
decision made by Truman and Eisenhower in the early years of the Cold War.
In November 1950, the CIA published another report on South Africa. In this
report, the CIA was more concerned with the implications of apartheid on the image of
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the U.S., being their economic and political ally. Image was, of course, very important in
the global Cold War, as propaganda and perception were as much a major part of the
Cold War as the space and arms races. “The Malan Government’s foreign policy is… a
serious embarrassment both to the US and the UK.” More specifically, “International
resentment directed against the Union is greatly intensified by the harshness with which
Malan’s Government has preached and practiced its racial program of apartheid….”27
The CIA’s report was hypercritical of apartheid, but recognized the strategic importance
of South Africa.
The 1950 report repeated and expanded on the same points as the 1949 report. It
too noted the economic, geographic, and military importance of South Africa to the U.S.
Conditions were favorable for the west to maintain a Soviet-free situation for foreign
policy decisions, saying, “It is an intensely anti-Communist government, but one also
permeated with certain strongly anti-democratic tendencies.”28 Apartheid was the biggest
liability with concern to possible Soviet penetration into the political system. “Apartheid
is also a ready-made invitation for propaganda from the Communist bloc directed against
both the Union and the countries associated with it.” Regardless of the possibility of a
Soviet threat in the form of being an anti-apartheid force for the racial majority, the U.S.
found itself unable to “disavow a country so firmly within the Western camp as South
Africa is.”29 The U.S. did recognize the possibility of a ready-made communist
revolution in the form of anti-apartheid groups representing the non-white population, but

27

Central Intelligence Agency, “South Africa Politics and US Security,” 17 November 1950, 1.
Ibid, 3.
29
Ibid, 8-9.
28

23

it was not so imminent that it should trump the positives that came from maintaining a
relationship with the South African government.
The 1950 report is one of the earliest reports to comment on the size of the
military, which would balloon throughout the 1960s and 1970s thanks to the U.S.,
France, and U.K. selling them massive amounts of conventional weapons. Should
governments in the west choose to do so, weapons sales and industrial development
“would make it more useful to the US and UK in its time of war.” More specifically:
In military matters the government has been favorably disposed towards
cooperation with the US and UK as part of its efforts to modernize the
obsolescent South African defense forces. The usefulness of this cooperation is
limited, however, by the Union’s small military budget, its preoccupation with
internal security, and by political meddling with the armed services aimed at
making Afrikaner elements dominant.30
The South African government started their weapons sales requests as early as 1950,
asking the U.S. to sell them B-29 bombers for the intended purpose of defending Africa
from the Indian Navy. The U.S. looked favorable on this because they were helping as
much as they could, given they had a miniscule defense force, in the Korean crisis. The
South African government also pled with the British government to help build up their
navy to help defend the Cape Route and to build up naval yards that would be helpful in
wartime for the U.S. and U.K. should they need it.31 These sales would be difficult for
the U.S. to deny because of its strategic location.
It is important to expand on why the South Africans were concerned about the
Indian Navy. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, KGB operations did increase in India.32
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The Indians did have a regional alliance with the Soviet Union, not as partners in the
Soviet revolution, but as two states that had mutual interests, such as being opposed to
the new Chinese government after the revolution.33 India also acted as a natural alliance
with the Soviet Union because the U.S. relied on Pakistan as a "strategic counterweight to
Soviet influence in Asia," thus encouraging the Indian government to look elsewhere.34
The KGB did consider their relationship with India a success because of their continued
alliance throughout the global Cold War against the U.S. and her allies in Asia. By the
1970s, the KGB had its largest presence outside of the Kremlin in India and felt that they
were successfully influencing elections via putting in officials that remained sympathetic
to the Kremlin, not because of the spread of communism.35
The Indian Ocean itself was an important zone to control in global war because it
was essential to trade, served as a geographically important alternative to using the Suez
Canal, and allowed ease of access to Eastern Africa, which saw colonial powers
withdrawing throughout the 1950s and 1960s.36 If one were to look at a map of states
bordering the Indian Ocean, they would see U.S. and Soviet bases along the coast line,
with the U.S. having bases in Mogadishu, Mombasa, Diego Garcia, and Berbera, among
other areas. The Soviets held bases in Mauritius, Seychelles, Socotra, and Aden.37
Regardless, the Indian Ocean was seen as being a “zone of peace” probably because the
threat of actual war was too great to conceive by the superpowers.
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By 1952, the CIA added an additional importance to South Africa- access to
strategic minerals, which was essential not only in the arms race sector of the global Cold
War, but the economy as well. South Africa had the potential to produce a substantial
amount of chromite, manganese, and uranium, all vital elements for the U.S.’s Cold War
machine.38 In fact, ¼ of the west’s total manganese and chromite supply came from
South Africa at the time, along with its entire supply of amosite asbestos. In addition,
South Africa provided large quantities of corundum, antimony, gold and industrial
diamonds to the west.39
Despite its economic potential, its military was still considerably small and
needed to be built up. It was “undermanned, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped.”
The military budget only constituted 2% of the nation’s total budget for 1952. CIA
analysts were concerned about this because, despite their weakness, they had
“considerable military potential.” They had proved themselves worthy of Western
support during WWII and continued to be helpful to the West by sending what they could
to the Middle East to support the British in their affairs there and to Korea to support the
war. The CIA saw enormous potential in their naval, air, and port facilities, which would
“be of considerable value in event of general war, as in World War II, especially if the
Suez Canal were denied the West.” The bases could be utilized for ship and aircraft
maintenance in route to conflict. In addition, the staging and deployment of submarines
from South Africa could be crucial during wartime.40
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The 1952 CIA report did discuss the potential for a communist invasion via antiapartheid forces. It puts a little bit more urgency on the threat of communism in the form
of non-white leadership, but it did not feel that it was an imminent threat. “Though
Communist progress will not be swift among the mass of the Natives, the Communists
may have greater success in acquiring positions of leadership among the Native
organizations.” The reason for its slow encroachment was that there was a lack of
organizers, distrust of communist leaders by the masses, and an absence of organized
tactics by the international community for successful intervention.41
All three CIA reports mentioned have two things in common. They all mention
the strategic importance of South Africa in the context of war, should there be another
World War, which has already been demonstrated. They also all mention the concern for
potential embarrassment against the U.S. given the growth of apartheid and their reliance
on the government at the same time. The blooming nature of apartheid did happen to
correspond to the gradual reliance of the west on South Africa for military and economic
needs.
The 1948 elections in South Africa were pivotal. With the election of Malan, the
National Party took control and kept its tight grip on it until 1994. The National Party
was the major proponent of the installation of apartheid for economic and political
control by the white minority population.42 With the National Party came swift and
fierce implementation of apartheid. In 1949, they passed the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act of 1949, which is self-explanatory. In 1950, they passed the Group Areas
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Act, which confined people of different races to segregated areas and would act as the
predecessor to the Bantustans. This law saw the increase in humiliation of the non-white
population by enforcing such acts as the “pencil in the hair” test which deemed how
African an individual was and consequently where they should live.43 In 1953, the Bantu
Education Act was passed, which brought school education and teacher training under
control of the Department of Native Affairs. Prior to this, schools had been run by
church and mission programs. Now, the state controlled education, which meant that the
non-white population saw their level of education plummet. By 1970, 34.8% of urban
Africans and 63.4% of rural Africans had no education.44
The racial policies of apartheid came to head via the Sharpeville Massacre on
March 21, 1960. By 1960, the white population owned 88% of the land, despite only
constituting 15% of the population.45 Sharpeville was essentially a peaceful protest
against stringent pass laws that kept the non-white population confined to certain types of
jobs for limited wages based on the Bantustan they lived in. Essentially, they could not
get a job without a pass. They could not get a pass without living in a Bantustan. They
could not live in a Bantustan without permission from the government. They were forced
to move onto Bantustans in order to get jobs. At the protest, the South African police
opened fired and killed 69 people. The government also responded by banning the ANC
and PAC. The West was disturbed by the media images that came out of this incident
and responded. In April 1960, the U.S. Executive branch moved to put apartheid
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permanently on the Security Council’s agenda. They also set up a selective arms
embargo.46 Despite the arms embargo and being under constant scrutiny for its domestic
policies, the National Party continued its brutal enforcement of apartheid. Between 19601980, the black population living on Bantustans grew from 39.8% to 53.1%.
Consequently, there was also a sharp increase in the number of black South Africans
living in shanytowns, an equivalent to Hoovervilles during the Depression.47
It is questionable as to why the U.S. was motivated to implement an arms
embargo, which would then by followed by a UN-wide embargo. In 1960 a rash of new
African states joined the UN.48 Did the U.S. support an arms embargo because it morally
opposed the massacre of 69 people at Sharpeville? Or, did they want to appeal to the
newly formed/ future independent states of Africa? J.E. Spence argues that the U.S.
supported an arms embargo to keep the Soviets from capitalizing on its anti-colonial
image in the UN and prevent the advancement of a Soviet- Third World alliance within
the General Assembly.49 This may be true, but the reality was that South Africa carried a
significant amount of importance economically and militarily and could potentially overpower any of the newly formed states in southern Africa. This could explain why South
Africa recovered very quickly economically and politically from Sharpeville. In the
1960s, it saw a 6% growth economically thanks for foreign investment largely from the
west.50
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Cuba in Africa:
In 1960, sixteen European colonies- French, British, and Belgian- all gained
independence in Africa. The U.S. State Department’s and Executive branch’s response,
according to Piero Gliejeses, was to see Africa as the next “battleground.” More
specifically, it feared the new countries’ immaturity and resentment towards the west,
which would then offer opportunities for political, economic, and military penetration by
the east.51 But, the reality was that the U.S. could, and did, offer a significant amount of
reliable economic aid. Little did they know that the most direct challenge to their
authority in sub-Saharan Africa would come not from the Soviets or the Chinese, but
Cuba.
In 1961, Khrushchev and the KGB approved a new and aggressive campaign to
revamp their global strategy pertaining to the so-called Third World. Rather than
focusing on the newly independent African states, they chose to focus on Latin America.
The Cubans configured their own revolutionary policy targeting Africa. Che Guevara
was “convinced that sub-Saharan Africa was ‘imperialism’s weakest link.’”52 Whereas
the Soviet relationships with new African leaders in places such as Algeria and Ghana
remained weak, the Cubans sought to create a sustainable relationship.53 For example, in
1963, Castro sent a group of 29 doctors, three dentists, fifteen nurses, and eight medical
technicians to Algeria.54 This would be the first of multiple trips that happened
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throughout the 1960s.55 In addition to medical aid, the Cubans also gave Algeria military
aid, which would be repeated in other countries throughout Africa. Congo and GuineaBissau would also benefit from this aid.56
One of the biggest areas of concern for the U.S. was Zanzibar. In 1962, Cuba
paid for eleven Zanzibaris to travel and train in Cuba. They returned in 1963 to Zanzibar.
The U.S. was very fearful that Cubans were trying to turn Zanzibar into a communist
state. Being that they had little intelligence available from the country, the U.S. feared
the worst, which included that they could serve as a base for insurgency operations from
Kenya to the Cape, all of which was friendly towards to the U.S. It would also serve as a
propagated example of what a successful African socialist state could look like. If the
Cubans were successful there, there was no telling how far the ripples of success would
travel in Africa. However, the reality was that Cuba was never able to spark any sort of a
revolution and the State Department concluded that there was no Cuban influence in
Zanzibar. In fact, by February 1963, Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika, a non-communist
state, to create Tanzania.57
The Congo (formerly known as Zaire) would be the next unstable country that
was cause for concern by the U.S. State Department. The Congo had been of high
interest to the U.S. for material reasons- namely that the Congo had uranium for nuclear
bombs and the U.S. wanted it.58 Belgium, the Congo’s former colonial power, lost their
control of the Congo when a referendum was held in June 1960 for independence. The
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Belgians tried to maintain their control over the armed forces and mineral resources,
much to the dismay of the new government of Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba wanted the
wealth to benefit the Congolese. U.S., British, and Belgian investors were all very
worried. Thus, the Belgian government created a crisis in the Katanga region of the
Congo. Lumumba asked the UN for help to keep the Katanga region from deteriorating
into warfare. The UN relented, possibly because of U.S. interests being at stake. The
U.S. then became intertwined by supporting Joseph Mobutu in an effort to “stabilize” the
country and thus, played a significant role in the downfall and assassination of
Lumumba.59 Che watched the U.S.’s reaction and decided that they should intervene
militarily. He assembled a squadron of 113 black Cubans to fight in the Congo.60 After
seven months of fighting and training in the Congo, Che finally realized that they could
not make significant progress toward a general revolution and they withdrew, but not
before causing alarm to the U.S. about the spreading Cuban influence in sub-Saharan
Africa.61
The Cubans were not finished after their failure in the Congo. Cuba found
relative success in Guinea-Bissau, a Portuguese colony that was fighting for
independence. While the country had hostility among its ethnic groups, they remained
united in fighting against the 20,000 Portuguese soldiers. They called the Castro
government for assistance and it answered.62 By 1967, Cuba had inserted nearly 60
doctors and military advisers. They also provided military aid. Guinea-Bissau benefitted
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greatly from the strategic disbursement of aid, knowledge, and medical care.63 By 1973,
Portugal had left Guinea-Bissau and independence had been declared. However, there is
evidence that from 1966-1972, the Soviets had also given Guinea-Bissau aid in the fight
against the Portugal empire. The question is, to what extent did Cuba act independently
or did they spark fires that the Soviets needed to tend to. While there is little evidence
that directly speaks to it, it was probably a joint effort begun by the Cubans and
completed by the Soviets, not to be outdone by their revolutionary brethren.64
The longest Cuban intervention would take place in Angola; however this
happened in the mid- to late- 1970s, outside the immediate scope of this thesis. With that
being said, the U.S. did know about Cuban intervention, albeit on a relatively small scale,
throughout Africa. Castro’s pattern of intervention did start in north Africa and
ultimately would work its way down to southern Africa, which was concerning to the
U.S. The South African government, a steady ally of the U.S., became that much more
likely because of such interventions that were largely driven by the Cubans, but partially
aided, in some instances, by the Soviets.

The Global Cold War in South Africa:
The 1960s was a volatile decade for South Africa. To contextualize, Britain
began to transfer power to African nationalists in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and
Gambia in 1957. In 1960, France gave up control over their colonies in west and central
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Africa. Also, Belgium withdrew from Congo (Zaire).65 In South Africa, the decade
opened with the Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960 in which 69 people were killed
in a peaceful protest against pass books. This stemmed from the harsh pass laws that
were passed by Hendrik Verwoerd’s National Party. He resumed the 1930s pro-racist
reconstruction world view and intensified racist policy by moving the black majority onto
Bantustans and regulate them using pass books, a major source of insult and contention
for black South Africans.66
In addition to passing even more pass laws and Bantustan regulations, the whiteminority South African government banned the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and
Pan-African Congress (PAC). The Executive and Legislative branches reacted to this
with some level of shock, agreeing to place apartheid permanently on the UN Security
Council’s agenda. Kennedy also set up a highly selective arms embargo one full year
prior to the UN.67 By 1961, the ANC, PAC, and South African Communist Party
(SACP) all began to use violence when attacking apartheid which diverted dramatically
from the highly encouraged use of non-violent acts by these groups to fight pass laws.68
This uptick in violence of course resulted in even more laws passed by the South African
government, including allowing for repetitive detentions of up to 90 days without trial
(General Law Amendment of No. 76 of 1962). By 1967, laws were passed that allowed
detention without trial for indefinite amounts of time.69
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To keep the U.S. and western Europe off their proverbial backs, the South African
government chalked up the violence used by the ANC, PAC, and SACP to the influence
of the Soviets. The South African government took steps to portray itself as a stable,
civilized, and indispensable member of the west and that tolerance needed to be afforded
towards them for taking preventative steps to maintain control particularly among the
population that was heavily influenced by such groups.70 How influential were the
Soviets in South Africa?
Many historians feel that the reality of the threat was minimal at best. John
Daniel argued that they had very little influence in the region, stating that even though the
“Cold War paradigm was a myth,” this did not mean that National Party leaders like
Botha and Malan did not sincerely believe that they were fighting on behalf of western
countries’ interests.71 This is not to say that the South African government did not have a
legitimate fear of the Soviets filling in a void that was left by the crumbling colonial
system, especially with Portugal losing their African footing in 1974, thus completely
eliminating the geographical buffer the South African government felt between
themselves and African states not associated with a western colonial power of some sort.
Leonard Thompson agrees with Damiel, arguing that even though the Soviets did dabble
in Africa, giving them weapons through East Germany to the resistance movements in
Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, the Soviets were far less menacing then the
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possibility of a black majority deciding to openly revolt against a very small white
minority in South Africa.72
This is not to say that there was no connection between the Soviets and the ANC,
PAC, and SACP. There was definitely a connection between the two, but it was not
nearly as extensive as the South African government would have had the U.S.
government believe. There were a few connections between sub-Saharan Africa and the
early Soviet Union as far back as 1921 when the Communist Party of South Africa
(CPSA) had representation in Cominterm, later replaced by Cominform after WWII.73 In
the 1960s, with African nations beginning to claim independence and newly formed
political contingencies voicing their desire to build their societies around socialist ideals,
Khrushchev responded with enthusiasm.74 Khrushchev in general was far more
interested than his predecessors in Africa. In the summer of 1960, Khrushchev attended
the UN to welcome the sixteen newly admitted African states. He liked the idea of the
anti-imperialist fire of the first generation of African leaders and wanted to capitalize on
it.75
Depending on the historian studied, there are a variety of views on the level of
importance and aid the ANC and SACP received from the Soviets. Vladimir Shubin,
author of The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa, argued that Moscow
heavily influenced the ANC and ultimately were responsible for aiding their struggle and
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keeping the groups afloat, particularly after the Sharpeville Massacre. He wrote that the
ANC and SACP got a significant amount of guerilla training from Moscow and that the
training was conducted in Minsk and Belarus. In addition, they requested weapons and
received them via Dar es Salaam and Maputo drop points.76 Christopher Andrew and
Vasili Mitrokhin, authors of The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle
For the Third World argued a different point. They said that South Africa was the only
KGB success story in sub-Saharan Africa but only because of the connections the SACP
kept open with the ANC and PAC. In addition, although Shubin leaned this way,
Andrew and Mitrokhin argued that the ANC was “never really a full Communist puppet,
but it was heavily sustained by the Soviet support and KGB back channels.”77
What did aid from the USSR look like? In the 1960s, the USSR did begin to give
assistance to the ANC and SACP. Much of the aid was awarded to the Umkhonto we
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), or the armed wing of the ANC and SACP. In 1963, the
ANC got $300,000 in aid from Moscow, while the SACP got an addition $56,000.78 One
of the reasons for this discrepancy in dollar amount between the groups is because the
SACP at this point operated out of London, whereas the ANC had just moved to
neighboring countries around South Africa and launched raids from outside borders. As
for the guerilla training that the ANC and SACP granted, it was reported that the Soviets
had been sent to ANC camps in Tanzania and Zambia in 1964; however, there is little
information to support this, according to Shubin. He argued that it was not until 1979
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that the Soviet instructors began to show up in ANC camps.79 However, from 19631991, over 1500 ANC activists did get trained in Soviet military institutions.80

Operation Mayibuye:
The early 1960s saw a shift in the ANC from violence to non-violence. Of
particular concern to the ANC was the Sharpeville Massacre. After the massacre, there
was a conscience decision among the leadership of the ANC to begin using underground
subversive tactics to make violent in-roads on the fight against apartheid. Thus, the
Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as MK) was formed on December 16, 1961.
Between 1961-1963, the MK undertook over 200 operations designed to damage public
facilities.81
The most ambitious plans laid out by the MK was Operation Mayibuye (see
Appendix B for the full text of Operation Mayibuye). This was a six-page detailed plan
that described how the MK might spark a mass armed uprising against the apartheid
government. The plan was discovered during a raid of Arthur Goldreich’s farm, known
as Lilliesleaf. During the raid on July 11, 1963, South African authorities found a
hundreds of ANC documents, along with 16 major ANC leaders such as Goldreich,
Walter Sisulu, and Govan Mbeki.82 These arrests ultimately led to the infamous Rivonia
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Trials where the ANC’s top leaders were tried and placed in jail for several decades prior
to the crumbling of apartheid in the 1990s.
Operation Mayibuye, while allegedly never adopted by the ANC and the MK, laid
out detailed plans for how to spark a mass uprising. Nelson Mandela, who was arrested
prior to the Lilliesleaf raid, said that the plan was “entirely unrealistic in its goals and
plans.” The plan specifically declared areas that would be targeted, such as Port
Elizabeth, Port Sephstone, North Western Transvaal, and North Western Cape. It called
for coordinated landings of four groups of 30 by ship and air to the designated areas.
These groups would then work methodically to arm local populations that would become
the core of future guerilla units. After arming the people, they would pre-select targets
that, if they were attacked, would create mass chaos and confusion, thus hoping to incite
more people to join the rebellion.83
In addition to the military plans of Operation Mayibuye, a massive propaganda
campaign would be launched domestically and internationally to garner more support for
the operation. Their means of communication would be via radio transmission to reach
“the world and to the people of South Africa.” The MK felt that once the rebellion was
in full swing, they would need coordination of international support to deal the final blow
to the fastidious apartheid regime.84
In looking at the document, there were clearly holes in their plan, or at least
elements that were not addressed on paper. For example, there was no mention of where
they would get weapons from. It could be inferred from Goldreich’s history that they
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may have received weapons from China, East Germany, and the Soviet Union, as he
traveled to these places prior to the raid. But, it is unclear if he got weapons or a
significant amount of aid from any of these countries.85 In addition, they never
specifically named outside countries that would have provided aid to them in the larger
forums, such as the United Nations. In fact, the only other country that was named
specifically was Castro’s Cuba, but only as an example of a successful uprising.86
Glenn Frankel, author of Rivonia’s Children: Three Families and the Cost of
Conscience in White South Africa, stated the obvious about how overwhelming and
unrealistic the plan was. The plan called for 210,000 hand grenades, 48,000
antipersonnel mines, 144 tons of ammonium nitrate, 21.6 tons of aluminum powder, 15
tons of black powder, 1,500 bomb timing devices, 48,000 batteries, 260,000 detonators,
and numerous types of machine tools with a knowledgeable workforce of 200 men to
work with the machines and the materials.87 In addition to the sheer impossibility of the
tactical side, there was a rift among the ANC and MK leadership about how realistic the
plan was, with men like Goldreich and Joe Slovo arguing that it was possible, while
Walter Sisulu and others liked the plan but felt it was impossible given the current
political climate.88
Whether or not Operation Mayibuye was on the U.S.’s radar screen while they
were making foreign policy and economic decisions concerning South Africa is unclear.
It does not appear in any documents that were available to my research, such as the
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Foreign Relations collection. However, they must have known about it because it was a
topic for discussion at the Rivonia Trials and weighed heavily in determining how the
ANC leaders captured in the Lilliesleaf raid should be punished.89 The operation must
not have been enough of a threat to garner an immediate reaction from the U.S. in the
form of recanting the arms embargo or retracting negative statements made about
apartheid on the record.

Communism, South Africa, and the U.S.:
There was some level of concern in both the State Department and Joint Chiefs of
Staff that communism was a legitimate threat. In 1964, National Security Action
Memorandum No. 295 was drafted, in which the United States proposed to take a tougher
stance on the National Party’s racial policies by threatening to pull the satellite and
missile tracking stations, suspending loans and monetary aid, and reviewing the selling of
weapons and submarines to the South African government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
were largely unhappy with these recommendations by the State Department. Max Taylor
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed his concerns to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, saying:
For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their views that the objectives
of the United States toward South Africa should include its alignment with the
Western Powers and the continuance of existing deep-space and tracking facilities
in South Africa. As long as communist penetration and racial discord in Africa
remain an active threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is
desirable and the United States should do everything that its political and moral
position permits to contribute to this.90
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Clearly, not everyone was on board in believing that communism was not a threat and
therefore that the relationship with the South African government was far more valuable
than the fall out of associating with apartheid openly.
It should be noted that shortly after the Independence incident, South African
industrialist Harry Oppenheimer, a liberal South African whose views starkly contrasted
Verwoerd’s racial policy, came to visit the United States in an effort to maintain U.S.South African relations, particularly when it came to private business. In a memorandum
for the President’s Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy and Ulric Haynes of the NSC to
Johnson, Bundy and Haynes specifically stressed how concerned they were by the
increasing mandates the South African government were taking in restricting racially
integrated actions, such as inter-racial Embassy gatherings or inter-racial crews from the
U.S. working at bases in South Africa. It was this type of attitude that was deemed more
risky by Bundy and Haynes to pave an avenue for Soviet penetration than anything else:
We are in turn deeply concerned about the accelerating trend toward Governmentsanctioned racial discrimination ("apartheid") and extreme political repression in
South Africa. "Apartheid" in particular is a major handicap to the Free World in
its efforts to stabilize the political situation in Africa and keep the Chicoms and
Soviets out… The gut problem in our relations with South Africa is that the
policies of the Verwoerd government are driving the rest of the world into a kind
of opposition which in turn will probably only make the South Africans more
bitter and determined.91
The government could have been more concerned with the connections between the
ANC, PAC, and SACP with the Soviets, but the alienation afforded by the National Party
was far more of a threat in this department.
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It would be presumptuous to assume the global Cold War cast a distinct shadow
on U.S.-South African relations during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, while there
were ties between groups like the ANC, PAC, and SACP with the Soviet Union, China,
and East Germany, it was not enough of a threat for the U.S. to react as strongly as they
did in such circumstances as Greece, Turkey, Cuba, and Guatemala. Thus, when looking
at the decisions made by the Executive branch and military leaders of the U.S. during this
era, historians must explore the issues that challenged U.S.- South African relations
during the global Cold War, such as the NASA tracking stations, port usage, and arms
embargoes, beyond traditional ideological parameters. U.S. foreign policy towards South
Africa was more complex than keeping the Soviets at bay within that country and region.
The following three events illustrate the argument calling for greater
differentiation made on the previous pages. They are ship docking procedure, satellite
tracking stations, and the rivalry with Charles de Gaulle in the South African arms
market.
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Chapter Two: USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt
A string of incidents that involved United States naval fleet docking at various
ports in South Africa illustrates the cross-roads of civil rights, national policy making,
and the global Cold War in South Africa. It is significant not because it illustrates
another example of east battling west; rather, it suggests a vacancy of the concern of the
Soviets by the U.S. More importantly, it establishes the significance of the availability to
ports technologically advanced enough that the U.S. could use during the global Cold
War to house and fix ships that were passing through.
The context of this time period is important to note, particularly before looking at
the particulars of the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt incident. The 1960s ushered in major
conflict on the domestic U.S. scene, namely that of the black civil rights movement and
the Vietnam War. Executive and Legislative branch decisions became increasingly
scrutinized by the U.S. public throughout the 1960s with relation to the civil rights
movement and the Vietnam War. Relations with the South African government were
unique in that respect because it tied together two major issues that dominated the media,
particularly in the late- 1960s.
Political decisions about apartheid South Africa were being made in a country that
was in the throes of racist Jim Crow laws. Washington D.C. itself had a strong Jim Crow
tradition. In fact, African officials of newly independent African countries were very
concerned to be posted as ambassadors in the U.S. and much preferred to be located in
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Europe. Washington was surrounded by segregationist states, such as Delaware,
Maryland, and Virginia.92
President John F. Kennedy was motivated to encourage the passing of a Civil
Rights bill for a multitude of reasons. One of the major benefits of passing such a law
was that he knew he would improve relations with African delegates if he could show his
commitment to decreasing segregation within the U.S.93 Thomas Borstelmann argued the
significance of improving race relations within U.S. borders:
In the southern parts of North America and Africa, racial polarization threatened
to destroy the multiracial unity that the Kennedy administration believed crucial
for its own political success at home and for American victory in the anti-Soviet
struggle abroad.94
The reality was that the Kennedy administration became more sympathetic towards with
apartheid rule in South Africa, despite the arms embargo that will be discussed in chapter
four, while getting tougher on segregationist governors in states like Alabama and
Mississippi.95
It would not be until President Lyndon B. Johnson was in power that the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 1965 were passed, leading the way to
more integration and rights for the black community in the United States. Between 19641968, the height of the death rattle of Jim Crow laws directly collided with the Vietnam
War, where military recruits were proportionally higher among black than whites. Civil
rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. saw major contradictions in demanding the
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U.S. government for black Americans to fight for the preservation of U.S. freedoms at
home, despite not being allowed those freedoms themselves. While there was major
rioting in response to the Civil Rights Acts in 175 U.S. cities in 1967, black American
soldiers were immersed in guerilla warfare thousands of miles away in Vietnam. In the
words of one anonymous solider, “‘How is it possible that all these people could be so
ungrateful to me after I had given them so much?’”96
When the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt went to dock in South Africa, a trifecta
of issues that had largely been buried by the media’s coverage of the Vietnam War
consolidated. U.S. policy towards South Africa became front-page news in February
1967 because of a ship carrying black soldiers during a politically contested war.
Unwanted exposure about U.S. relations with South Africa was revealed for all to see.

The Incident:
On February 2, 1967, the New York Times began to carry headlines featuring the
possibility of the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt docking in South Africa. On board,
there were an estimated 100-300 black servicemen among the 3,500 total enlisted men.
They were returning from Vietnam and expected to get leave in South Africa upon
docking. As reported, civil rights leaders were immediately concerned about the
implication of leave for the black soldiers. The NAACP sent a telegram to Washington
urging them to reconsider docking the ship in Cape Town. The ship was due into the port
February 4, 1967.97 However, this issue did not begin on February 2, 1967; rather, it
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started with the issue of the docking of the USS Independence in 1965 when there was a
brief diplomatic skirmish between the U.S. and the South African government about
leave rights for black servicemen who were docking in South Africa.
In May 1965, the USS Independence asked permission for planes from the carrier
to land at South African airports, a rather routine request. In an unusual twist, the South
African government, led by Hendrik F. Verwoerd, agreed, but there were stipulations: the
planes’ crews had to be white. In the past, black crewmen had been seen landing and
docking both at airports and naval ports. The U.S. inquired further- was this a suggestion
or a condition? The Verwoerd government did not clarify. In June 1965, Verwoerd took
this request a step further and demanded that no black U.S. workers were to be permitted
to work on NASA satellite tracking stations in South Africa (this issue will be addressed
in chapter three).98 Verwoerd clearly took a tough line against the U.S. nonsegregationist policy by banning (officially or unofficially) mixed race crews from using
ports or working within the borders of South Africa. In addition, Verwoerd scolded U.S.
embassies for holding multi-racial functions within South Africa, something that would
obviously be unacceptable in an apartheid state. In a memorandum from the NSC to
Johnson, they said:
Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it
essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic
policy. Failure to do so if this issue becomes widely publicized would alienate
members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church
groups, and liberals in general.99
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The NSC essentially warned Johnson of the dangers of making decisions that, while
internationally may have made sense, would have been destructive to his image
domestically.
The Independence incident set a precedent of caution by the U.S. Executive
branch in the use of South African ports because Johnson feared a backlash from the U.S.
public by being viewed as condoning the policies of apartheid, while a race war was
raging inside U.S.’s borders. Essentially, it became frowned upon for the U.S. military to
use South African ports, but that is not to say that ports were not being used between
1965 and 1967. There were at least four visits made by major U.S. ships, including the
Valdez in Cape Town from December 13, 1966- January 2, 1967, the Coastal Crusader
in Durban from October 25- November 29, 1967, the Sword Knot at various dates in
1966-1967 in Cape Town, and the Twin Falls during various dates in 1966-1967 at Cape
Town and Port Elizabeth. Granted, most of these ships were contracted out and/or had
few military personnel on board, but they still used the ports, despite the Independence
“policy.”100
The Independence policy set a precedent for the U.S. Executive branch and
military to follow when determining whether or not it was appropriate for the aircraft
carrier USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt to dock in Cape Town, and if it were to dock, if
they would allow leave for their soldiers, despite having black servicemen on board. The
State Department knew that the landing of the Roosevelt at Cape Town would be an
issue. In June 1967, there was a choice to permit the Roosevelt to dock in Cape Town or
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to fuel it from an oiler in the sea and have shore leave at Rio de Janeiro. A third option
was to refuel in Malagasy, but this would cost an additional $100,000- 200,000. Johnson
preferred to go via Rio, but Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze said that Cape Town was
the preferable route.101 They went with Nitze’s recommendations.
It is not clear when the civil rights community discovered or were told that the
Roosevelt would dock in Cape Town, but the reaction was simple, strong, and united. On
January 30, 1967, Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, and Theodore E. Brown, leaders in
the civil rights community, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and stated, in addition
to the violation of the precedent set by the Independence incident and past policies
towards apartheid, “Such a visit will [be] an insult to American Negroes, to the black
people of Africa and to democratic [men] through the world dedicated to the elimination
of apartheid.”102 The initial response by the Secretary’s office was that of acceptance of
the Roosevelt docking at Cape Town. They claimed that the Independence incident was
isolated and that since then, the U.S. had used South African ports routinely and even
allowed leave for mixed racial crews. In addition, to deny the crew of the Roosevelt
leave would be inhumane: “We deplore apartheid policy but cannot ignore the
importance of shore leave for humanitarian and morale purposes.”103 The Secretary of
State surprisingly admitted the use of ports since the Independence incident and went on
to support the need for leave for the ship’s crew. This view would change very quickly
over the next few days prior to February 4, 1967, when the ship was scheduled to dock.
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When the news broke in the newspapers on February 2, 1967, naval authorities
stuck to their rationale of allowing shore leave for morale and operational reasons. The
men aboard the ship were coming home from Vietnam after having 95 days without any
sort of a break. Cape Town was exactly halfway from Subic Bay in the Philippines to
Mayport, near Jackson, Florida. Thus, the port served as a great place for leave and an
important spot for refueling prior to embarking on the last 7,000 miles. The ports were
equipped with the capability to fix ships should they need any repairs. They also denied
that allowing the leave and port visit was violating some sort of Navy policy that
required, or strongly urged, ships to avoid South African ports.104
Despite this rationale, many members of Congress protested the decision. The
New York Times reported that 40 members of Congress complained to Johnson that, “a
visit would condone South Africa’s policy of apartheid.” They also pointed out that the
Independence incident did not merely produce a loose policy to abide by when possible,
but that in 1965, G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, made it clear that all future naval stops at South African ports should be
canceled. More moderate Congressmen suggested that the State Department should still
allow leave, but make it clear that the U.S. still heavily condoned the use of apartheid.
The result of such Congressional discussions was that Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus
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R. Vance and Secretary of the Navy Nitze announced that sailors would be granted
“‘modified shore leave in connection with integrated activity only.’”105
The U.S. State and Defense Departments were not only being pressured by civil
rights leaders and moderate and liberal Congressmen, but they were receiving a fair
amount of criticism from South African press. The incident was portrayed in a variety of
ways in the press prior to the ship landing at the port. The most alarming to the State
Department was the message in pro-Nationalist paper Die Burger, which stated in
columns and editorials that this was an attempt by the U.S. to isolate South Africa from
the international community, and that the South African government must not succumb to
pressure to respond to the taunting by the American Naval and State Departments.106 The
ports in South Africa were clearly important to the U.S. Navy; thus, bad press by the
South Africans would not help enable open access to them.
By February 4, the State Department issued a declaration suspending the leave of
any soldiers from the Roosevelt. The Ambassador of South Africa, William M. Rountree,
reported to the Secretary of State’s office in Washington that:
As result painstaking review alternatives with Captain [William G.] O’Neill and
Executive Officer FDR and senior members my staff, we have reached reluctant
conclusion that only adjustment in fairness to all concerned which can be made to
comply with instructions REFTEL is cancel all liberty….
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It is unclear if this decision was made by Rountree and the captain of the Roosevelt or by
the State Department. Furthermore, Rountree reported on press release alerting the
international community of the decision:
The American Ambassador, Mr. William M. Rountree and Captain William G.
O’Neill, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, wish to
thank the South African authorities and public for their great generosity in
offering hospitality to the personnel of the carrier visiting Cape Town. Because
of difficulties in organizing leave arrangements, it will not be possible for these
kind offers to be accepted. The carrier will remain in Cape Town for refueling
and provisioning as scheduled. The public is cordially invited to visit the ship
during the scheduled hours.
Ultimately, it was decided that integrated visits aboard the ship would be allowed, in
addition to trying to salvage as many of the off-shore activities so long as they could be
accommodated on board. Rountree stated that the Captain was very persuasive in
arguing against shore leave when he said that the impact of off-shore leave and being
exposed to apartheid on the 10% non-white soldiers would not be worth the negative
press that would most likely come with canceling activities planned by South African
hosts.107 The press release was a polite decline designed to keep the U.S. Executive
branch in favor with the South African government and to lessen the blow that could be
delivered by the South African government. But, it also took as step towards merting the
needs of civil rights leaders and the vocal Congressmen upset by the docking of the
Roosevelt in Cape Town.
The details of the leave were not released to the public, though if it had been, it
would have cut down on some of the criticism that was delivered by domestic and
international press. The Navy did not solicit offers for shore leave activities, rather they
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were deluged with numerous offers from the South African government and private
individuals and groups. The program for leave was planned on the eve of the visit and
consisted of mostly integrated activities, such as church services, shopping, cable car
rides, and bus tours. However, there were a few segregated events, including offers of
home stays and private dances. On February 3, Captain O’Neill received the Naval order
that ALL activities must be integrated. Given that they were to dock in only a matter of
hours, the Captain at that point decided that no leave should be granted because it would
be impossible to sort through all of the activities and keep only the integrated ones
available to soldiers. Also, logistical concerns, such as the use of segregated bathrooms
during bus tours and shipping, would have broken the official orders given by the Navy.
Thus, according to the State Department, the Captain made the best call he could, given
his extremely limited time constraints.108
Prime Minister John Vorster, who replaced Verwoerd after he was assassinated in
1966 by a mentally ill person with no political motivations, did not wait long to make a
reply to the seemingly diplomatic move by the U.S. Navy and State Department.109 He
thanked South Africans that offered their homes and hospitality to the soldiers for their
good will. He apologized to them for putting in the time, money, and planning to provide
a welcoming stay in their communities and homes. In addition, he clarified that at no
time did the South African government ever put stipulations on the leave of the interracial crew. Furthermore, Vorster expressed his surprise at the sudden decision of the
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U.S. Navy to cancel the leave after plans and discussions had been made and agreed upon
by both South African and U.S. parties.110 Vorster may have been more upset about
being notified of the cancelation of the leave through a general press statement, rather
than personally, than by the actual cancelation of the leave.
The cancelation of leave and Vorster’s response made for sensational press in
South Africa on February 5, 1967, with South African papers claiming that upset citizens
went on board demanding answers from the ship’s crew and captain and that the ship’s
crew was visibly grumpy at not having leave. The Nationalist Die Beeld reported that all
of South Africa had hoped this visit would usher in a new era of more amicable relations
between the two countries. Despite these headlines, the embassy in Cape Town reported,
“Despite sharply critical nature of much of official and press reaction, public interest and
goodwill remain high as evidence of tremendous turnout for public visiting today.”111
U.S. papers, including the New York Times and Washington Post, also looked at
this event critically.112 On February 5, the New York Times published a “carefully
worded” editorial, as the U.S. embassy in Cape Town would say, that looked at the
impact of the docking of the ship domestically and internationally. The first paragraph
stated:
With the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt in Capetown, many South Africans, black
and white, will conclude that they need not take seriously the official United
States opposition to their Government’s racial policies and its defiance of the
United Nations on South West Africa.
110

National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “Prime Minister’s Statement on
FDR,”Def 7 SAFR-US, 4 February 1967.
111
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “FDR Call,”Def 7 SAFR-US, 5
February 1967.
112
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “FDR Call,”Def 7 SAFR-US, 6
February 1967.

54

In addition, it claimed that the Department of Defense had “managed once again to
interfere in the conduct of American diplomacy and create the impression that one branch
of government is ignorant of or indifferent to the policies of another.” The editorial
lobbed the idea that the Navy should have known better than to even risk exposing the
3,800 person crew to the ugliness of apartheid, despite promises of fully integrated
activities, especially with Nitze at the helm of the Navy, considering that he was once
chief of the State Department policy planning and should have been able to recognize
potential policy pitfalls.113
The London Times was very critical of the events surrounding the cancelation of
leave, more so than the New York Times, pointing out anomalies that U.S. papers missed
in assessing the situation. Why did the carrier need to go past the Cape? The article
suggested that sailing past the Cape of Good Hope was hardly routine upon returning
from Vietnam to North America. Also, why did the Navy potentially plan to subject a
large amount of servicemen to the realities of apartheid by attempting to plan integrated
and equal activities for all crew in Cape Town? The article then turned to the
significance of the event, specifically pointing out that the U.S. diplomatic attitude
towards South Africa was unsteady and unpredictable at best. In relation to England’s
policy towards South African, the article suggested strongly that the decision to use South
African ports undermined their own attempt to oppose the Nationalist regime and its use
of apartheid through diplomatic means.114 This newspaper article raised questions that
major papers in the U.S. failed to consider, such as why the route past the Cape was
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selected. However, this article’s coverage is subject to similar shortfalls as the New York
Times because they failed to mention key glitches in their criticisms, such as the fact that
England was selling the government of South Africa serious weapons.
To further this negative depiction of the incident, The Times reported that the
picture on board the ship was not as civil and pleasant as Rountree would like to have
reported. “While nearly 4,000 angry members of the crew are confined to their ship in
one the world’s most hospitable ports… a bitter quarrel has broken out between the South
Africans and American governments over what it had been hoped would be a good-will
visit.”115 In addition, The Times reported that signs posted by the servicemen indicated
that they heavily regretted not being able to disembark and spend time in the South
African communities which suggested “that they disagreed with Washington orders that
made leave impossible.”116
This was somewhat of a different picture than what the New York Times reported.
The New York Times did highlight the disgruntled nature of soldiers, even pointing out
that black servicemen wanted to see what apartheid was like for themselves; however,
short of the editorial on February 5, they hardly delved into the larger implications of this
event on South African-U.S. relations. They depicted a mutual disgruntlement of soldiers
and visitors alike that was not directed specifically at either of the two governments, but
rather at “politics in general.” However, they did ponder what this meant on South
African-U.S. relations, especially given headlines from South African newspapers such
as Die Beeld, which stated, “South Africa’s hand of friendship, which was given to the
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United States this weekend… has been suddenly and rudely knocked aside.”117 Given
that embassy records show significant concerns about media coverage of the event, the
U.S. government was concerned about the image being created of them by this incident.
On February 9, 1967, a particularly lengthy Department of State airgram from the
Cape Town Embassy to the State Department was sent depicting a news story from
February 6. Whereas other airgrams and telegrams being exchanged between the two
State Department groups were short summaries of news stories from around the world,
this one focused at length on a South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) story that
criticized U.S. policy choices. On SABC’s “Current Affairs,” it was alleged that because
the visit was originally orchestrated by the Department of Defense and canceled so
abruptly by the State Department, one could have concluded that “liberals” like UN
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) were behind the
change of plans. More significantly, the SABC imposed the idea that apartheid was a
“mutually accepted fact” and that people like Goldberg, who visited South Africa in 1966
and appealed to U.S. businesses to uproot themselves from South Africa in a show of
solidarity against apartheid, were turning the U.S. government into hypocrites who could
not be trusted or relied upon. The reversed decision of allowing leave was a sign of the
times- U.S. policy was surely changing towards South Africa, said the SABC.
Furthermore, the “Current Affairs” piece depicted the Department of Defense and private
U.S. business as the good guys, whereas the State Department was clearly painted as the
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“villain” in this situation.118 This negative press may have been cause for concern among
the State Department that there was clearly a depiction of them as being disjointed from
the other departments in government and that their move was unilateral, despite evidence
to the contrary.
Ultimately, on February 7, 1967, the Roosevelt left for Florida, leaving in its wake
more questions than answers about its impact on foreign policy, the potential fall-out
between South African- U.S. relations, particularly among the Executive branch and
military co-operation, and the future use of South African ports, airports, and satellite
tracking stations by the United States. Essentially what could have been a minor bump
for U.S. diplomacy among the Executive branch and the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned into
a jumble of national civil rights issues crossed with global Cold War concerns and mixed
with economic questions.

Implications of the Roosevelt Visit:
After the Roosevelt docking, months were spent in the State Department,
Congress, and the Department of Defense discussing what to do. Before looking at their
reactions, it is important to contextually frame this incident internationally and look at the
strategic significance of the ports. A natural place to look then would be at why the
United States military wanted to use these ports, which leads the issue back to the Middle
East and the Suez Canal Crisis.
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Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, was much to the
dismay of the West.119 The U.S. Executive branch and Joint Chiefs of Staff were
surprised and concerned, particularly of the fate of U.S. ships- for both private enterprise
and public military ships alike. The canal was a key avenue for U.S. ships going East,
particularly ships related to the military. Thus, Suez was critical for ships going east for
the Vietnam War, for access to India and the Indian Ocean, and, more obviously, to the
Middle East. Should the Suez have had another crisis, like the one in 1956, the United
States needed an alternative route. The best alternative, or what was being argued as the
best alternative in 1967, was around the Cape of South Africa. As early as January 4,
1967, when discussing whether or not to allow the Roosevelt to go through Cape Town,
the State Department took the following stance: “Department would like to use occasion
of operationally desirably refueling visit of FDR to Capetown Feb 1-4 to establish
principle that related flights from carrier would be permitted without racial
conditions….” More specifically, they knew Cape Town was an advantageous spot to
refuel and they wanted to maintain the precedent that the U.S. Navy could use the ports to
refuel if need be despite racial considerations.120
The Legislative branch took up this debate as well. On July 12, 1967, Joe D.
Waggonner, Jr. (D- LA), a critic of the denial of leave for U.S. soldiers and apparent
supporter of the Nationalist government in South Africa, said:
South Africa has proved herself to be a valuable ally in the wake of the Middle
East war by her cooperation in allowing American and British shipping to visit
her ports while the Suez Canal remains closed.
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He argued that the Cape Town route was vital to American shipping because 1500 ships
used the Suez route and should that route’s access to U.S. ships be tampered with again, a
viable alternative needed to be in place. In addition, he claimed that South Africa had the
only major dry dock in all of Africa able to accommodate cruisers and aircraft carriers,
which were critical to immediate ship repair and maintenance during wartime. He was
dismayed by the “liberals” and UN for criticizing such an important ally. He goes on to
say:
One is reminded of the incredibly foolish and offensive decision by the White
House not to allow crewmen of the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt,
returning from the Vietnam War, to enjoy liberty in Cape Town. Clearly, it is time
that the Johnson administration make a public statement, repudiating the antiSouth African policy which endangers the vital interests of the United States and
other friendly maritime nationals. Control of the Cape must remain in the hands
of a stable, European-type government which will stand by the West in a time of
crisis.121
Waggoner was clearly frustrated because he saw a need to maintain access to the ports,
apartheid or not. The reality was that the U.S. was at war with Vietnam and had other
adversaries located on the east side of Africa in the Middle East, Asia, and the USSR.
Should they need a central location to repair war torn ships, and especially if the Suez
becomes inaccessible to the U.S. again, South Africa was a logical option for transit and
ships repairs.
The importance of the strategic location of South Africa for the U.S. military,
especially in lieu of the use of Suez, was of high importance to the Navy. Secretary of
the Navy Nitze said that South African ports were extremely useful but not indispensable
in relation to NASA and NSA mission requirements at the satellite and missile tracking
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stations. But, the use of those ports allowed for an efficiency that could not be
substituted if they were to use Kenya’s ports again. South Africa had the best ship repair
facilities in sub-Saharan Africa; better than that of Kenya. Also, in relation to refueling
stops, particularly in the route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the ports in South
Africa were very beneficial for the U.S. to use, but not irreplaceable with at-sea refueling
or the use of other ports in the area. However, the strategic importance of the South
African ports during wartime was irreplaceable. They had five major ports, ten major
airfields, technical competence in their ports and airfields, and allowed for control of
access to vital sea lanes should they need them to the Indian Ocean and Far East,
especially in the event that the Suez Canal was closed to U.S. access.122 Even though
there were alternatives, there were many reasons to want to uphold access to these ports
and airfields, despite pressure at home. This sentiment would be echoed in further
memos from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara in that they too wanted access to
these ports and airfields, despite the heavy objections from the home front in the U.S.123
Political idealism surfaced during the Congressional debates following the
docking of the Roosevelt. There were more Congressmen concerned by the use of South
African ports than those who thought it was perfectly fine to maintain access to the ports.
Representative Don Edwards (D-CA) called the Roosevelt situation an “unfortunate
episode.” He said:
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We simply cannot do business with apartheid. The administration apparently
appreciated this when it refused to dock the U.S.S. Independence in 1965, rather
than accept the application of South Africa’s racial policies.
He did not want the U.S. Navy to make any more calls to South Africa and that the State
Department “should not seek to make private accommodations with the South African
Government in direct opposition to precedent and previous policy.” Use of the ports and
showing support for apartheid went hand-in-hand for Edwards.124
Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) agreed with Edwards and furthered the
statement saying that the U.S. needed to have a strong, consistent, and clear policy that
showed its commitment to racial justice in South Africa:
The incident dramatizes all the weaknesses of American policy in Africa.
Consultation between the Departments of State and Defense seems to have been
negligible. Precedent was ignored. African sentiment was disdained. And
logistical needs were permitted to outweigh the clear demands for diplomacy.125
The Congressional Record reflects a divide among those who were okay with the status
quo of not challenging apartheid so that they could maintain access to ports and those
who felt this showed too much support for apartheid, but it is unclear just how many
Congressmen would have settled on either side of the debate. Regardless, those who
opposed the use of the ports must have asserted themselves strongly enough to the State
Department because a need for a clear policy towards South African port usage became a
topic of conversation after the Roosevelt visit.
Aside from the newspapers previously mentioned, several South African
newspapers looked to the future implications of this visit and offered insight into the
incident that deviated from Nationalist newspapers. The Eastern Province Hearld, a Port
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Elizabeth newspaper, spent a significant amount of time in the days following the
Roosevelt visit looking at what this meant for them. Whereas some of their fellow
countrymen’s newspapers attacked U.S. hypocrisy, the Eastern Province Herald took a
fairly moderate stance. In relation to the Independence incident, the newspaper stated on
February 6:
South Africans are fully aware that in the eyes of the world American policy in
this respect is considered to be right and their policy wrong. But within the ambit
of their laws they had opened their hearts to the American sailors and airmen now
marooned in the Duncan Docks and they are rightly resentful of the fact that their
proferred hospitality is spurned. They had hoped to eradicate once and for all the
memory of the ill-fated Independence incident….
Furthermore, on February 8, the Eastern Province Herald somewhat criticized their
government for speaking out against the change of heart by the U.S., saying that they
could have proved their “bigness in heart” had they turned the other cheek. Had the
South African government gone aboard the ship in an act of goodwill, they would have
helped improve the relations between the two countries, rather than strain it further.
The Evening Post of Port Elizabeth furthered this sentiment. While they did tend
to blame the U.S. for this incident, they seemed to understand the U.S. State
Department’s rationale for not allowing leave in saying, “… the U.S. government is not
prepared to allow men who are willing to die for the freedom guaranteed by their
Constitution to be exposed to the indignities and restriction of apartheid; it would make a
mockery of the struggle for freedom.” They also pointed out that this incident should
have taught South Africans that if they were to continue supporting apartheid, there
would undoubtedly be international consequences, namely that of increased isolation
from the “strongest military power in the West, the United States.” An additional note is
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what the Daily Dispatch of Port Elizabeth said, which is that despite earning the
reputation for being the most hospitable people “in the world,” they had ultimately
become “an embarrassment to her friends.”126 These are perspectives that did not
necessarily forgive the U.S. State Department for their decision, but it looked at the issue
from that of growth rather than condemnation in relations between the two governments.
It is unclear if the State Department was responding to pressure from the media,
Congress, or civil rights leaders, but they did begin to take a much harder look at what
their policy should be for use of South African ports and installations. In a confidential
memorandum sent on February 9, 1967 from Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach to Joseph Palmer II, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Katzenbach stated that the Roosevelt incident called for a review of U.S. policy in regard
to South African ports by the U.S. Navy. The old policy, or that which came from the
Independence precedent, was to permit U.S. Naval vessels into South African ports if
there was a need for provisioning and servicing, so long as there were not racial
restrictions put upon crew. Would this type of policy still hold or should a more hardline policy be put in place? And if a more hard-line policy is put into place, how would
that impact ships with mostly civilian crews or ships servicing the tracking stations
located in South Africa? How would this impact American planes? More importantly,
would all use of South African ports, airfields, and tracking stations need to be suspended
because of a potentially more hard-line precedent set by the Roosevelt incident?
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Katzenbach suggested that large warships should bypass South Africa all
together, as it was unfair to expose large numbers of servicemen to apartheid. Also, this
would help “demonstrate our abhorrence to apartheid.” Small ships, on the other hand,
would still be permitted to use ports, especially since these tended to carry scientific
equipment that was needed in the tracking stations. In addition, ships with pre-approved
clearance at the time of the memo, ships with repair contracts already made, and ships
with majority civilian crews would be allowed, in addition to ships of all sizes if it were
an emergency situation. Katzenbach speculated that the continued use of the ports would
help ease tensions between the South African government and the U.S. government in the
post- Roosevelt era.127
The State Department and Navy needed to make a decision because the Sword
Knot, a Navy Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) Trading Vessel, was
scheduled to make a stop at Durban on February 12, 1967 for two months’ worth of
work. As mentioned previously, the Sword Knot had visited South African ports prior to
the Roosevelt incident. However, on February 13, carrying electronic equipment, the
Sword Knot had been left for four days with no word as to whether or not they could dock
in Durban. On board were 67 crewmen, eleven of whom were black.128 The Sword Knot
was being watched by the international community to see what the U.S. would do and
how the South African government would react.
Behind the scenes, there were talks between the South African government and
the U.S. State Department. South Africa was interested in keeping the U.S.’s shipping
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industry. There were discussions being held between the two parties on the lessening of
racial law enforcement on visiting black U.S. soldiers. By direction of Prime Minister
Vorster, local authorities and citizens were instructed to allow the crew to use any
restaurant or bar as they pleased. Also, there would be no arrests or trouble whatsoever
under “immorality or race laws.” In fact, it was thought in some circles in South Africa
that the Roosevelt incident may have started to pave the way towards lessening
restrictions on non-whites in South Africa:
But I believe the Department will find interesting the fact that not only DFA
officials but key moderate leaders like Anton Rupert, have advised that the Prime
Minister had counted on certain liberalizing impact of FDR call to help him move
gradually in direction improving lot of coloureds and reducing extremes of
apartheid. They claim that FDR affair deeply regretted set-back to plans of PM
and factor strengthening position of Afrikaner die-hards. Rupert said to [embassy
officer] that he had been ‘waiting for twenty-five years for kind of forward
movement now emerging under Vorster and which will continue despite set-back
of [FDR] incident.’
Based on this assessment, the State Department highly recommended that the Sword Knot
be permitted to use the Durban port.129
On February 13, Palmer made a recommendation to Katzenabach for the Sword
Knot. At this point, the South African government had already given the ship clearance
“provided the crew is not restricted to the ship,” a lesson learned from the Roosevelt
docking. Palmer recommended three courses of action to be considered. The first was to
permit the Sword Knot to enter Durban and for the crew to be given liberty with the
caveat that they avoid any organized segregated activities. The second was to send the
Sword Knot to a different port altogether. The third possibility, though Palmer did not
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recommend it, was to allow the work to be done on the Durban, but to not allow the crew
any sort of leave. Palmer did not like this third option because it was expected that the
ship would be there for two months.
There were many reasons to allow a visit to Durban, according to Palmer. The
Sword Knot did have a crew of 65, ten of whom were black, but it was a civilian ship,
repairs parts had been sent to Durban already and were waiting installation, the South
African government had already given clearance and there was presumably a contract
already in place, and any alternative was thought to have been expensive and
inconvenient and may have affected their “space capabilities,” of the satellite tracking
stations run by NASA. In addition, it would be fairly easy to spin positive publicity in
domestic media. Finally, and most importantly, Palmer recognized the fact that they
needed to have South African cooperation for some time with their tracking stations, use
of airfields for a variety of reasons, scientific relationships, and commercial relations.
The cons for allowing the ship to dock in Durban included that there would be protesting
at home, the repairs were not of an emergency situation, there may be other repair
facilities that are easy access, and the South Africans would have a feeling of
“indispensability.” Palmer clearly leaned towards allowing the Sword Knot to dock in
Durban because it had a civilian crew, it would keep South African relations positive for
the time being, and the expectation of the crew avoiding segregated activities was
feasible.130
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By February 14, the State Department clearly took the stance that it did not want
the Sword Knot to dock in Durban. Although it was not confirmed on February 14, the
State Department did communicate to the Cape Town Embassy that they were wary of
“feeding the fire” of the anti-apartheid feeling that was created by the Roosevelt stop.
But, they did specify that diverting the Sword Knot did not necessarily mean that they
wanted to discontinue the use of other ports and facilities in South Africa.131 Defense
Minister of South Africa P.W. Botha made the following statement, as reported by
Katzenbach to the Cape Town Embassy:
Acting Secretary in regretting unpleasantness surrounding incident said press
attention and hospitality arrangements, no matter how well intended, ballooned
event which he had hoped could have occurred in low key. This focused attention
here on issue over which most Americans feel very strongly. Fact that
Congressional and public opinion came to head at last moment before ship arrived
Cape Town made it impossible take any other action than we did. To Mr.
Katzenbach’s observation that both sides and everyone concerned shared some
responsibility for problem, Taswell asserted that SAG had done nothing wrong
and had received no complaints from Embassy.
To which Katzenbach replied:
A combat crew has worked together, fought together, taken recreation together.
To give them leave in a place where distinctions are made is ipso facto to men
themselves, Congress, and others a humiliation. The nub of the problem is South
Africa’s racial policy itself.132
This demonstrates that South Africa continued to play the role of victim in the Roosevelt
incident and the policy decisions that followed. This sentiment was preceded by a letter
from South African Foreign Minister Muller that reaffirmed the idea that the U.S.
approached the South African government with hopes of an integrated visit, with which
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South Africa provided and were harshly rejected with such short notice after spending a
significant amount of time and resources on providing a good visit.133 Whether or not the
U.S. was concerned about their feelings of victimhood is unclear, but what is clear is that
the U.S. wanted to preserve the use of ports.
The U.S. State Department was stuck in a no-win situation when it came to
deciding what to do with the Sword Knot. They were dealing with the fall-out of the
Roosevelt stop and the wave of anti-apartheid “hysteria” that followed and they were
trying to coddle the South African government, whose cooperation they needed for future
port and facility use, despite the fact that they could not connect the U.S. actions to their
own misdeeds with apartheid and the past Independence incident.
On February 15, after eight days of waiting in the waters by Durban, a decision
was made that the Sword Knot would be rerouted to Mombasa, Kenya.134 The South
African press immediately reacted to this cancelation. On February 16, the Johannesburg
Star reported that the cancelation of the Sword Knot’s visit would surely worsen relations
between the two countries and would possibly threaten the access of the U.S.’s use of
other ports and tracking stations within the country.135
An editorial in the Cape Times suggested that the indecision by the U.S. State
Department and the lengthy decision-making process showed a weakness not previously
seen in the U.S. government.136 Not all articles in the South African newspapers were
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negative. The Rand Daily Mail took an anti-apartheid stance on the issue and suggested
that rather than pointing fingers, that the South African government look at its policies
and truly understand the full impact it was having on international policies of other
countries.137
Kenya’s reception of the Sword Knot was not as warm as the U.S. State
Department would have liked, especially given the conflict around their preferred use of,
but highly debated, South African ports. Ambassador Glenn W. Ferguson, of the Nairobi
Embassy, warned the State Department that the United States should not play up the
hospitality of the Kenyans opening their port to the Sword Knot. Ferguson warned,
“Reason is that Kenya, as independent African nation, is sensitive to allegations of being
partial to West and US.” More specifically, because the ship was carrying material for
the tracking stations in South Africa, they did not want to be seen as harboring the U.S.
during the Cold War.138 Kenya did not want to get embroiled in the Cold War or be
known as a western-friendly country, which potentially could have been a problem
should the U.S.’s space program or military need their ports again in the future. Which
sub-Saharan country could they rely upon with dry docks that could handle warships and
aircraft carriers of their capacity? This must have made the U.S. nervous about future
ships needing to dock in the region.
Furthermore, Katzenbach said that Kenyans were very concerned by how serious
the U.S. Executive branch was in fighting apartheid. They did not trust the level of
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association the U.S. had with South Africa and felt that they themselves had sacrificed
more than the U.S. to fight apartheid, such as ceasing sales of soda ash to them.139 The
U.S. found themselves potentially losing an ally that could help them with docking and
repair needs of large ships and aircraft carriers because of their association with
apartheid.
The Roosevelt stop forced the State Department, military, and Congress to
establish their stances on the future of South African-U.S. relations, as was already
previously seen in Congress when Representatives used the incident as a temperature
gauge of how they felt towards the South African government and specifically being
connected to a country that openly touted their use apartheid. Shortly thereafter, Arthur
Goldberg, the lightening rod of much of the negative press around the incident, spoke out
about what the U.S. policy should be. In a letter to Secretary Rusk, Goldberg laid out his
rationale for his desire for the U.S. to break their ties to South Africa. Allowing the
Roosevelt to even dock in Cape Town showed a relaxation of the U.S.’s stance on
apartheid in the direction of acceptance. If the U.S. really wanted to exert influence over
South Africa, they should have exploited South Africa’s fear of isolation, which was so
clearly expressed in the incidents with the ships. This would be much more effective
than trying to tempt them into submission by offering them tokens of friendship if they
made the right political choices. Thus, Goldberg proposed an immediate disengagement
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from South Africa militarily and scientifically, namely in the tracking stations used by
NASA and the military.140
Goldberg was not alone in asking for a clarification in policy and gladly giving
his own interpretation of what should happen. On February 15, Representative Julian
Bond of Georgia, wrote to President Johnson. In his letter he asked the President to open
up an inquiry into why the visit was allowed to happen in the first place. In addition, he
berated the State Department for not only showing “indifference” towards South Africa’s
use of apartheid, but he was appalled by Rountree and Katzenbach’s apologies to the
citizens of Cape Town who opened their homes and communities to them, despite the
fact that these private functions were allegedly segregated. Ultimately, he asked that the
use of ports be reviewed and rejected, as he felt that the U.S. should not show military
allegiance to countries that do not uphold the basic idea of human rights for all of its
citizens. On February 25, Bond got an answer from Palmer on behalf of the President. In
the letter, Palmer restated why South African ports were used, which was that there were
“strong operational reasons” for refueling at that particular port and that they only
stopped because integrated activities and leave were guaranteed by the South African
government. However, with that being said, on February 21, it was decided that South
African ports would not be used by U.S. Naval warships, barring any sort of emergency
and that further use of the ports was being reviewed.141
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It should be noted that this was a form letter sent out to other members of
Congress or government that expressed their concern about the use of the ports, thus
indicating an official State Department position. For example, Representative Lester L.
Wolff (D-NY) wrote to the President and received a letter that had parts of the letter sent
to Bond stated verbatim, however it was signed by Douglas MacArthur II, the Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations.142

The Roosevelt in the Global Cold War:
There is an absence in this issue, which is that of the concern of the direct threat
of the Soviets in the region. Granted, South Africa was looked upon favorably for the
fact that it offered highly technical ports and was a great alternative to the Suez Canal
should there be another situation involving the closure of the canal. However, the Soviet
threat is not apparent in the documents available, thus making it is easy to forget that
their presence existed in the first place. While it may seem irrelevant to raise the issue of
the global Cold War in relation to the Roosevelt and Sword Knot stops, it is actually very
relevant as it is easy to jump to the conclusion that most U.S. decisions, if not all
international decisions, were made with the threat of the Soviets spreading their influence
to particularly volatile countries during this time period.
A side note that offers a brief moment of closure and clarity involved private
aircraft. In a memo from the President Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to
Johnson himself dated April 19, 1968, Rostow raises the issue of whether or not civilian
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aircraft should fly into or through South Africa. Katzenbach suggested that an addendum
be added to the 1947 U.S.-South African Air Transport Agreement. Essentially, the
amendment would enable South African airlines to fly to the U.S. for the first time,
probably to New York, by the end of the year. In addition, the U.S. could fly to South
Africa. TWA and Pan American both agreed to the plan because it was a “very good
economic bargain for the U.S.”
However, there was a political hurdle. The UN General Assembly passed a
resolution in 1962 without U.S. support that requested that all member nations refused
landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. Thus, Rostow predicted that
there would probably be some backlash from the UN community, in particular from the
African states. However, South Africa did fly its airline through UK, France, German,
Italy, Switzerland, Australia, and other industrial countries at the time of this memo. In
addition, Rostow checked to see if there would be a huge objection from the Legislative
branch and he found that there would be little to no domestic opposition. He asked
Johnson to determine if he agreed with the amendment. Johnson checked off that he did
agree with the amendment, thus opening up air traffic between the U.S. and South
Africa.143
To further substantiate the claim that the Soviet threat was minimal at best, the
National Intelligence Estimate of 1967 makes no mention of fear of Soviet expansionism
in South Africa. Instead of worrying about the threat of spreading Soviet influence, the
U.S. government was concerned about racial policy and what that would amount to
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domestically over the next five years in relation to economic development of the black
African population and the access to living amenities. It appears that South Africa did
want to improve relations with the U.S. State Department particularly after the rocky few
months following the U.S.S. Roosevelt incident, thus further illustrating that the South
African government had no intention of allowing any sort of communist influence into
their country, especially if it meant jeopardizing the remains of their relationship with the
U.S. government.144

Allowing the docking of the USS Independence, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Sword
Knot was reliant more on future use of ports and bad press, rather than of concern for
U.S. soldiers potentially being subjected to apartheid. With the inauguration of Hendrik
F. Verwoerd, an archetypal apartheid advocate, came an attempt to restrict black U.S.
crews from using South African ports. In May 1965, the U.S. was scolded publicly by
Verwoerd for not only allowing planes with black crews to use airbases, but also because
the U.S. Embassy held mixed-race functions, a clear violation of apartheid policy. Rather
than taking a stand, the U.S. continued to dock ships and land planes in South Africa until
it became an issue when a mixed race American crew returning from Vietnam requested
ship leave in February 1967.
The docking of the Roosevelt prompted anti-apartheid advocates in the U.S. to
question what the U.S. was going to do from there on out. What would U.S. diplomatic
and military policy be for using naval and air bases in South Africa? After restricting the
crew from leaving the ship, the State Department, Congress, and Department of Defense
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took to discussing future policy. Access to the ports was a far higher of priority to the
U.S. for a variety of reasons. South Africa’s ports were capable of serious maintenance
should the U.S. need it on any of its ships or planes. Also, access to the Cape Route was
important to maintain should the Suez Canal become restrictive to the west again in the
future. Only Congress reflected any serious concern for the friendly relations with
apartheid the U.S. essentially maintained in allowing ships and planes to dock in South
Africa. Serious questioning from the Civil Rights community prompted form letters to be
sent out on behalf of the State Department insisting they were working on the problem.
Was the decision to maintain access to ports and the Cape Route based on the
global Cold War? Yes, but not in the traditional sense of keeping communism from
penetrating the borders via black opposition groups, such as the ANC and its armed wing
the Umkhonto. South Africa was strategically placed and had technological
advancements that allowed them to be a good ally for geographical and strategic reasons,
rather than preventing the spread of communist influence. When the U.S. government
received criticism domestically and internationally it was for its heavy reliance on the
South African government, who had been denounced by the international community for
its domestic policies. Little is mentioned in the documentation to contextualize the
situation into the global Cold War, unless one looks at the South African perspective.
From their perspective, they were fearful they would lose the U.S.’s ship and plane
business. When they discussed future relations with the U.S. they liked to promote
themselves as being vital to the effort against the Soviets in the global Cold War,
particularly in preventing the spread of communism into South Africa. Yet, the reality
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was that Washington was not primarily concerned with this, rather they wanted to
maintain port access without international flack.

77

Chapter Three: Tracking Stations
A second case study that highlights the complexity of U.S.- South African
relations was the use and employment of the tracking stations in South Africa. This was
a contentious issue because of the implications of a potential airfield and ship docking
ban by the U.S. government after the Roosevelt incident, but also because at installations
that represented U.S. interests for military and scientific realms apartheid was used to its
fullest application.
Between 1949 and 1957, the Soviet Union had managed to create and maintain an
impressive space program, one that clearly threatened the U.S for valid reasons. In 1949,
the Soviets successfully created their own atomic bomb. In the early 1950s, they
produced long-range bombers. By 1954, they had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb.
By 1957, they had fired a long-range missile over 5,000 miles. However, the real shock
that was concerning for the U.S., from the Executive branch to the common citizen, was
the launching of Sputknik into space in October 1957. The Soviets could now launch a
nuclear missile anywhere in the world, albeit with minimal accuracy. The U.S. had yet to
even launch their first missile into space.145
On January 31, 1958, the chief of staff of the Air Force, Thomas Dresser White,
delivered a new policy in response to the launching of Sputnik. He stated that for the first
time in U.S. history, the homeland was in “mortal danger.” The launching of Sputnik
eliminated the safety of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that helped largely thwart any
all-out assaults on the U.S. since the civil war. He said, “‘America’s answer to the Soviet
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challenge would require the military use of space.’”146 Thus, space became vital to the
efforts in fighting the domestic and global Cold War with the Soviet Union.
In July 1958, Eisenhower, via Congress’s approval, signed a bill that established
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA. In addition to the
establishment of NASA, there was also an overall restructuring of scientific education
through the National Defense Education Act in the U.S. in the face of vulnerability that
Sputnik brought with it.147 NASA essentially acted as a consolidating effort of all the
diverse programs and interests in space exploration within the U.S. NASA’s importance
was heightened even further when in April 1961 Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin was
launched into space and orbited around the Earth. Newly inaugurated President Kennedy
was threatened by this major development and successfully lobbied Congress to double
the space budget and vowed to place a man on the moon before the Soviets could do it.148
The German V-2 rocket, most notable for reigning terror on the British during
WWII, was key to space exploration, along with the scientists that developed them. A
major spoil of the war was German rocket technology for both the U.S. and the British.
At a Bavarian ski resort, Garmisch-Partenkirhcen, Werner von Braun and his fellow
scientists who were responsible for the procurement of the guided missile system were
interrogated at length by the U.S. and British. It was at this locale that “Project Overcast”
was launched by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in which 350 German specialists were
hired to help develop a more advanced U.S. missile system. Von Braun worked with the
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U.S. to come up with a list of no fewer than 115 scientists that could help develop the
U.S. program for the following 6-months. When the Soviets learned of this, they were
disappointed to not have gotten von Braun for themselves.149
Von Braun and his group of scientists started work immediately in April 1946 in
White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, with the launching of V-2 test missiles. The
Germans were surprised and frustrated with the lack of advancement the U.S. had in their
development facilities. The group of scientists were kept in this location not only to work
on the V-2 missiles, but to also keep them away from the Nazi war crime trials that were
unraveling at Dachau in 1947.150
The scientists were moved to Huntsville, Alabama in 1950 by the Army where
they would become the preeminent rocket development group in the U.S. It was here
under von Braun’s leadership that the group developed the nuclear-tipped Redstone and
Jupiter missiles of the 1950s. The Redstone became the vehicle to help propel the first
satellite and first U.S. citizen into space. They also developed the Saturn vehicles that
helped launch Apollo spacecraft into orbit and put U.S. astronauts onto the moon.151
This is not to say that the Soviets who actually occupied the region that the V-2
development program in Germany was located, Mittlewerk, did not benefit from
rounding up and exploiting German scientist as well. Between 1951-1954, the Soviets
went back to Germany to round up as many scientists as they could and used their
knowledge to develop ballistic missile development. The result was the launch of
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Sputnik in October 1957, which rested largely on the use of German technological
advancements.152
The U.S. saw substantial growth in its space program as it was connected to the
military. By 1959, ICBMs had been developed and were being tested under the guidance
of von Braun. Also, between 1958-1962, the U.S. developed and tested its ability to
knock out spy satellites using nuclear explosions in space. The testing for this became so
enormous that the U.S. actually caused considerable damage to the earth’s
electromagnetic field. For example, in 1962, the U.S. exploded the 1.4 megaton nuclear
bomb the Starfish in space. The test was so powerful, 100 times more powerful than
Hiroshima, that it knocked out the power grid in Hawaii and disabled three satellites in
low-earth orbit.153
The development of rockets that could deliver satellites into space was one step.
Designing effective satellites was the next. Satellites could serve as spies, targeters, and
monitors of arms control agreements.154 Satellites also served as a way to maintain peace
in that they could monitory the launching of missiles and give the other side ample
warning of launches that could harm millions of people. They also provided the means to
establish a communication link between the U.S. and Soviet Union via the “hot line” that
was put into place 1971.155
In the early 1960s, the U.S. launched a system of spacecraft called the Vela Hotel
program, whose purpose was to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. This system
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was highly reliable and durable. It helped the U.S. track what weapons were being
tested, how strong they were getting, and, ultimately, who had the ability to detonate a
nuclear bomb.156

South Africa and the Space Program:
International cooperation would play a vital role in enabling the growth of NASA.
More specifically, NASA worked with the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of
the International Council of Scientific Unions to achieve military prowess in outer space.
COSPAR was created in 1958 to provide “an apolitical venue for cooperation in outer
space.” Its main purpose was to allow scientists from across the globe to work with one
another despite military or political rivalries that existed among various states.157 South
Africa was a member of COSPAR.
South Africa would play a noteworthy role in this lofty goal. Even prior to the
creation of NASA, the U.S. State Department looked to South Africa for land and support
in the form of Minitrack radio tracking stations in Esselen Park, agreed upon on October
11, 1957 (the agreement was made by the United States Naval Research Laboratory) and
the Baker-Nunn camera optical tracking station located at Olifantsfontein, established in
February 1958.158
South Africa had nearly a decade of importance in the U.S. science community
prior to the Roosevelt incident, thus they were rooted in their success, at least marginally.
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In Pretoria on September 13, 1960, six months after the Sharpeville Massacre, the U.S.
and South African governments sat down and signed an agreement about tracking
stations to be located in South Africa. The U.S., represented by the NASA, and South
Africa, represented by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), agreed
to work together to advance their “mutual scientific knowledge” of space and the
development of space vehicles, including manned vehicles.159
The 1960 agreement ensured U.S. access to key tracking stations. Essentially, the
South African government gave the U.S. access to various facilities for NASA and the
military at no cost to the U.S. government in exchange for scientific collaboration. Rules
pertaining to the admission of U.S. citizens into South Africa to work on the sites were
established. The agreement stated:
The Government of the Union of South Africa will, subject to its immigration
laws and regulations, take the necessary steps to facilitate the admission into the
territory of the Union of South Africa of such United States personnel… to visit
or participate in the cooperative activities provided for under this agreement.
This obviously became an issue with the Independence incident in 1965 in which the
South African government clearly stated that the U.S. must follow all laws established
under apartheid. The program was intended to last for up to fifteen years and had the
possibility of extension based on the agreement of both parties.160
South Africa became a key spot geographically for NASA, particularly during the
Apollo and Mercury missions. Cape Canaveral was the central point for which other
stations were established, as it was often used as a launch point. Originally,
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Johannesburg was picked by NASA as a third-tier tracking station because it allowed for
the determining of the initial orbit of satellites. Other stations in this tier (the first and
second tiers formed direct “picket lines” north, south, east and west of Cape Canaveral)
included San Diego and Woomera, South Australia. All of the stations were staffed by
military personnel from the Army and Air Force except for the one in Johannesburg,
which was staffed by the CSIR and NASA personnel. 161
In 1957, a Minitrack station was opened in Johannesburg, a less sophisticated site
to track satellites in that it required a satellite to submit some sort of signal source or
transmitter beacon, so that radio signals could be sent out and picked up by the Minitrack
stations, thus allowing for an accurate tracking of location.162 However, in 1960, work
began on a much more sophisticated Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition Network
(STADAN), which allowed for tracking to evolve from the use of radio frequency for
tracking to the use of optics. As NASA shifted from Minitrack to STADAN, their
location of stations shifted. Tiers mentioned previously were no longer relevant, but
South Africa was largely untouched and remained in existence until 1975.163
In addition to Minitracking and STADAN capabilities, Johannesburg also had
Deep Space Network (DSN) and Satellite Automatic Tracking Antennae (SATAN)
capabilities as well.164 DSN was a program created as early as 1958 and allowed for the
exploration of unmanned planetary missions and radio and radar astronomy in the
exploration of the solar system and the universe through the use of telecommunications
161
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and radio navigation networks routed around the world.165 SATAN replaced Minitrack
units with more efficient and cheaper large dish antennas that were used to make satellite
tracking possible.166 The Johannesburg station was critical not only because it was one of
the few stations to have DSN and STADAN, but also because it was essential to the
success of the DSN because it allowed NASA to maintain continuous coverage of space
probes as they departed the planet and rotated the earth.167
Even prior to the Independence incident in May 1965 when Prime Minister
Verwoerd began putting stipulations on crews to follow apartheid and not to allow black
crewmembers onto racially segregated bases, there was discussion about the importance
of the Johannesburg station. The Director of the Office of International Scientific
Affairs, Ragnar Rollefson, told the State Department that Southern Africa was very
critical to the success of NASA, in combination with launch sites in California and
Florida. Southern Africa was on the same parallel, which was essential for support.
South Africa and Madagascar at the time both had tracking stations, but South Africa was
clearly more essential to the efforts as it was located on the same parallel. The facilities
were used for long-range missile testing, tracking earth orbiting unmanned satellites and
lunar and planetary probes, and tracking earth orbiting and lunar manned flights in the
Apollo program. Rollefson warned about getting rid of the facility that would help
ensure its existence until 1975:
This office had concluded that this continued use and extensions of ground
facilities (tracking, data acquisition and command stations) under U.S. control in
the area of Southern Africa over the next five years is a critical requirement, if the
165
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United States is to carry through the space program to which it is committed
within this decade… there is no satisfactory alternative. Failure to meet this
requirement will be costly in time and money. More important, it will jeopardize
the success of key space missions and may, in the long run, damage the image of
the U.S. technological and scientific achievement which we seek to foster abroad
through a successful space program.
Essentially, South Africa was the only viable option to help run a successful space
program.168
This recommendation came on the heels of turbulence involving access to other
African stations that could have been useful in tracking. Johannesburg was not the only
station in Southern Africa. Zanzibar also had a station that was essential to STADAN
and the Mercury missions. However, in 1960, Zanzibar became politically unstable. By
1963, Zanzibar was facing pre-civil war tensions. There were elections in 1963 and
Zanzibar gained independence. It ultimately merged with Tanganyika and formed
Tanzania, but the transition was not as peaceful as NASA would have like. NASA feared
that political tension could turn into hostility in a moment’s notice and put into place an
evacuation plan should it come to that. In 1964, the station was ordered to be evacuated,
thus one of the alternatives for tracking was eliminated.169
Johannesburg was also protected by Rollefson because it was assigned to provide
support for the Apollo mission in a backup or standby capacity.170 President Kennedy
had given NASA a significant goal in putting an American on the moon by 1970 and
NASA was determined to meet this goal. The Gemini missions significantly helped get
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the U.S. within a stone’s throw of achieving this goal. Gemini saw a series of firsts- the
first two-man flight, the first spacewalk, the first docking, and the highest orbit to date
(850 miles above Earth).171 Thus, Apollo became the central element to the goal of
walking on the Moon.
The goal with Apollo was not only to land on the Moon and have a successful
exploration of its surface, but to have the ships reenter Earth’s atmosphere successfully
and safely. This would require the best tracking possible with no possibility of
interruptions or failures from the Earth’s bases.172 Thus, in 1964, Johannesburg received
a $5 million expansion to make it ready for the Apollo mission.173 So, it is no wonder
that Rollefson was urging the U.S. State Department and Congress not to give up on the
South African station, particularly in the next five years when it was projected that a man
would land successfully on the Moon.
The renewal of the tracking stations, which were originally set to expire on March
31, 1962, was tied indirectly into the sale of weapons to South Africa. (The reason for
the sale of weapons to South Africa will be addressed in depth in the next chapter.) In a
secret memo sent from the embassy in Cape Town to the State Department on June 15,
1962, it was revealed that part of the deal for allowing NASA’s and the U.S. military’s
access to the tracking stations was tied into the South African government’s desire to buy
weapons:
In the latter the view of the South African government was expressed that an
arrangement in connection with the military tracking station operations be
“accompanied by an understanding that the United States would give more
171
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prompt and sympathetic consideration to reasonable requests for the purchase of
such military equipment as may be required for South Africa’s defence.”
In the memo, it specifically stated that while the U.S. was “prepared to give an assurance
on military procurement, it would prefer that this question not be included in the
proposed exchange of letters covering the tracking station.” Weapons were clearly tied in
at some level with access to the tracking stations- to what degree is unclear, but the
connection is undeniably present. The Ambassador was therefore allowed to make the
following official statement to the South African government during negotiations:
The United States Government has in the past indicated its willingness to
cooperate with the South African Government in defense against international
communist aggression and to sell military equipment for this purpose. Taking
into account, of course, technical questions of availability, security, and
engineering compatibility, the United States Government can assure the South
African Government that it will give prompt and sympathetic attention to
reasonable requests for the purchase of military equipment required for defense
against external aggression.174
Keeping access to the tracking stations on behalf of NASA and the military was of clear
importance to the State Department. It was important enough to risk public ridicule for
selling weapons to South Africa, despite the embargoes that were put into place by the
U.S. and U.N. to prevent weapons from going to South Africa. South Africa was
geographically too important of an ally in fighting the larger global Cold War against the
USSR.
On April 26, 1964, National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 was handed
down on behalf of the request the State Department made on March 10, which asked for a
policy paper on South Africa. In NSAM No. 295 stipulations were set for U.S. policy
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toward South Africa. This included the need to develop a comprehensive program of
diplomatic activity, continue sales to South Africa (except submarines), discontinue loan
applications by South Africans from U.S. government lending agencies, and to continue
the use of tracking stations in South Africa by NASA and the Department of Defense but
should prepare alternative stand-by stations should they need to leave South Africa. With
this last stipulation, an interesting and telling stance was taken towards continuing the
relationship with their tracking stations:
This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to
public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of
State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our
relations with South Africa may be coordinated.175
Again, there was a foreshadowing of the political pitfalls that could follow the revealing
of the nature of this program within the South African government due to the precarious
nature of having any sort of important alliance with South Africa.
This same memo looks at the reality of possibly giving up the South African
station and shifting the tracking burden to the Tananarive (Madagascar) station in case
there was a need to walk away from Johannesburg. Based on geographical location,
workload, communications capabilities, U.S. and foreign staffing needs and cost,
Johannesburg was by far the more desirable station. Johannesburg provided the first
major land mass that would be encountered by ships leaving Cape Canaveral (in the
memo it is referred to as Cape Kennedy), whereas Tananarive was much further away.
Cape Canaveral is located at 28˚N, Johannesburg is located at 26˚S, which was deemed a
very “compatible” latitude of Cape Canaveral; however, Tananarive is located at 19˚S,
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which did not have nearly as much satellite traffic overhead as Johannesburg. This was
clearly very crucial to the STADAN requisites.
Johannesburg was also more reliable in the communications department because
of improvements made by the South African government’s installation of a submarine
cable, which would have allowed for a 99.8% reliability for communications.
Johannesburg did not require a large number of U.S. staffing, as the CSIR provided a
highly competent staff, whereas Tananarive required a much larger number of U.S.
personnel, which would cost three times as much as the Johannesburg station. The
Johannesburg station was financially and technically more sound of a choice for a
sustainable STADAN station. More importantly was that Johannesburg also had DSN
capabilities, which was irreplaceable at the Tananarive station. In fact, NSAM No. 295
clearly states, “Loss of the Deep Space Station in South Africa would significantly injure
the space program.” Thus, despite the political pressures that existed with being reliant
on South Africa for anything, it was recommended for technical reasons that the
Johannesburg station be kept open and operational.176
There was a concern that if the South African government caught wind of the
NSAM No. 295 recommendations to be able to move out of Johannesburg with sixmonths’ notice, that there would be an undesirable downfall for relations with the U.S. In
a status report on NSAM No. 295, the Department of State was happy to see that
alternative space tracking facilities in Tananarive, Spain, and Ascension Island were
being prepared, but they were worried that the South African government would figure
out why they were building alternative sites. They wondered if they should inform South
176
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Africa about the other sites’ existence.177 But, the reality was the State Department,
Department of Defense, and NASA did need alternatives to Johannesburg because there
was a clear worsening of racial relations in South Africa that could potentially isolate the
U.S.’s international position and pose major problems for U.S. foreign policy.178 This
was of course about to be tested with the Independence and Roosevelt incidents, which
clearly brought U.S. relations with South Africa into the spot light for an uncomfortable
amount of time.

Independence and Roosevelt:
The Independence incident has already been discussed at length in terms of its
impact on naval ports and airfield use by the U.S., but what impact did it have on the
tracking stations? On July 4, 1965, the New York Times reported at length about a speech
given by Prime Minister Verwoerd in which he said that integration was not a problem in
the U.S. where black men were outnumbered ten to one, but it was in South Africa where
white men were outnumbered five to one. Integration would have meant the end of South
Africa as a nation. “The result would be black rule and the result of black rule would be
Communism.” This was a common statement made by various government officials in
South Africa when discussing their importance to the U.S. They often used the idea of a
communist take-over in the same breath when discussing the end of white apartheid rule.
This same New York Times article dissected what this meant for the critical tracking
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stations located in South Africa. Verwoerd specifically said that no black U.S. citizens
would be permitted to work on the tracking stations at any time. NASA and the
Department of Defense had never assigned black citizens to work there and never had
intended to do so. The New York Times put more emphasis on the tracking stations than
the port call by the Independence:
But the tracking stations were far more important than a single port of call. There
can be no doubt that their removal would have had a tremendous impact here,
shaking the confidence of investors and bringing the two Governments to the
point of outright mutual hostility. This was what neither side wanted.179
It is unlikely that this sparked any sort of U.S. public outrage towards the tracking
stations, as very little was known about them at this point by the public.
There is no doubt that urgency was added to the NSAM No. 295 with the
Independence incident. Having other stations that STADAN and DSN could use “just in
case” were no longer just in case. A real threat was the possibility of South Africa
terminating its space-tracking agreements with the United States, which was very
stressful to NASA in particular because of the progress of Apollo and the need for South
Africa as a tracking station. The State Department was clearly concerned for how they
were perceived in the international arena:
In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others
to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians
have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically
citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa’s
pursuit of its present racial policies.
But, there was a minor voice that was beginning to be heard in that the tracking stations
could potentially be an important card to play at a later point with South Africa should
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the need arise. The U.S. would be ready with alternative situations should the attempt at
vis-à-vis diplomacy fail.180
NASA was clearly very concerned about the situation the Independence
presented. But they were very frank with the State Department during the midst of this
crisis. NASA stated very clearly that the State Department had a choice: either they
could move the stations to Spain and Tananarive, where other tracking stations already
existed, and put the space race on hold or they could leave the stations as is and stay on
track for a lunar landing by 1970 and hope for the best politically. Also, there was some
delay in getting the Spanish tracking station established to be operational within the next
six months, which made the South African station more critical for DSN.181
Several weeks later the Administrator of NASA, James E. Webb, made it very
clear to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that closing down access to Johannesburg was not
ideal, not because of geography, but because of the capabilities of the different stations.
The Madrid facility could only handle one mission at a time, which would severely slow
progress down on Surveyor missions and Orbiter mapping missions. In addition several
unmanned missions needed to be launched to ensure the success of Apollo and the
closing of Johannesburg would severely delay this process and make it impossible to land
a lunar mission on the moon by the end of the decade. More importantly, Webb issued a
warning hard to ignore:
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… the USSR has already launched four spacecraft in a vigorous effort to achieve
a successful unmanned lunar soft landing. Further delays in the Surveyor
schedules would strongly reinforce their chances of being the first to accomplish
this important mission, which would attract a great deal of attention.
The earliest the Madrid facility would be ready would be in February 1967, thus South
African facilities would have to be maintained at least until early 1967 when Madrid
would be ready.182
In addition, NASA found South Africa to be the most favorable spot for a variety
of reasons and did not want to give it up. In addition to all the previously mentioned
reasons, they favored the Johannesburg station because “it was actually the most
democratic and most stable government [emphasis author’s own] accessible to the United
States on the continent at the time.”183 NASA pointed out the inevitable scenario that
presented itself- the U.S. State Department found itself between a rock and a hard place.
Should they risk their international reputation by continuing to do political and scientific
business with South Africa or should they take actions that would delay a goal stated by
the late President Kennedy to land a man on the moon by the end of the decade (and
before the Soviets in the highly politicized space race)?
The Roosevelt docking in February 1967 posed the second major challenge to
NASA’s attempts to hang onto Johannesburg. With this much-publicized event came
cries from the public, the civil rights movement, and other government officials to
establish some kind of clear policy towards South Africa and the use of ports, airfields,
and bases. The conversation began immediately in the State Department and Department

182

Memorandum From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (James E.
Webb) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 15 January 1965, FRUS 1964-1968, XXIV: 1046-1047.
183
Tsiao, 208-209.

94

of Defense. On February 21, 1967, Deputy Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requested a
prioritization of Department of Defense requirements for use of South African ports,
yards, airfields, and real estate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He specifically wanted to
know how essential South African ports and yards were for U.S. Naval war ships and any
other ships or vessels essential to Defense operations or under contractual obligation to
satisfy Defense and NASA requirements and how essential land-based tracking facilities
were. He also requested that they come up with alternative plans to satisfy all Defense
requirements should South African ports, airfields, and tracking stations become
unavailable.184 As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff all felt
very strongly about retaining the right to use South African ports, especially if the Suez
Canal was unavailable for use.
On February 7, 1967, Rountree made the implications of the Roosevelt decision to
keep soldiers from engaging in leave clear to the State Department. He stated the tough
political position the U.S. found themselves in quite nicely:
In terms of our concrete defense interests in SA, we are concerned that the FDR
decision may render it extremely difficult for us to justify or permit other naval
visits which have taken place on more or less routine basis…. Further cases in
point are our project magnet flights and MAC flights in support of space tracking
stations. Obviously, tracking stations themselves present important policy
question.
This highlights the immediate importance and concern there was for the space tracking
stations. In the face of blanket diplomacy, the U.S. had a lot to lose in South Africa.
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Furthermore, Rountree did offer his assistance as he knew that the U.S. was facing some
immediately tough consequential decisions as handed down by the Roosevelt ruling.185
The Sword Knot issue, which arose immediately after the Roosevelt, was also very
concerning to the U.S. State Department because it not only called for an immediate
policy decision, but it also called for the government to actually enforce it and face the
real reaction by the South African government to a more stringent policy regarding the
ships. On February 12, 1967 the Cape Town Embassy communicated with the State
Department that the implications of the Roosevelt decision were about to become very
evident. In regards to the Sword Knot and the possibility of diverting it to another port,
the U.S. State Department feared how the South African government would react. They
feared that their action might be interpreted as the “beginning of end to all Naval calls.”
The Embassy said that diversion at this point could potentially be more costly than
dealing with the domestic fall-out of the racial implications. They stressed that if the
South African government felt this was a beginning to an end that the South Africans
would “be far less cooperative than heretofore with respect other U.S. military and space
projects in connection with which we have in past had very few problems.”186 This was a
warning that the State Department was surely not to take lightly, especially given the
pressure of the space race and the importance that NASA afforded that particular space
station in the years’ past.
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Being that it was 1967, this was a legitimate fear. The Vietnam War’s peak of
U.S. troop and political commitment began in 1967 and would last several years
thereafter. While it is unclear how often ships going to and from Southeast Asia were
traveling by the Cape, it is clear that it had been used by the U.S. Navy for troops and
supplies heading to and from the war in Vietnam. Thus, losing such a vital port for its
geography and ship repair and docking capabilities could be an issue for troop and supply
movement to and from Southeast Asia.
South Africa also sought a clarification in U.S. policy. In a rather harsh message
from South African Foreign Minister Bernardus G. Fourie to the Secretary of State sent
via the South African Ambassador in D.C. on February 14, 1967, it is apparent that the
U.S. concern about the impact of the Roosevelt and future Sword Knot decisions was not
unfounded. Fourie said that he was upset and confused by the decision to keep the
Roosevelt from docking, especially given the fact that the U.S. asked to dock there and
that extensive welcoming plans were laid by the community. He also clearly warned that
he did not know what this meant for future cordialness between the two countries and
future cooperative exercises in diplomacy and scientific affairs. In addition, he expressed
confusion at how large ships would be made to pass South African ports, while smaller
ships routinely used their services. He asked for some sort of clear-cut policy by which
they could expect the U.S. to follow so that relations between the two countries would
not be harmed any further.187 Furthermore, in a Johannesburg Star article published on
February 16, it was stated that the future of the tracking stations shared by CSIR and
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NASA were in question due to the vague policy that was tending to lean towards the
abolition of use of South African ports.188
On February 17, 1967, in the midst of the naval port controversy, Ambassador
Goldberg, wrote a letter to Dean Rusk expressing his opinion of what should happen with
South African policy. In the letter, he said, in contrast to the Embassy position, that the
U.S. government had never really had much of an influence over the South African
government and that decisions should be based on this premise. He opposed the idea that
closer relations would bring forth more opportunities for the U.S. to influence or guide
South African decisions. In his own words, “I estimate that it is her fear of isolation
which provides us our best lever in dealing with South Africa and I believe it would be a
false step to reassure her of our goodwill.” Therefore, Goldberg suggested that the U.S.
immediately “disentangle ourselves from remaining military and scientific ties.”
Specifically, missile and satellite tracking stations needed to be closed immediately and
shifted to Madagascar and Spain.189
In chapter two, the Sword Knot’s docking was looked at length. It is essential to
revisit here because the Sword Knot was a carrying parts for the tracking station in
Johannesburg. This is a moment where the two case studies of docking policy of naval
ships and the use of satellite tracking stations meet. The Sword Knot had eleven U.S.
black men on board, but they were not being denied access to the ports, such as the
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Independence in 1965. They docked the Sword Knot in Kenya, and moved the goods
over dry land to Johannesburg.
The South African newspaper Die Beeld carried a front-page article on the event
shortly after the docking of the Sword Knot in Kenya with the headline proclaiming
“Yanks Practice Deceit on our Airfield.” The headline was below a picture of a U.S. Air
Force plane stationed at the Jan Smuts airfield. The article talked about how the U.S. had
no difficulty enforcing apartheid protocol at airfields, but drew a line in the sand around
the use of naval ports, which may not have been true, as there are other accounts by the
U.S. State Department, as reported by the Embassies in South Africa, that said black U.S.
crews did frequent airfields after the Independence incident. The article discussed how
the U.S. flights did frequent the airfields to bring in equipment and crew members to help
with the satellite tracking stations.190 Seemingly separate issues collided head on because
of the policy that could potentially be set in ruling that no ports in South Africa should be
used by any U.S. vessels.191
In addition to dealing with the political repercussions of Roosevelt and the Sword
Knot incidents, NASA also was contending with budget cuts required of them by the
Legislative and Executive branches. On April 11, 1968, NASA was set to meet at the
Inter-Regional Group (IRG) meeting to discuss this issue of budget cuts. NASA
proposed to cut the DSN station in Spain and the STADAN station in Madagascar, as
Johannesburg had both capabilities and was in a better situated place geographically. The
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only problem with this was that the State Department had asked NASA to have
alternatives so that there was room for negotiation with the South African government
should a vis-à-vis situation arise.192
In April 1968, the State Department looked closely at the issue of the budget cuts
versus the needs of NSAM-295, which stated that NASA and the Department of Defense
needed to have alternate stand-by facilities available for use within six-months’ notice
should Johannesburg need to be shut down for politically motivated reasons.
Johannesburg’s station was run by CSIR and employed 237 foreign nationals, 131 of
whom worked for STADAN and 106 for DSN. There were only three contracted U.S.
citizens there to act as liaison for the DSN network. In contrast, the Tananarive
STADAN had 233 employees just for its STADAN station, including 59 U.S. citizens,
and Madrid’s DSN program staffed 252 people, including five U.S. citizens. Because the
Johannesburg station was locally operated by CSIR, NASA would be saving $520,000
per year if they did not need to operate the Tananarive station. For budgetary and
logistical reasons explained previously, Johannesburg was clearly the most viable option
at the time. However, given the political climate, the solution became much more
muddled.193
There was a significant amount of political pressure to close Johannesburg. On
February 17, 1967, Ambassador Goldberg urged that NASA become disentangled from
South Africa so that a more stream-lined policy could be put into place towards port and
airfield usage in South Africa. He wrote:
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Make a firm and final decision to close our missile and space tracking stations in
South Africa and to shift to facilities in Madagascar and elsewhere by this
summer at the latest… I would like us at the earliest possible date to free
ourselves of the restraints which the continuation of these facilities in South
Africa impose upon us.
Goldberg was very uncomfortable with having a potential situation arise where the U.S.
would be vulnerable politically to South Africa. In addition to the pressure put on by
Goldberg, the UN also did not like the presence of U.S. tracking stations in South Africa
and thought of it as “evidence of US-SA military cooperation.” Essentially, the domestic
and international community were breathing down NASA’s and the U.S. government’s
necks to find a resolution to having a station in Johannesburg.194
Ultimately, Clark recommended that the Johannesburg NASA station be closed
and that the STADAN and DSN stations in Tananarive and Spain be kept open. His
rationale was built on the above considerations by the UN and Goldberg. In addition, he
was not concerned about the Department of Defense’s use of the facilities because
Johannesburg had “reportedly become less than of critical importance since last spring.”
In addition, he felt the U.S. should retain positive relations with Madagascar and Spain
and that closing the site there would reduce critical positions and aid that they relied upon
from the U.S. government.195
Clark received a concerned phone call from Don Morris, the representative for
NASA at the April 11th IRG meeting. After reading Clark’s recommendations, Morris
called Clark and said that Johannesburg was considerably important to the DSN efforts.
After NSAM-295, NASA built a third DSN dish (the first two were in South African and
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Spain, it is unclear where the third one was located) as they needed a secondary back-up
dish and should stand-by stations be invoked by the U.S. government, the third dish
would be necessary. However, in the light of budget cuts, it would make sense to reduce
the operations of the other dishes and keep the South African dish, as it was more
essential in DSN. It is important to note, that in a “very much off-the-record comment
Don said that he would fight in NASA for a full withdrawal from South Africa, if this
were part of a general US disengagement.” This meant that if all U.S. interests in South
Africa were asked to withdraw, including private businesses such as General Motors, that
NASA would also withdraw, but without insurance from the U.S. government that this
would happen, NASA would strongly resist any move to challenge Johannesburg. This,
of course, prompted Clark to change his recommendations and suggest that NASA
capabilities in Johannesburg be severely limited- to the point where only a skeletal
reserve is left operational for STADAN, but not necessarily shut down.196 NASA kept
the station open until 1975. The downfall of the South African station would ultimately
be Congressional pressure in the form of a House bill that cut $3 million for NASA
funding for stations in South Africa. The bill was defeated, but the end had become
clear.197

NSSM-39:
The conflict with the strategically important bases for NASA was an issue that
needed to be dealt with in a quick and efficient manner. This was an issue much bigger
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than the State Department and its Ambassadors in South Africa and soon thereafter
would see the direct involvement of the Executive branch, namely in the form of the
National Security Council. The National Security Council (NSC) was a medium for
making policy decisions, such as port usage. In order to understand the decision-making
process, it is important to understand how the NSC functioned and what its intentions
were.
Presidents Johnson and Nixon both saw the need for a strong NSC when they were in
office, Nixon especially. On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National
Security Act of 1947, which created the NSC. Section 101(a) of the act best describes the
role of the NSC:
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security
as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
The council largely consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments,
along with the military departments.198
The NSC is largely structured by the president in charge. Under President Johnson,
influential names in the NSC were Bundy, Rusk, Rostow, and McNamara. Johnson’s
NSC sought to deliver a united message from the various departments; essentially, NSC
meetings saw the settling of White House infighting before policy was presented to the
other departments.199 President Nixon’s NSC was different. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s
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NSC Advisor, was largely responsible for approving policy. In Kissinger’s NSC,
interagency committees would write National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM)
and submit them to the NSC. The NSSMs were supposed to take into consideration
potential problems and outcomes of policy decisions. If the policy was sound and agreed
upon, they would become National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM). The NSC
was essentially an engine driving U.S. foreign and national security policy.200 During
Nixon’s first term, no fewer than 165 NSSMs were completed.201
Kissinger felt that the procedures they put into place were very important. He felt
it was important to centralize the decision making and keep secret crucial foreign policy
decisions until the time was right to reveal them, if at all.202 Kissinger would later
comment on his role as National Security Advisor:
‘The president sees the security advisor as being at his disposal, representing his
interest, whereas the secretary of state is seen as representing the bureaucracy….
After all, the State Department has 180 clients. So they have a lot of things to get
done each day which have a necessary priority for them. So the operation of the State
Department, for example, is basically answering cables. It is very hard when you are
secretary of state to say, the hell with this, now let’s talk about long-range problems
and work back from that…. It doesn’t tell you where to go in the long term. That’s
what we tried to do. And the security advisor also ends up dealing with and knowing
the problems that are of greatest interest to the president- which inevitably has to
include all or many or most of the major policy issues.’203
Kissinger did not deny the enormity of his role and his influence on policy making.
Thus, when looking at policy choices towards South Africa, which Nixon was forced to
do immediately upon taking office in 1969, it is important to keep in mind how the NSC
worked and who was at its helm.
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In April 1969, the NSC was instructed to prepare a comprehensive review of U.S.
policy towards Africa. These efforts were headed by Roger P. Morris. What was
produced was NSSM-39 in 1969. This was essentially the cornerstone to Nixon’s policy
in South Africa during the first term of his presidency.204 Morris personally believed that
no U.S. president should jeopardize U.S. investments in southern Africa. He also felt that
economic prosperity would translate into political liberalization, particularly in South
Africa.205 In addition, he believed that economic sanctions against the South African
government would never dismantle apartheid.206
Thus, when Morris presented NSSM-39 in December 1969, he had five options
for the departments to mull over. (It is important to note that NSSM-39 is a policy
toward southern Africa, not necessarily just South Africa). The first option, known as the
“Acheson Option,” saw the condemnation of white supremacy as excessive and that the
U.S. should rather align themselves with the white regimes to help defend U.S. interests
politically, militarily, and economically.207 The second option called for continued
association with white regimes, but also with black governments as well in an effort to
enlist cooperation from black states to reduce tension. This option saw to it that the U.S.
would also be able to continue persuading white governments through a close
relationship, rather than dismissing them as illegitimate and losing any sway over their
policy already held.208 This option called for relaxing political isolation and economic
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restriction on South Africa.209 The third option strictly limited cooperation with white
states in an attempt to safeguard its interests in the rest of southern Africa and to help its
posture in international politics. It also called for more aid to go to southern African
states that were now led by black governments. The fourth option called for the
dissociation of relations with white governments and closer relationships with black
states. The fifth option saw the severance of ties to both sides in the racial conflict in
South Africa because it was unmanageable and potentially dangerous and would
eventually grow into a political nightmare on the international stage for the U.S.
government.210
The NSC and State Department clashed over which option was the best. The
third option was favored by the State Department, as they felt that following the wishes
of the black majority in South Africa would best suit U.S. interests. Morris favored
option two over option three because he felt that the State Department in choosing option
three did so in an attempt to save face internationally, rather than try to do anything that
might help the situation. The State Department defended its position by saying that if
they were forced to make more harsh decisions in the future, they would have less
hurdles, such as domestic investment in South Africa, to contend with.211 Nixon and
Kissinger probably best liked two because they felt that closer relations between the U.S.
and South African governments might speed up the erosion of apartheid, thus they did
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not establish any new policies from their predecessors towards the most pressing problem
of apartheid.212
One of the major reasons for the NSC supporting option two was the investment
in science and military that the U.S. already had there. NSSM-39 stated:
NASA has a space tracking facility of major importance in South Africa, and
overflight and land rights for support aircraft are utilized in connection with
various space shots. The NASA station is particularly oriented towards support of
unmanned spacecraft and will be of key significance for planetary missions.
In addition to the “key significance” of the Johannesburg station for planetary
exploration, NSSM-39 specifically addressed the importance of South Africa for the
Department of Defense. NSSM-39 also noted the importance of South Africa’s
geographical position should there be another Suez Crisis and with the increasing concern
of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean. The importance of port and airfield access is
noted, particularly in emergency situations where ships need to port. Also, the
Department of Defense had a missile tracking station where some military aircraft traffic
did require access to this space. However, it was noted that the station was no longer
needed for research and development of missiles, as it may have once been.213
The reality was that Kissinger, Morris, and Nixon all felt that option two was best
because it could help attain the objectives the U.S. set forth in NSSM-39 for South
Africa. These goals included the improvement of U.S. standing in black Africa and
internationally concerning race; to minimize the possible escalation of violence, which
could potentially involve U.S. involvement; to minimize any opportunities the Soviets
and Chinese might have to exploit the struggle between black and white in southern
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Africa, particularly in relation to black nationalist movements that were gaining
momentum with the crumbling of the colonialism; to encourage moderation of apartheid
and similar policies in place in white government-led countries; and “to protect
economic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the region….”214 The
NSSM-39 applied each option to the list of goals and suggested pro’s and con’s for each.
It is clear that option two was favored by its author.
The authors behind NSSM-39 were obviously big advocates of keeping NASA’s
access to Johannesburg’s stations open, which may be why it was open until 1975.
However, revelations involving the treatment of workers at the actual station would
eventually come to light in 1970, thus influencing Congress to ultimately rebel against
the idea of a NASA station in Johannesburg. It also probably did not hurt that the U.S.
landed a man on the moon on July 20, 1969, thus successfully meeting the goal of the
Apollo Missions.

Diggs Commission:
The Congressional role in policy making towards NASA in South Africa is
noteworthy. In September 1970, the fatal blow was thrown at NASA by Congress. It
surfaced, thanks to letters sent by a private citizen, that NASA was allowing hiring
practices at the South African station to follow apartheid procedure. Lester G. Paldy,
assistant professor of Physics at State University of New York, wrote to Representative
Edward I. Koch of New York on July 30, 1970. In his letter, he wrote about how NASA
was using federal funding to hire under the guise of apartheid policies. His letter inquired
214
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if NASA falls under the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics and if it did if they would not mind looking into the matter to see if it were
true.
Five days later on August 4, 1970, Koch wrote to Thomas Pain, Director of
NASA, to inquire about the claim’s validity. On August 19, 1970, Koch got a letter back
from H. Dale Grubb, the Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs stating that he
was looking into the issue. In that letter, Grubb stated, “ ‘NASA does not support
scientific research in South Africa and the only funds expended there are for the
operation and maintenance of NASA tracking stations.’” In a later letter between Grubb
and Koch, Grubb stated that NASA did not do any hiring at the South African stationCSIR was responsible for the hiring. By September 22, 1970, Koch was fed up with the
situation and took it upon himself to write a letter to President Nixon stating that he felt
that NASA was financially connected to the hiring practices of apartheid and that he
wanted it stopped. On that same day, Koch wrote a letter to Grubb and said:
I believe the practices you describe in your letter of having hiring done by the
‘national agency under contract to NASA for station operation’ is racially
discriminating and is NASA’s way of evading its responsibilities. I find that an
intolerable situation and urge that a change be made.
By September 28, 1970, Koch was reading these letters to Congress and demanding that
something be done.215
Congressman Coles Diggs, a member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, sought to research this issue by actually conducting a visit
to the station in August 1971. Diggs was one of the first black members of Congress,
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being elected to the House of Representatives in 1954 by Michigan residents. From very
early on, Diggs expressed an interest in African politics, attending the independence
ceremonies of Ghana in 1957. Five years into his career, he was placed on the
subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He slowly acquired
legitimacy on this committee and successfully began to persuade its members to readjust
their focus on southern Africa.216
Diggs would finally ascend to the chairmanship of the House subcommittee on
Africa in 1969. As chairman, he was kept busy fighting U.S. policies that appeared
tolerant of apartheid policies. For example, Diggs fought hard against allowing domestic
flights to fly from South Africa to John F. Kennedy International Airport on South Africa
Airways. He was particularly concerned with the advertisements they made in the U.S.
encouraging tourists to visit its resorts, places where black U.S. citizems would not have
been allowed. While the flights were never suspended, the Civil Aeronautics Board did
finally pull the airline’s rights to advertise in the U.S.217
Diggs also fought various other issues that symbolized implicit support of South
Africa in various branches of the U.S. government. For example, he fought with the
Justice Department to end the FBI’s exchange of forensic information, such as
fingerprints, with Vorster’s police. He also openly opposed John Hurd, the Texas
millionaire appointed ambassador to South Africa, because he threw a whites-only party
to honor the ten-year anniversary of the founding of the Republic of South Africa.
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Finally, he pushed to end the sale of sixty thousand tons of sugar by white farmers at
twice the price of world sugar prices.218
Most notably, Diggs decided to research the claims against NASA. His findings
were extensive and telling about the true nature of affairs between NASA and apartheid
practices. While in South Africa, Diggs interviewed the CSIR Vice President, Dr.
Hewitt, who was the senior officer directly responsible for the NASA contract. He also
interviewed the station manager D. Hogg. In the questioning, Diggs found out that the
South African government purchased all of the land provided to NASA; however,
operation costs were paid for by NASA. The tracking stations employed 224 whites
because they had technical qualifications, whereas 61 blacks were employed in
maintenance and general custodial work. Whereas the black employees were paid at
most1,020 Rand per year, the lowest paid white employee earned 1,600 Rand per year.
Salaries were determined by the South African Public Service Commission.219
Diggs was especially concerned about the treatment of black employees at the
station, particularly because NASA did pay for operational fees. Predictably, he found
that apartheid did not stop at the tracking station’s gates. He found that all black
employees and their families lived on site, fifteen of which lived in ten NASA-financed
houses. Other black employees lived in farm labor houses that were already on the
property prior to NASA and CSIR acquisition. The housing was rent free, but only the
NASA housing had electricity, bathrooms, interior sewage and running water. If any of
the black employees or their family members got sick, they could get a ride to the
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hospital for fifty cents. Doctors could be called to the station, but the employees would
have to pay for it. In addition, black employees were not allowed into the mess and
lounge facilities in which the Diggs meetings were held. No mess or lounge was
provided for them at all. Additional segregated facilities included toilets, which did not
need to be marked “white” or “non-white” because “employees knew which facilities
were for them.”220 In September 1971, Diggs testified before Congress about his findings
and said specifically about the eating conditions for black employees that, “Blacks eat
outside under a tree, nibbling sandwiches.”221 Hewitt defended their treatment saying
that local customs could not be totally discounted just because NASA was affiliated with
the station and that there should be some credit given in that appropriate housing and
eating facilities were provided based on economic “rank” of the employee, regardless of
race.222 Diggs was pointing out the obvious, which was that apartheid was happening on
a U.S. installation.
Hewitt and Hoggs had to do more research to answer the questions asked by
Diggs. In September 1971, after Diggs visited, more truths about the station began to
surface. Hewitt discovered that the 61 blacks employed represented 21% of the total
staff. These employees were not allowed collective bargaining rights. The average wage
for black employees was 674 Rand per year (1 Rand = $1.40). The 56 unskilled laborers
earned anywhere from R. 408 to R. 780 per year. The two drivers and foreman earned R.
492 to R. 960. The three Lab Assistants earned R. 618 to R. 1020. This is clearly very
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different than what Hewitt had reported earlier in August to Diggs. White employees, in
comparison, earned R. 1200 to R. 9300. It should be noted that all of these employee
costs were “directly reimbursable by NASA.”223
Higher employment opportunities for black employees, or lack thereof, were also
an issue, as discovered by Hewitt. There were various training programs offered to
tracking station employees. The Radio Space Research Station (RSRS) had two training
programs- one for electronic technicians at the Witwatersrand Technical College and one
for engineering at various local universities. No black employees were enrolled in these
programs. The trainings were paid for by CSIR; however, “salaries of these trainees
during ‘practical experience’ actual work at station during training are charged to
NASA.” When asked why there were no black employees enrolled in these programs,
Hewitt said that no black employees had ever applied, possibly because there were no
electrical engineering programs at black schools. Technically, they did not bar black
employees from applying for the RSRS internships, but they did not qualify in the first
place. In fact, if black employees had applied and, in theory, been accepted, CSIR would
not have provided for all or even part of their tuition. This led the Pretorian Embassy to
question whether or not any education was being provided to children of the black
employees’ family. Hewitt feigned ignorance about the educational fate of the 100 plus
children on the grounds, but ultimately did admit that school was three to four miles away
with no transportation provided.224
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The Diggs visit also inquired into the role of CSIR in the decision making
processes. His findings stated:
Hewitt stressed that CSIR’s contractual obligation was to follow sound
administrative practices within context local situation and be as frugal with
NASA funds as their own… Station run on reimbursement by NASA of actual
cost and, as Hewitt pointed out to Diggs, SAG purchased site and provides it free
of charge. There is levy for program administration overhead which totaled R.
156,580 in FY-71. This includes charge of R. 270 each for white staff and R. 70
each for African staff.
This clarification is significant for the main reason that NASA dollars, U.S. tax dollars,
were paying for apartheid policy to be applied to the tracking station, thus directly tying
the U.S. to South Africa in a very unattractive way. Granted, NASA tracking station
personnel was not related to the military research installation that shared the site, but it
was not unheard of that personnel from the tracking stations did work for military
research because highly trained personnel were limited.225
A second site visit happened in October 1971 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Robert S. Smith. On November 19, 1971, Smith met with Dr.
Willis Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator of NASA Gerald Truszynski, Associate
Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition for NASA, about the conditions of the
tracking station. He recommended that ten houses built by NASA needed to be repaired
and that more family houses needed to be built since most of the employees lived in 100year old farm houses that lacked water and electricity. A school bus needed to be
provided to kids whose school was more than four miles away. A nurse and clinic
needed to be located on site and that medical care provided off site should have
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transportation costs paid for. An indoor eating facility also needed to be built for the staff
and that they should get fed lunch as well. The wage scale had “room for
improvements.” Also, the CSIR needed to make more serious efforts to recruit nonwhites for technical positions. If this could not be done in South Africa, then maybe
NASA could offer training in the U.S. for non-whites so they could apply for and be
accepted to more technical positions. At the meeting, Shapley said that he felt
improvements could happen without the special request or additional funds from
Congress. 226
Shapley and Truzynski traveled to South Africa themselves on December 1, 1971.
The U.S. government was very wary of the South African government and CSIR seeing
this visit as an attempt to get CSIR to change as quickly as possible, rather that they
should move at a pace as they saw fit to make equitable changes that would fix the
human rights violations concerns.227 NASA did face an uphill battle, as Hewitt very
clearly stated to NASA in a previous conversation that while improving housing and
eating facilities was one thing and possibly doable, improving opportunities for nonwhite
employees was far less feasible. “He emphasized a strong belief that any precipitous
effort in this area would impact present staff would severely jeopardize CSIR ability to
maintain current high level of operating efficiency.”228 These thoughts would ultimately
be repeated to Shapely and Truzynski when they visited on December 1.
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The issue inevitably made its way back to Congress in the form of NASA’s
budget approval. Using one of its tools to control foreign policy via its Constitutional
rights, Congress debated extensively what to do about funding in relation to the
Johannesburg’s recent findings about their enforcement of apartheid on its employees as
revealed in the Diggs visit. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) was a relatively new
black Congressman from Harlem when he introduced a restrictive amendment to the bill
about NASA’s budget. Concerning the budget, NASA would not be permitted to use any
of the budget “in the Republic of South Africa.” Rangel’s rationale for this was:
The continued operation of our NASA tracking station in Johannesburg, South
Africa, however, compromises American integrity and completely undermines
our stated goals of equal opportunity and equal justice.
For Rangel, funneling tax payer dollars to CSIR and its use of apartheid was
unacceptable, particularly because of their separated facilities, such as restrooms and
dining halls, and dual pay scales that were incomparable. In addition, he was very
concerned that of the 243 visits made by U.S. personnel on behalf of NASA, there were
no black Americans sent, possibly to honor the 1965 Independence decision set forth by
the South African government.229
There were Representatives that agreed with him. Representative Ed Koch (DNY) pointed out the double standard employed by this situation:
What, for instance, would be the response of this country if the Northern Irish
Government said to the United States, ‘You have a facility here but you may not
employ Catholics, or if you do, you will them at less than what you pay the
Protestants.’ We would say, ‘This is an outrage, we cannot do that….’ Or take
the situation when not so long ago certain Arab states said, ‘You may not have a
Jewish soldier in this facility.’ … And so, today the black community rightfully
229
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asks how we can sit here and permit Government moneys to be appropriated and
used in a discriminatory way…?
Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) agreed with Koch and Rangel saying that his
frustration was with the fact that the U.S. had no problem keeping open the station to
protect a handful of astronauts but did so at the risk of the dehumanization of the dozens
of black employees at the station. Representatives who agreed with the amendment had
no difficulty basing their decision on the clear human rights violations committed by
CSIR and NASA (albeit indirectly).230
This amendment tipped off a Congressional debate. There were Congressmen
that disagreed with the amendment for a variety of reasons. Texas Representative Olin
Teague opposed the amendment because of the tactical concerns, saying that it was
unreasonable to leave a gap in a major tracking zone for the space program and then
ultimately revise the use of South Africa to help track ships and planes in the area as well.
Another common argument from several Representatives was that if the U.S. were to
only cooperate with countries that subscribed to U.S. ways of life that “we are going to
become a mighty lonesome country.” In addition, it was pointed out that not doing
business with the South African government and CSIR would be more detrimental to
U.S. programs than to South Africa’s programs and that U.S. interests should be put first.
Robert Leggett (D-CA) said:
…I do not believe we should use the space program as a vehicle to vindicate civil
rights theories or to use civil rights as a basis to kill the space programs… We
need this space station there to make the space program go. I do not believe
anybody should be misled that this is a civil rights vote in any way, shape, or
form. It is a clear effort to kill the space program.231
230

Ibid, 13643.
Ibid, 13643-13644.

231

117

Many of the Representatives who spoke out against the amendment would preface their
comments with the context that this was not a race issue, but a national security or
scientific advancement issue. Ultimately, the nays would rule the day, as the amendment
was rejected prior to be sent on for authorization.
In May 1973, a House bill that would have cut $3 million of NASA funding for
stations in South Africa was defeated, but the fate of this station was becoming clear.
When the bill was up for debate, NASA tried to argue that it was helping improve local
conditions for black employees by providing approximately $109,000 a year on
improvement for programs for the black community, including constructing an
elementary school, better housing, and a small onsite medical facility onsite for black
employees and family members to use. However, this could not overcome the fact that
even though black employees consisted of 25% of the total employees at the station, they
only earned 5% of the total wages paid to employees. In the official historical account of
the tracking stations, NASA historian Sunny Tsiao said that “black and liberal
politicians” were to blame for the demise of the station. There is a tinge of blame in
Tsiao’s account as he stated:
The Republic of South Africa, being on the very southern tip of the continent, was
ideal. As unfavorable as the South African political climate was, it was actually
the most democratic and most stable government accessible to the United States
on the continent at the time.
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The question is immediately raised is “Democratic for who?” On July 10, 1973, NASA
Administrator James C. Fletcher announced that NASA was pulling out of South Africa
completely by 1975.232

Throughout the various issues with NASA and access to their satellite tracking stations,
the undertones of the space race segment of the global Cold War are clear. The space
race in and of itself was endemic of the global Cold War; however, there was little
concern to the retention of the satellite stations due to the threats by the Soviet
expansionism in South Africa proper. The issue of the tracking stations uniquely crosses
U.S. civil rights issues with those of South Africa’s apartheid. The pressure of the global
Cold War further aggravated the situation because policy employed in this situation could
have potentially impacted decisions in other areas, such as the naval ports.
NASA and the Department of Defense satellite and missile tracking stations was
another reason the U.S. wanted to maintain friendly relations with the South African
government. Had they decided to relocate all their ships to Kenya, for example, they
would risk losing access to the vital tracking stations in Johannesburg. For the U.S. it
was far more beneficial to maintain the status quo with South Africa then risk losing
access to their strategic location, particularly in light of the space race that had
preoccupied the scientific community. However, this situation is unique in and of itself
because it is a clear example of the U.S. allowing apartheid to be used to support its own
efforts in the space race.
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The Diggs Commission’s directly conveyed the connection of South Africa’s
importance to the U.S. despite the close connection of U.S. policy and apartheid. He
proved that U.S. government dollars were supporting apartheid directly. The U.S. paid
for a significant amount of the tab accrued by the NASA- CSIR satellite tracking station
in Johannesburg. That money paid for property, maintenance, and staffing in
Johannesburg. At the station, they heavily employed apartheid policy when hiring,
paying, and housing the black African staff. Despite his findings, Congress was split.
Some members found it abhorrent that the U.S. would knowingly support apartheid to
this extent. However, other members felt it was irrelevant as the stations were helping to
advance the U.S. in the space race. There was complete disregard for apartheid in
exchange for benefitting the U.S. scientifically and militarily.
All branches of the U.S. government knew that supporting the satellite and missile
tracking stations was controversial. In NSAM No. 295 of April 1964, it was declared that
the stations should be kept secret as they did not want a negative backlash to come from
the public. It also asked NASA and the Department of Defense to be prepared to move
their tracking stations at a moment’s notice for fear of the South African government
pulling the plug on the project or the public finding out and needing to move so as to not
be seen as being supportive of apartheid through disregard of South Africa’s policies.
The controversy surrounding the tracking stations is a clear example of the U.S.
government making decisions based on the global Cold War, more specifically the space
race component of the global Cold War. They were involved in the space race, which
saw a restructuring of NASA and the educational system. South Africa’s stations were
certainly involved in this. However, holding onto the stations was intertwined with
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access to naval and air fields. It was more complicated than just wanting to maintain the
bases for the sake of beating the Soviets in the space race. The Johannesburg station was
crucial in landing a man on the moon, and therefore policy decisions reflect the need to
win the space race.
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Chapter Four: Weapons Sales to South Africa
South Africa has a significant amount of natural wealth that was exploited from
the 1860s on. The result was to provide enough extra cash to build a strong military
infrastructure. During the 1960s, the South African government wanted to buy weapons,
artillery, and vehicles. Despite having the cash and the ability to carry, they did have a
difficult time maneuvering around the various embargoes that were placed on them by
the UN and the U.S. Executive branch. Regardless, they still obtained weapons even
after the heavy international criticism that followed the Sharpeville Massacre. The sale
of weapons on behalf of the U.S. and international community is an important indicator
of the relationship South Africa had with the U.S., which was one of productivity. While
weapons sales were not nearly as important to the U.S. to maintain as, say, port and air
field usage, a positive relationship was important and the sale of weapons could smooth
any ruffled political feathers fairly quickly.
Much of South Africa’s productivity was built off the backs of those inflicted by
apartheid. The non-white population was vital to the efforts of industrialization. To keep
the non-white population in check, numerous laws involving Bantustans, pass laws,
education prohibition, and censorship, among others, were passed to keep the population
encased in what could be compared to indentured servitude. The South African
Executive branch saw to it that they had the weapons necessary to keep this population in
line with their rules and goals. In 1960-1961, the estimated military budget for the South
African government was $44 million Rand. In 1965-1966, it was $230 million Rand. In
1970-1971 it was $257.1 million Rand. By 1975-1976, when the economic boom would
begin to fizzle, the South African government had a military budget of $948 million
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Rand.233 While it can be argued that South Africa felt the need for security as its
European colonized neighbors were gaining independence rapidly throughout the second
half of the twentieth century, it is difficulty to not see the parallels between the passing of
decrees and laws during this time and the need for enforcement on the home front. From
1967-1971, pass laws were being stringently enforced. A result was that three million
people were arrested during this time period for pass violations. This is equivalent to
25% of the population of Africans in South Africa. On average, the police were arresting
1,649 people daily.234
This chapter will look at the embargoes set forth by the U.S. government and the
UN and how they were broken repeatedly in the 1960s and 1970s. There was a
connection between weapons sales and the desire to have good relations with the South
African government. While some historians, such as Anna-mart van Wyk, claim that the
weapons sales were to keep the South Africa government in the U.S.’s good graces
because they were an important ally against the communist threat, they were actually
used to keep access to ports and NASA space stations in an effort to stay ahead of the
Soviets in the global Cold War.235 South Africa was too good an ally geographically and
economically to throw away over the sale of weapons that could potentially be used in
the war for apartheid.

Historical Context to Economic Importance of South Africa:
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South Africa became economically important for Europeans as early as 1652
when the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a base at the Cape of Good
Hope. The ships traveling through the Cape of Good Hope were traveling to East Asia
for the VOC. With the establishment of this base came a large influx of Europeans who
sought to provide food, supplies, and soldiers to help support the VOC. Permanent
establishments housed Europeans whose task was to grow wheat and vegetables and to
breed cattle and sheep.236 Though the VOC did not have the intention to acquire a large
colony to support the fort at Table Bay, it did provide a basis for later colonial conquest
of South Africa. The farms that were to be temporary support for the VOC became
permanent and more expansive.237
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the European population
steadily grew. There were many causes for the influx of Europeans, including French
Protestants fleeing persecution in 1685. Other Europeans fled confinement, regulation,
taxes, and various types of persecution in Europe. Also Dutch and German sailors and
soldiers working for the VOC began to move to South Africa permanently.238 By 1806,
when the British took control of the colony, there were 27,000 Europeans permanently
residing in South Africa.239
During the nineteenth century, under British rule, farming grew exponentially in
South Africa. As opposed to the Dutch, the British encouraged permanent settlement by
Europeans because they wanted the colony to become self-sufficient in its costs to the
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British Empire. From wineries to wool, the British began to expand on the production of
goods for export to Europe in South Africa. For example, merino wool was exported at a
quantity of 20,000 lbs in 1822 to Europe. By 1862, it had climbed to 26,000,000 lbs.240
British territorial expansion was slow and methodical during the nineteenth
century. This was not without conflict from the African kingdoms that resided in the
annexed areas and the Boers, descendants of the Dutch who moved inland to farm.
While, in most cases, the various African kingdoms were easily defeated, the Boers
proved to be more of a challenge. The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 marked the
completion of the process of annexing the whole of South Africa for the British. The war
was very destructive to property and life, with 22,000 British troops, 26,000 Boer women
and children, and 14,000 African internees being killed. Over 30,000 farmsteads were
destroyed as well.241 While this war did result in British annexation of South Africa, it
did not have a clear political outcome for the Boers. Boers were allowed to govern
themselves under the British and they were allowed to keep much of their land, with
encouragement from the British to continue farming and developing the South African
countryside.242
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, South Africa experienced a
mineral revolution that would build up their economy for decades to come and encourage
foreign investment. Diamonds were initially discovered in 1867 in the north-eastern
Cape. By 1880, the De Beers Consolidation Mines, under the control of Cecil Rhodes,
had monopolized the industry by buying up land with known and potential diamond
240
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shafts in it.243 The mining of diamonds rapidly increased upon the discovery of diamond
shafts. In 1872, output of diamonds surpassed 1,000,000 carats. By 1888, output of
diamonds totaled over 3,500,000 carats. Also, in 1884, major deposits of gold were
discovered in the Transvaal in unique reef-like formations. By 1910, exports of gold
equaled £27,000,000. 244
When the Depression hit, South Africa’s exports dropped by 25%. This included
diamond sales, which nearly collapsed during the early 1930s. However, in 1933, the
value of gold skyrocketed.245 In 1930, gold was worth £4 per ounce and by 1970 it was
worth £13 per ounce.246 By the late 1930s, South Africa was exporting an annual average
of £80,000,000 of gold per year. Although gold and diamond mining was not the sole
cause, it did significantly contribute to the growth of South Africa’s GDP by 67%
between 1933-1939.247
The success of the gold market encouraged the South African government to
industrialize. Industries producing machinery, electrical equipment, explosives, wire
cable, cement, and footwear all began to experience major growth. It also stimulated coal
mining and the generation of electricity to provide for the growing need of energy.
Transportation, namely railroads, was also expanded. Because of this explosion, South
Africa saw the need for doctors, lawyers, geologists, accountants, bankers, engineers, and
educators grow.248
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During WWII, the U.S. private sector began to invest in South Africa. By 1943,
South Africa saw U.S.-owned assets reach $86.6 million, including $50.7 million in
direct investments. Johnson and Johnson, Colgate-Palmolive, and Coca-Cola all found
markets in South Africa. Also, South African became the seventh largest market for U.S.
auto parts and accessories.249 In 1958, Charles Engelhard, a U.S. citizen who ran a
network of companies with enormous holdings in chromium, coal, gold, and uranium,
arranged for a $30 million U.S. bank loan to the South African government, which helped
keep South African government and industry afloat right after the Sharpeville Massacre
in 1960.250 Chromium and uranium were both significant to the U.S. in the context of the
global Cold War because they could be used to make better weapons, weapons delivery
systems, and vehicles, such as tanks. For example, chromium is used to harden steel and
can be used in missiles and tanks alike to make a stronger machine. Between 1966-1970,
the South African economy was still flourishing at a growth rate of 7%.251

Weapons Sales under Kennedy:
President Kennedy attempted to put pressure on the South African government,
particularly after the Sharpeville Massacre, but he was up against domestic, international,
and bureaucratic backlash should he do so. The Defense Department valued over flight
rights, the use of South African ports, both naval and air, and information on Soviet ship
movement in the Indian Ocean. The Commerce Department wanted to continue spending
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and investing in the region as South Africa was a viable market. The Treasury
Department was worried about the potential destabilizing effect that the disruption of the
gold flow could have on the international monetary system. And, finally, the CIA wanted
to protect its close relationships to its South African contacts.252
Between 1958-1970, South Africa’s defense budget multiplied seven-fold to $350
million in 1970s dollars. The army possessed 200 tanks, the navy had 30 warships and
three submarines, and the air force had 44 British jets, 50 French Mirage fighter-bombers,
80 helicopters, and over 100 other types of military aircraft. They developed and built
sophisticated underground radio communication centers, underground air defense radar
stations, and five “anti-terrorist” training centers.253 Despite having a lucrative export
business of minerals, South Africa could not build up the largest military in the region
without some outside help. The United States, France, and England were all responsible
for helping to build up their military, despite numerous embargoes and the risk of bad
publicity should their aid be found out.
A subsequent question that follows the statistics presented on the growth of the
South African military would naturally be “why.” While South Africa found itself at war
in the 1970s with Angola, it was largely concerned with upholding apartheid, particularly
as their cushion of apartheid-friendly neighbors began to dissipate. South Africa felt that
it was necessary to uphold a “total strategy” policy that involved the mobilization of all
forces- diplomatic, economic, political, and military- in defense of apartheid. This not
only included total control of its people internally, but striking absolute fear in its

252

Massie, 213.
Ibid, 245.

253

128

neighbors should they consider aiding anti-apartheid groups. South Africa also liked
being the heart of the transportation and communications systems and did not want
neighboring countries to replace them; thus, South Africa aggressively pursued its total
strategy in its neighboring countries in a series of undeclared wars, namely South West
Africa.254
The development of the NASA base in South Africa was not just for assistance to
NASA flights, but it also housed a missile tracking station. In a letter to Under Secretary
of State Chet Bowles from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric dated
March 16, 1961, Gilpatric wanted to know how essential it was to have a station in South
Africa. He stated:
Many months ago it became clear that the full development of our national
missile and space vehicle capability would require the geographical extension of
our Atlantic Missile Range facilities into the general area of southeastern Africa.
Such facilities are required for the testing of missiles at ranges over 5000 miles….
Furthermore, he said that a ship-based station could not remotely satisfy the need for
local airfield support to promote the long-range missile tests. With the State Department,
NASA, and South African government already on board and okay to create the longrange missile testing site, it seemed futile to avoid using the NASA base also as a base to
do long-range missile testing.255 In further correspondence, Bowles did mention concern
for the racial policies, as Sharpeville was still fresh in the minds of the U.S. government
when dealing with South Africa. Gilpatric addressed those concerns in a letter dated May
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17, 1961, saying that the support provided at this base for the long-range ballistic missile
tests were of “recognized importance to national security.”256
Upon hearing about the agreement made between the U.S. and South Africa,
Adlai Stevenson, then the Representative to the U.N., wrote a letter to Secretary of State
Dean Rusk on June 2, 1961 stating:
While I am not fully informed about the necessity for this transaction, I am
sufficiently concerned to presume to send you this note of caution. At a time
when the feeling about apartheid and the policy of the Union of South Africa is
rising everywhere, including pressure for sanctions in the U.N., I would think that
the necessity must be very compelling to risk the repercussions from a transaction
of this kind if and when it becomes known, as it must be inevitably. I hardly need
add that relations with the rest of Africa, and especially the new states, are
important to our security too.257
Stevenson knew how bad public and foreign relations the U.S. could get by tying
themselves so pivotally to South Africa. To Stevenson, it was an unnecessary and fairly
risky new move in the light of relationships with the newly emerging African states.
It would not be long before the access to the missile and satellite tracking stations
would become connected to the sale of weapons. On June 30, 1961, the State
Department informed the Department of Defense that there was a deal on the table for
large aircraft to be sold from Lockheed to the South African government. The U.S. State
Department initially could not authorize the sale, but would delay giving Lockheed the
final decision until the negotiations for a two-year contract allowing access to the missile
and satellite tracking stations was complete.258
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A few months later in September 1961, it became clear that there was a growing
connection between weapons sales and access to the tracking stations. The South African
Embassy sought formal approval from the U.S. to buy seven C-130s from Lockheed:
It is Ambassador Satterthwaite’s view that refusal of the sale may foreclose any
further South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense and make it
impossible to negotiate arrangements for the continued use of the tracking
facilities.259
The U.S. found itself in a tight spot because they wanted to make good on an intended
practice of quid pro quo where they got access to the tracking stations in exchange for
weapons, but they were fearful of the potential backlash they would receive from the
domestic and international community should they approve the $100 million sale of
airplanes. To bout, should the U.S. have denied them the sale, South Africa would have
still gotten the planes from France, thus upsetting the potential access to the tracking sites
and an American corporation.260 The sale would ultimately be approved on September
29, 1961.261

French Interests in Africa:
France had a vested interest in Africa and would prove to be a potential
competitor for arms sales to South Africa with the U.S. government. Along with Britain,
France also had an African empire, with the bulk of their colonies located in northern and
western Africa. The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 had implications for the
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French government that moved past the Middle East and into northern and western
Africa. In its failure to capture the Suez Canal and remove Nasser from power, the
French government soon saw a renewed vigor in its African colonies to gain
independence. The leadership of the independence movements in the colonies saw the
Anglo-French fiasco of Suez as a sign of the collapse of the colonial system throughout
the world, including Africa.262
As Charles de Gaulle assumed power as president of France in 1958, he faced an
African constituency that demanded freedom from its colonizers. The French
government had already granted Tunisia and Morocco independence in 1956. However,
Algeria, home to over one million French, would be different. Between 1956-1958, a
brutal war was waged between the Algerians and the French. This war would ultimately
come to an end under de Gaulle. In September 1959, de Gaulle stated publicly that
Algerians had a right to determine their own future. At the Evian Conference in France
in May 1961, negotiations began between the two governments to usher in independence
through a referendum to be held on July 1, 1962. Over 6 million Algerians voted for
independence and thus earned it on July 3, 1962.263
With independence in the other French West and Equatorial African colonies in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, came the need to establish a continued French military
presence to support newborn local security forces, to assure stability in the region, and to
protect French citizens and their interests in the newly independent states. De Gaulle
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realized that having a full-blown French military in the former colonies would be
politically undesirable and very expensive, thus he sought to provide local forces with the
resources and training they would need to uphold the goals of having a military presence
in the former French colonies.264 In essence, de Gaulle’s military strategy was that of
“out of sight, but not out of mind”:
President de Gaulle saw clearly… that the large colonial army could best be used
as the nucleus for the formation of national armies. Although a continued French
military presence in the newly independent countries might be desirable from a
French point of view, it should be discreetly limited in size and restricted to a few
carefully chosen bases and logistics facilities. To combine effective deterrence
with political sensitivity, the French sword must be out of sight, but not out of
mind.265
To sustain this policy, de Gaulle’s government had to assure access to weapons and
training to the former French colonies.
The French government expanded its military assistance through formal
agreements to other former non-French colonies including the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda,
the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Cameroon, among others. The rationale behind the
expansion was to protect economic interests, often in the form of raw materials, and to
protect French residents.266 Although the French did not have a formal agreement with
South Africa, they justified the selling of weapons to South Africa as being a contribution
to the safety of South Africa from external threats.267 Thus, the French became major
sellers of weapons to the South African government throughout the 1960s and 1970s and
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would become a constant competitor to the U.S. Executive branch, which sought to sell
weapons to South Africa to help maintain positive relations with them.
Africa would not be the only location where de Gaulle, Kennedy, and Johnson
would have conflicting interests. In addition to the challenge of weapons sales, de Gaulle
also sought to improve relations with Latin America. After becoming President, de
Gaulle traveled to Latin America in early 1961 to strengthen diplomatic ties.268 Relations
between Kennedy (and later carrying over into Johnson’s presidency) and de Gaulle
became more complicate when de Gaulle opposed a joint plan for coordinated defense of
the Atlantic. Why he rejected a joint plan for defense of the Atlantic is unclear, but it was
most likely part of de Gaulle’s goal to establish French policy in Latin America as he saw
fit, rather than fitting his foreign policy goals into that of what the U.S. White House had
already established.269

Kennedy’s Embargo Challenged:
In 1963, the South African government asked for submarines; however, this
request was tangled up in the embargo the U.S. imposed on South Africa in August 1963.
In a speech given by Stevenson to the UN on August 2, 1963, the U.S. announced its
official position to stop selling weapons to South Africa:
…the United States has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding the sale
to the South African Government of arms and military equipment, whether from
government or commercial sources, which could be used by that government to
enforce apartheid….
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There was, of course, a stipulation to the embargo of weapons, namely that existing
contracts would be honored and that weapons used for “defense against external threats,
such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines” must be honored.270 These
segments of Stevenson’s speech eventually gave the U.S. enough wiggle room to justify
the sale of several different types of weapons, including small arms and planes.
The immediate aftermath of the speech created much speculation among the
South African government and invigorated UN members. While various African
countries cheered the action by the U.S., it was speculated that the South African
government would seek retaliation. The New York Times stated that, “Much American
investment could suffer and United States Government agencies in the country, such as
missile-tracking stations, could find their facilities withdrawn.”271 Regardless, the UN,
possibly inspired by Stevenson’s speech, followed suit and banned arms shipments,
ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa in a 9-0 vote on August 7, 1963. The
original draft of the resolution called for a boycott of all South African goods to refrain
from exporting materials of military value; however that was removed from the
resolution.272
The U.S. immediately had to deal with several situations challenging the
embargo, the first of which was the sale of four 1700 ton attack submarines that the South
African Naval Chief of Staff “urgently” requested on March 16, 1963, five months before
the embargo was set into motion. Each submarine would have cost $40 million. At the
time, U.S. policy was to sell military equipment for external defense only, which made
270
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the U.S. Executive branch look at this request closely. Rusk told President Kennedy that
a “yes” to the sale would be very beneficial for good military relations, help keep
tracking stations open, and provide an alternative for the Suez should there be a crisis
there again. He did not say why a “no” would be beneficial, as he feared that relations
with the South African government were deteriorating and saying no to the sale might
have been a serious casualty for them. He asked Kennedy for guidance, but it is clear
that he was hoping for approval on the sales.273
Rusk elaborated further on why he thought the U.S. should sell the submarines to
South Africa. He felt that by selling South Africa weapons, the U.S. would maintain a
hand in helping to influence and promote human rights and democratic ideals. This
would echo that later established NSSM-39. In addition, he said, “But I believe it is
worth reminding ourselves that there are other states where obnoxious practices of one
sort or another exist.” He listed countries such as Korea, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
and Turkey to make his point. Furthermore, he said:
I will admit that apartheid presents a case of unusual difficulty but I would not put
it ahead of the violations of human rights within the communist bloc or in the
certain countries governed on authoritarian basis with which we have correct and
sometimes even friendly relations.274
Rusk clearly felt it was a good idea to sell the submarines, and possibly other weapons, as
the U.S. had in the past looked the other way when there were clear violations happening
in the name of maintaining precious allies, particularly in regions of value, such as the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe.
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Although he was not specifically commenting on the sale of submarines to South
Africa, on July 11, 1963, McNamara weighed on the weapons sales debate in a letter to
Rusk. He was a moderate in the debate, seeing both advantages and disadvantages on
selling weapons. On the one hand, he knew the importance of maintaining good
relationships with South Africa, particularly in light of U.S. military and NASA access to
the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station, saying, “this station has contributed greatly to
our missile development and other space programs and will continue to be important after
1963, although not vital.” However, he felt it necessary to take into consideration
upsetting the “African bloc.” McNamara felt it was essential to maintain positive
relationships with other sub-Saharan African nations should the U.S. lose access to South
African ports and airfields. In short, McNamara stated, “Given these considerations, it
should be our basic objective, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid prejudicing our
relationship with either side in this dispute.” He was hoping that there would not even be
a vote in the UN to have serious economic sanctions and an arms embargo against South
Africa.275
Ultimately, McNamara would lean towards Rusk’s side in advocating for the sale
of the submarines to South Africa. Rusk and McNamara made a strong case to sell
submarines to South Africa. Their first point referenced a statement South African
Foreign Minister Louw said on September 10, in which the U.S. and Britain could not
count on continued support against communism and that the Simonstown Agreement on
use of naval facilities might be dissolved in the wake of statements the British and U.S.
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made at the UN and in other venues about apartheid. Their second point focused on how
U.S. companies that produced ships stood to make $75-90 million for the sale of the
submarines, thus benefitting the U.S. balance of payments. The third and final point
specifically stated how the U.S.
must remember that the South Africans agreed to establish the missile and
satellite tracking facilities because of an exchange of Aide Memoires on June 15,
1962, which noted that the U.S. was willing give ‘prompt and sympathetic
attention to reasonable requests for the purchase of military equipment required
for the defense against external aggression.’276
This illustrates the connection between access to facilities to the sale of weapons to South
Africa.
Kennedy responded more cautiously to the sale of submarines. By the time of his
assassination, the South African navy had modified their request to smaller submarines
totaling a value of $38 million. They also wanted a $35-40 million air defense system for
the Simonstown Naval Base.277 On September 23, 1963 it was made clear that Kennedy
wished to table the sale of the submarines:
The U.S. can make no decision before the end of this year regarding the sales and
any eventual decision will be taken in the light of the circumstances at the time
the questions considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in
August.278
This issue would not be resolved until Johnson’s administration due to Kennedy’s
assassination.
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Even though the sale of the submarines was continually getting tabled, various
personnel- diplomatic and military- weighed in on the issue. In November 1963, a team
was sent to South Africa to discuss the sale of the submarines. The team ultimately
recommended that they do sell the South African government three conventional
submarines.279 It is unclear specifically who was on the team, but various members of
the Defense Department were involved. On April 13, 1964 Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff Maxwell D. Taylor highly recommended to Secretary of Defense McNamara that
the sale of the submarines should be completed. He believed that not selling the weapons
would compromise U.S. military interests in the country, of which there were many,
namely the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station. He felt that there was a resentment
growing among the South African government and military towards the U.S. and the
quick, decisive sale of the submarines would help smooth this over.280 Ultimately, the
sale of the submarines would be fatally postponed upon the release of NSAM No. 295 in
April 1964.281
A New York Times article from October 10, 1963 praised the U.S. government for
following through on the arms embargo, regardless of debating the idea to sell
submarines to the South African navy. Despite filling remaining contracts to sell them $3
million of air-to-air missiles, submarine torpedoes, and spare parts for seven C-130
transport planes, the U.S. was seen as holding up the embargo.282 There is no mention of
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submarine sales. Although, one has to wonder, given the context of Stevenson’s speech,
and the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would selling submarines
have violated the embargo? Stevenson specifically stated that if the weapons were for the
general defense of South Africa, that they would not be blocked. This would become an
issue under the Johnson administration.

Weapons Sales Under Johnson:
President Johnson’s interaction with South African weapons sales was more or
less much of the same as what Kennedy did. On one hand, he acknowledged the arms
embargo, but at the same time was still selling them weapons that did not overtly violate
the U.S. and UN arms embargo. Johnson’s administration dealt with the Roosevelt
incident and retained the satellite and missile tracking stations. However, they had a
favorable situation in that South Africa was continually seeking U.S. approval and trying
to stay in the U.S.’s good graces due to the negativity associated with its racial policies.
Johnson’s administration lacked consistency in its policy choices towards South
Africa. The reality was that the arms embargo had too many loop holes and the U.S. was
fearful that they would lose access to invaluable ports and tracking facilities, despite the
reality that South Africa was not going anywhere, barring any major embargoes. In
addition, Johnson had an administration that was split on how to deal with South Africa.
One side, represented by UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, was that of zero tolerance.
He argued that the State Department should discourage any more investment in South
Africa and to try and void any existing contracts already in place. He wanted a total arms
embargo, despite the fact that France was becoming a major supplier of arms. On the
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other side, Undersecretary of State George Ball opposed all that Goldberg stood for. He
vehemently opposed the 1962 arms embargo because he felt that South Africa’s
weapons’ industry and economy were developed well enough that the sanctions would
not work.283
In a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa on
January 11, 1964, shortly after Johnson took office, Rusk clarified the U.S.’s position on
weapons sales. This memo provided the justification needed to skirt around the
provisions of the arms embargo, thus helping establish Johnson’s policy on weapons
sales to the South African government. The telegram clarified that there was certainly a
need to uphold the December 4 and August 2, 1963 announcements made by Stevenson
at the UN to embargo arms that might be used to uphold apartheid. However, if weapons
were “for maintenance of international peace and security and for the common defense
effort in the interest of the world community” then it would be highly considered. In
addition, the telegram points out very clearly that the satellite and missile tracking station
access was contingent on weapons sales and that should the U.S. chose to fully enforce
the embargo that they would most likely need to vacate with six months’ notice.284
On April 24, 1964, the National Security team put out NSAM No. 295. This
memo made three pivotal decisions. First, it stated that, “Existing policy regarding
military sales to South African will be continued.” Essentially, weapons being sold for
international defense would continue to be sold, except for the submarines, which were to
be postponed and considered at a later date. Second, it suspended applications for U.S.
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government loans and investment guarantees, thus protecting what investments were
already there, but preventing further investment from happening. Finally, it also gave
NASA and the Department of Defense a warning that they should be ready to close up
their programs and move to an alternative placement at six-months’ notice.285
Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were visibly irritated by it, as they felt
that their views and expertise were not represented in NSAM Mo. 295. They were very
concerned that it would force the South African government into having upper hand,
particularly in concern to the missile and satellite tracking stations, because the U.S. had
now solidified their position in supporting the arms embargo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
felt that the NSAM No. 295 would force the U.S. to follow its previous mandates to a “T”
and close loopholes that already existed to allow for some sales of weapons.286 In
addition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor specifically said:
As long as communist penetration and racial discord in African remain an active
threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the United
States should do everything that its political and moral position permits to
contribute to this.287
The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s decisions were governed by Cold War experience. They
wanted the Executive branch should head their advice and curb NSAM No. 295 as the
South Africa government was a very important ally militarily for the U.S., particularly in
relation to port and airfield access.
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The NSAM No. 295 was immediately challenged when the South African
government asked Lockheed to sell them 16 P3-A ASW aircraft. This sale would total
about $100 million for the U.S. company. On August 31, 1964, the South African
government informed Lockheed that if they did not sell them the aircraft, that they would
instead order French Breguet Atlantique planes. The Departments of Treasury,
Commerce, and Defense were all supportive of the sale, but the Executive branch was
hesitant to make a move on the sale. The reality was that South Africa provided a great
market for weapons sales, as it was estimated that they would potentially buy $300-$400
million dollars over the next five years on weapons. However, the NSAM No. 295
stopped and shelved all sales.288
The Lockheed sale was ultimately not approved. William H. Brubeck of the
National Security Staff informed MacGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, that:
You should realize that in the eyes of almost all the world this sale associates us
with the British, French, and Portuguese as helping the South Africans- and the
rest of the world includes, with varying degrees of intensity, everyone from
NATO partners like Norway, through Latin America to the Afro-Asians. I don’t
want to overstate the practical significance of this, but its symbolic and emotional
impact does count for something- the racism issue is, in the long run, a real one in
coping with the Chicoms.289
Clearly, diplomatic rationale trumped Cold War rationale, as provided by Taylor in the
previous memo. The U.S. government was clearly walking a thin line between keeping
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an important ally and not forsaking their other allies in the region or in similar
developmental status, such as Kenya.
A National Intelligence Estimate (N.I.E.) was published on May 20, 1964 by the
CIA analysts. This largely focused on South African relations with the West and their
prospects for change. The first sentence of the N.I.E. is, “The Nationalist government is
firmly entrenched in power….” The N.I.E. goes on to lay out why exerting change in
South Africa would be difficult if not completely fruitless, stating, “We consider it
unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the
government to alter its basic domestic policies.”290 Part of the reason that the Nationalist
government would not change is because they did not need to- the opposition in South
Africa, such as the United Party, was divided and had such a small percentage of the vote
in past elections (this is among white voters, as blacks were disenfranchised). In
addition, South Africa was moving quickly towards self-sufficiency, largely driven by the
gold industry and successful foreign investments.291 White South Africans did not want
to change- the majority of white South Africans wanted to maintain apartheid as they
benefitted greatly from it.292
The May 20th N.I.E. discussed at length the probability of success in outside
forces bringing change to South African racial policies. The CIA argued, “We consider it
unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the
government to alter its basic domestic policies.” One of the reasons for the likelihood of
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change being slim was because the CIA was concerned that economic sanctions on South
Africa would be nearly impossible to carry out. The reality was that the countries that
would need to enforce the embargo were economically intertwined with South Africa,
such as the U.K. The 1963 arms embargo exemplified the potential failure of a more
drastic embargo. The CIA pointed out the enormous holes within the embargo that
countries could literally fit a submarine through, saying:
South Africa still has little difficulty in obtaining adequate supplies of arms of all
sorts. For example, arrangements have recently been made to produce small arms
under license from various Western European firms.
The French, British, and Americans were able to get away with continuing to send arms
so long as they were not for upholding apartheid, but rather in defense of the country.293
More specifically, the CIA felt it highly unlikely that the U.S. would want to
establish and uphold a more stringent embargo. They had many reasons to put off
establishing a loftier embargo. At the top of that list was the missile and satellite tracking
station. Also, the U.S. had over $600 million of private investment, which was seen as a
source for considerable leverage by the South Africans.294 In addition, the U.S. liked
having access to naval ports in the post-Suez crisis world. Like the British and the
French, the U.S. was too entwined economically to effectively enforce an embargo.
In 1965, a National Policy Paper on South Africa clearly laid out the economic
and military prowess the South African government had in the region and with its trading
partners. Their military had emerged to be fully modernized and efficient on the ground,
air, and sea. Ultimately, their goal was to be completely self-sufficient economically and
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militarily. Their shortages in basics were in petroleum products, some automotive and
airplane parts, wheat, cotton, and rubber. However, they did produce over 50% of the
world’s gold and sold large amounts of its uranium to the U.S. and U.K., thus creating a
situation in which they could trade for the materials they needed. And trade they did, not
only in gold and uranium, but also livestock, sugar, wool, and fruit. In addition to trade,
the South African government encouraged foreign investment to help obtain their goal of
self-sufficiency. The British exceeded over $3 billion in investment, while the U.S. had
over $600 million. Businessmen found it agreeable to invest there, as they had very high
returns on their investments.295
The National Policy Paper contemplated what appropriate steps the U.S. should
take in South Africa in order to retain the international community’s good graces but also
to maintain investments and maximize from a supple market:
Difficulties of enforcement, adverse effects on the people of South Africa as well
as the race relations situation, and the consequences for other countries, such as
the UK, all need more searching analysis that is currently being undertaken in the
Department of State.
Ultimately, the National Policy Paper laid out a series of questions for which there was
no easier answer:
Should the US avoid intervention in South Africa because the short-term situation
is relatively stable and might be worsened by interference? Should the US join in
treatment of South Africa as a pariah nation and back up this condemnation with
pressures going beyond the arms embargo? Is apartheid so dangerous to
international order in Africa and so susceptible to Communist exploitation that the
US must seek ways to resolve the issue? …Are there constructive ways in which
the US and its allies can show South Africa a path toward racial harmony?
…Failing these, should we progressively dissociate the US from South Africa
with respect to arms, space, investment, trade and cultural relations?296
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These questions ultimately shaped the issues that Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon’s
administrations dealt with when discussing weapons sales, the satellite and tracking
stations, and the use of naval ports. The South African government had so much to offer
as an ally during the Cold War that apartheid almost became forgivable, even during the
height of the Civil Rights Movement.
Regardless of NSAM No. 295 and the National Policy Paper, the sale of weapons
continued. Despite the Joint Chiefs of Staff being concerned that NSAM No. 295 and the
embargo would ultimately close any loopholes to allow for weapons sales, the loopholes
still existed. It is essential to remember that the original arms embargo, as stated by
Stevenson in front of the UN, allowed for the sale of weapons so long as it was for the
national defense of South Africa. NSAM No. 295 did not change this. The arms
embargo and NSAM No. 295 would be tested in 1966-1967 with the approval of sales for
Cessnas to South Africa.
On February 21, 1966, the sale of eight Cessna Aircraft (Model 411), worth $1.5
million, was discussed at length by the State Department and National Security Affairs.
It is questionable as to why these eight Cessnas were a cause for concern, as 50 Cessnas
had already been approved for sale, totaling $39 million in sales. The State Department
made two very solid arguments as to why the Cessnas should not be sold. First, the intent
for the use of the aircraft was to survey and locate smugglers, as they were equipped with
a special type of radar. They were not for an external threat. This would very clearly
violate the UN arms embargo of 1963. Second, it would have been be very easy to use
these weapons in an unintentional way, such as to enforce apartheid among its
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population.297 It is clear that the U.S. State Department was fearful not only of violating
the arms embargo, but that their weapons would be directly used to enforce apartheid,
which could have been a political nightmare for the U.S.
Even though the Cessna sale was denied, presumably because of the embargo, it
did provoke a conversation about the extent to which other countries were following the
UN arms embargo, such as the U.K., France, and Italy. On December 20, 1967 Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Rostow informed Under Secretary of State
Katzenbach, Rostow that, “The basic problem is that we adhere to a more restrictive
interpretation of the Security Resolution that most other countries, while France openly
ignores it.” What prompted this concern were the sales of the French Mystere aircraft,
the Italian Piaggio aircraft, and the British Beagle 206 civilian aircraft. The Mystere jet
and Piaggio aircraft had U.S. engines and/or components in them, so the U.S. was
concerned, should they be following the arms embargo as it were stated, that they were
violating it. More importantly, it was unclear what the intent of the need for the weapons
were for South Africa. This created a difficult situation for the U.S.:
The net result is that the U.S. balance of payments suffers, the British balance of
payments suffers, we create friction with our European allies and give de Gaulle
another chance to say that you cannot do business with the United States without
ending up having the United States dominating your foreign policies.
Thus, it was recommended by Rostow to move towards a “more realistic application of
the arms embargo,” in particular that was more in line with the British who were at least
attempting to justify the sales by saying they were for the defense of South Africa. 298
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On February 17, 1967, UN Ambassador Goldberg wrote a letter to Secretary of
State Rusk stating his views on how to handle South Africa. He strongly felt that the
U.S. would be hurting not only themselves diplomatically if they continued to have any
sort of relations with the South African government, but the South Africans themselves.
He felt that is was far more important to protect their interests on the continent of Africa
over retaining relations with the South African government. Moving away from their
government was the U.S.’s only viable choice because Goldberg felt that U.S. persuasion
of the South African government was minimal at best. Pertaining specifically to weapons
sales, he said that the U.S. should:
Continue strictly to enforce the arms embargo including, as we have in the past
year, embargo of all dual purpose equipment for South African military, such as
trucks and executive-type aircraft for VIP transport, whether others do so or not.
At the same time, we should take whatever steps we can to assure that the arms
embargo is similarly observed by South Africa’s other trading partners and that
orders not filled United States suppliers are not thereby lost to competitors.299
It is unclear how Rusk took the advice from his UN ambassador, but based on events that
followed, it seems as if the advice fell on deaf ears. Whereas Goldberg was more
concerned about U.S. relations with the rest of the continent, other various government
officials were more concerned with the lack of adherence the other countries gave to the
UN embargo and its impact on U.S. private investment and access to ports and airfields,
as discussed previously. In addition, particularly under Nixon, it was felt that the U.S.
must retain connections to the South African government because they could influence
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their race relations positively, as expressed in NSSM 39, which will be discussed in the
next section.
On May 4, 1967, CIA analysts produced a second N.I.E. on South Africa. While
the N.I.E. largely focused on the issues South Africa was having with its sub-Saharan
neighbors, it did broach the subject of weapons sales. The N.I.E. stated:
South Africa especially wants to improve relations with the US and, if possible, to
obtain some expression of US approval for its attempts to appear more flexible. It
will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least
during the period of this estimate, provided that the US does not participate in
significant sanctions against South Africa. We believe, however, that the whites
will hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant
changes in South Africa’s policies either in response to domestic developments or
external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years.300
This statement generalized a steadfast belief that would structure much of the policy
choices around U.S.-South African relations.
In the N.I.E., the CIA addressed their relations with the west, more specifically,
the U.S., U.K., and France. The N.I.E. stated that, “South Africa values its affiliation
with the West and never fails to stress its strong anticommunism and its present and
potential importance to the West in military and strategic terms.”301 There are repeated
examples to confirm this in the chapters on the Roosevelt incident and the use of the
tracking stations. In fact, the CIA felt that Vorster’s government was trying campaign
specifically to the U.S. government to get greater sympathy for their plight and their
attempts at reform. They did not need to campaign so heavily to the U.K. and France for
several reasons. The U.K. had self-interest in deterring UN measures for sanctions
against South Africa because it would have seriously damaged the balance of payments
300
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owed to the U.K. France benefitted greatly from the embargo because they had begun to
make significant amounts of money off of South Africa’s military needs. They stood to
make an estimated $90 million annually in sales from the South Africans, selling them
such things as armored cars, electronic equipment, Mirage II jet aircraft, helicopters, and
submarines. Regardless of the close ties to the British and French, the South African
government still sought out the best relations with the U.S. because they regarded the
U.S. as “the leader of the West and the first line of defense against communism.” They
wanted to encourage U.S. trade and investment and were willing to provide the U.S. with
access to the space and tracking stations so long as there were no major sanctions placed
against them by the U.S.302
France was making serious economic gains on weapons sales to South Africa.
The French Consul General Romain Vuillaume met with the U.S. Consulate in Athens to
discuss weapons sales. Even though he said he would deny it publicly, Vuillaume
confirmed that the French government traded a significant amount of weapons- 100
aircraft, over 100 AMX tanks, two destroyers, and large quantities of other war materialsfor gold, as the gold market was doing very well. When he was asked how France would
manage such a large order, Vuillaume commented that they would “renege on other
commitments if necessary which were either already made or were reportedly in
process….” Vuillaume offered a similar argument that was echoed in the halls of the
U.S. State and Defense departments, which was that continued relations with the South
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African government might enable them to have some sway over their domestic and
international policies.303
A few months after the N.I.E. was published, it was found that a significant
amount of napalm and other dangerous chemicals were being produced at a plant in
Umbogintwini, Natal using U.S. machinery and parts. Even though U.S. citizens were
not necessarily employed at the M.W. Kellogg Company’s (Kellogg’s international
branch) sites in South Africa, they were there supervising the construction and operation
of an ammonia processing plant when they discovered, using “infra-red analyzers,” that
there had been some testing of bombs using nitrogen, methane, and ammonia. Much of
the reporting on the explosives development and testing was reported by Ray Browne, an
“instrumentation superintendent” working with M.W. Kellogg Company to help
construct and operate ammonia processing plants in South Africa. He reported, “ ‘There
are 2,500 pounds of liquid ammonia,’ and various other low flash point chemicals and
fuels that ‘could do a lot of damage if they got loose…’” In addition, even though they
had not observed any blasts, suspicious materials shipments to and from the plant had
workers on high alert.304
Not only was the U.S. State Department worried about the weapons production,
but they were worried about the extent that private U.S. companies were involved with
the production of materials such as napalm. In addition to Kellogg designing and
implementing usage of the plants, Motorola, Pacific Pumps, Mercoid Corporation, The
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Foxboro Company, Belco, and other various companies all helped contribute elements
that went into the processing plant. The high pressure tanks, centrifuges, the motors, the
pumps, the governor valves, all control equipment, walkie-talkies, and round storage
tanks were all provided by U.S. companies. It is unclear how much help South Africa got
from these companies, other than purchasing it, but it is fair to assume that some help in
assembly may have transpired, by Kellogg or the companies themselves.305 This is a
minor, but informative, blip on the weapons sales screen because it points to a weakness
in the arms embargoes and policies passed by various presidents- that of private
corporations looking to sell their products, despite what might be built with it.
On February 10, 1968, Goldberg received a note from Joseph J. Sisco, the
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. It was revealed that
U.S. policy reaffirmed the decision, and recommendation by Goldberg, that U.S.manufactured aircraft and aircraft components would still not be sold to the South
African government. This was in reference to the sale of Mystere 20 aircraft that was
sought by the South Africans. While this decision seems very clear, it was followed
immediately with the decision that U.S.-made components would still be exported to
“third countries” for re-exportation to South Africa in finished products, so long as the
finished products were not of a “ ‘weapons nature’”. In addition, there was a “Grey
Areas Committee” that met to decide on whether or not the “third country” weapons
components would visibly violate the embargo, because if they did the, sale would be
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denied.306 This letter is extremely significant because it very strongly alludes to the fact
that the U.S. government under Johnson still wanted to sell weapons to the South African
government so long as they did not get caught for violating the embargo. It also
mentioned a “Gray Areas Committee,” which was never mentioned previously, whose
job was seemingly to erase “Made in U.S.A” labels from components used on potential
weapons sold to the South African government.
The letter from Sisco to Goldberg barely preceded Senate Congress Resolution
60, produced February 28, 1968, which further opened the door to weapons sales to
South Africa, much to Goldberg’s demise. The resolution offered eight reasons to loosen
the arms embargo on South Africa. Among these eight reasons included recognizing
South Africa as an important ally in the Cold War diplomatically, that the U.S. may need
to rely on their ports and trade routes should another Suez crisis occur, and their
allowance for use of naval ports and airfields, particularly for the satellite and missile
tracking stations. Ultimately, they proposed:
That it is the sense of the Congress of the United States that the United States
Government immediate cease its unfair, harmful, arbitrary, and costly policy of
prohibiting the sale of military goods to the armed forces of the Republic of South
Africa in keeping with the needs of the Republic of South Africa in maintaining
her defenses against aggression and to allow the Republic of South Africa to be
military prepared to defend sea routes, coastline, and other areas vital to
maintaining peace in the world, and to allow the Republic of South Africa to
continue effective support as an ally to the United States.307
Congress essentially gave the U.S. State Department the okay to go ahead and sell
weapons directly, or indirectly through “third countries” to South Africa, as they saw it
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vital to positive relations with the South African government diplomatically and
militarily.
Under Johnson’s leadership, hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons
were sold to the South African government by the U.K., France, Italy, and U.S. The
British made ten-year contracts worth £200 million. This included 16 Buccaneer strike
aircraft, eight Nimron maritime reconnaissance machines, four missile frigates, six
HS125 light jet transports, as well as ship-to-air missiles, radar, and other equipment.308
The French flagrantly sold $100 million worth of weapons, including Mirage jets,
Alonette helicopters, AMX tanks, Panhard armored cars, and Daphne-class coastal
submarines.309 The U.S. also sold their share of weapons, including 22 Cessna Model185 light planes, Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, and AL-60 single-engine
transports. In addition to directly selling their own models, the U.S. supplied major
components, such as engines, to Italian aircraft that were sold to South Africa, including
the Piaggio P-166, the AerMacchi Am-3C, and the Atlas C-4M.310 Despite weapons
being sold, it could be argued that the U.S. had some sort of political conscience to at
least discuss the fact that weapons were being sold despite a U.S. government imposed
embargo in 1963, a UN embargo in 1964, and a restatement of embargo by the U.S. State
Department in NSAM No. 295. Regardless, the U.S. Executive branch skirted around the
embargo because they feared political reparations from the South African government
concerning their access to ports and the satellite and missile tracking stations.
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Weapons Sales Under Nixon:
With Nixon’s swearing in as president in 1969, he too found himself struggling
with U.S. foreign policy in weapons sales and base usage in South Africa. The
Department of Defense, namely the Chiefs of Staff, highly praised the South African
government’s aid in the global war against communism. They wanted to keep open the
avenues of communication created by weapons sales in exchange for base access. On the
other side, there was a softer voice that argued the U.S. government should not be selling
the South African government weapons, nor should they be utilizing their bases, as the
argument for change via monetary influence was a bad myth. Nixon’s response was to
unleash Kissinger and the National Security Council on the problem, thus producing
NSSM-39.
Upon discussing NSSM-39, there were five proposals set forth in December 1969,
prior to the publication of NSSM-39. Option one called for closer association with the
white regime in order to better protect the U.S.’s economic and strategic interests.
Option two sought closer relations with Pretoria in an effort to persuade it to move its
political system towards reform. Option three wanted highly limited cooperation with the
South African government in an attempt to safeguard its economic investments while
saving face in front of the international community. Option four suggested total
disassociation with Pretoria and closer relations with black nationalists. And, finally,
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option five wanted disassociation from both sides in order to become disentangled from a
problem that only was projected to get worse despite the west’s best efforts.311
Through time, it became evident that the first, fourth, and fifth options were not
agreeable by any department’s standards. While the State Department preferred option
three because they believed constructive engagement would not work, Roger Morris, the
architect of NSSM-39, Nixon and Kissinger all highly recommended option two because
they believed that change to apartheid would ultimately only come through them.312 One
historian, Joan Hoff, felt that option two was racially motivated, saying that it was “the
racist ‘tar baby’ policy adopted for all of Africa in 1970 favoring cooperation with white
minorities against black nationalist movements….”313 Whether or not it was racism or
some other driving factor, option two became the option of choice because white
minorities were seen as being permanent, whereas black nationalists could only find
success through violence or extreme political measures, such as communism, thus
making white minorities the only viable choice to support.314
Given the economic implications of doing anything but working with the South
African government, it was no surprise that the root of NSSM-39 became option two. At
the time that Nixon came into office, South Africa was the U.S.’s 15th largest capital
market, even though it only accounted for 2% of its total overseas earnings. The thirteen
largest companies in the U.S. owned 25% of all U.S. investment in South Africa. Also,
South Africa was responsible for providing the U.S. with six of its 35 most important
311

Coker, 19.
Massie, 236.
313
Joan Hoff, “A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1
(1996), 116.
314
Paul Rich, “United States Containment Policy, South Africa, and the Apartheid Dilemma,” Review of
International Studies 14, no. 3 (July 1988), 184.
312

157

commodity imports, including ferrochrome metals, manganese, chromium, and
vanadium, (all of which are used to make stainless steel) and nonferrous metal fluorspar
(helps purify steel) , and platinum (used to modify and strengthen various types of
metals).315 In addition, over 300 U.S. companies had invested there, thus helping the
United States to have a healthy trade balance with imports totaling over $600 million and
exports equaling $1,160 million by 1974.316
Nixon did face an elevation of tactics used in apartheid by Pretoria, which may
have made discussions around how to handle the relations more complicated. By
Nixon’s inauguration, South Africa had over 6,000 laws and 4,000 regulations, 60 public
statutes, and a full-fledged system of legal detention that was used to keep blacks
disenfranchised and disempowered.317 After 1968, Prime Minister John Vorster was
seemingly determined to separate development with an increased vigor; he wanted the
black majority to live on homelands separate from whites. Even though black South
Africans constituted 85% of the population, Vorster wanted them moved onto 13% of the
land.318 Vorster justified the moving of blacks onto the nine different Bantustans as a
return for them to their “homeland.” In reality, black South Africans faced being
uprooted from their homes in urban areas to a “homeland” many of them had never seen.
Also, there were not enough jobs in the Bantustan locations.319 Unfortunately for
Vorster, jobs that relied on lower waged workers, black Africans, were located in
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industrial centers away from the Bantustans. The act of total segregation was impossible
for Vorster as it would have unintended consequences of removing the cheap labor that
wealthy white South Africans so heavily relied on.320
By July 1970, African states had enough of the continued sales of weapons to the
South African government and pushed the UN to tighten its embargo on weapons to
South Africa. In a vote 12-0 on July 23, 1970, the UN approved Resolution 282, the
prohibition the sale of equipment or vehicles that could be used by the military. The
rationale for the bills was that the resolve of the arms embargoes from Resolutions 181,
182, and 191 dissolved at a rapid pace resulting in a heavily armed South African
Defense force. Resolution 282 reiterated the previous resolutions and broadened its
conditions.321 It included the ban of sales of spare parts, patents, and licenses for arms,
aircraft, and naval vessels. It also called for a ban against training South African forces
by UN member nations.322 The resolution also very specifically stated, “Calls upon all
States to strengthen the arms embargo by implementing fully the arms embargo against
South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever….” The U.S., U.K.,
and France all abstained from the vote.323
Regardless of increasing apartheid laws and the passing of Resolution 282, Nixon
still believed that option two of NSSM-39 was the best policy to implement regarding
South Africa. He, and Kissinger, made it clear that economic sanctions were not going to
work and that they should be avoided. However, an arms embargo was a different matter
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and was thus handled separately despite NSSM-39.324 In 1970, Nixon set out to resolve
the “gray area” issue of the 1963 arms embargo. The result was National Security
Decision Memorandum 81 (NSDM 81). In the August 17, 1970 memo, Nixon made it
clear that the U.S. was going to stick to the original 1963 arms embargo, but that some
clarification was needed. In NSDM 81, it specifically stated that nonmilitary dual-use
items which were “preponderantly employed for civilian use” would be manufactured
without military specifications. Also:
Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly used by military forces, but
which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security
operations, will be licensed for sale to civilian purchases for civilian use, and may
be licensed to military buyers… Such items will be built to military
specifications.
However, dual-use items that had a “clear and direct application to combat or internal
security operations (including aircraft suitable for troop transport), will not be licensed to
military buyers.” Under such guidelines, Nixon allowed the sale of Lear jets and Cessna
dual-engine 401s and 402s to the South African Defense Forces. However, Cessna
single-engine 180/ 185s, Lockheed Orion P-3Cs, and L-100 aircraft were not to be sold to
SADF.325
While NSDM 81 did try to clarify the so-called “gray area” sale of weapons, it
still allowed for the sale of some very serious weapons. During the 1970s, under Nixon,
Ford, and Carter, the U.S. sold South Africa M-47 tanks, Commodore V-150 and M-113
AI armored personnel carriers, M-109 155mm self-propelled guns, 205A Iroqouis
helicopters, Lockhead F-104FGA/ Interceptor, Lockhead L-100 transport, Augusta Bell
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205 A helicopter, M-47 Patton I Tank, M-113 AI armored personnel carrier, V-150/200
Commando personnel carrier, and M-109 155mm self-propelled guns.326 With the sale of
such weapons, it is unclear what NSDM 81 had planned to accomplish, other than
allowing civilians to buy and use planes that had military capabilities so long as they
were not manufactured to military specifications.
In addition to continuing to sell weapons to the South African government, the
U.S. State and Defense departments also continued to train South African Defense
Forces. In October 1970, the question of how to deal with continued training of the
SADF via training films and direct contact was discussed at length. In the memo it was
suggested, and eventually accepted, that the U.S. would continue to sell unclassified
defense training films to the SADF. In addition, SADF military personnel could
participate in military correspondence classes so long as they were unclassified, could not
be applied to internal security of South Africa, and were not related to combat training.
They could take classes in the areas of economics, management, law, and safety and
health. Finally, visits of SADF military personnel was to be kept at a minimal and with
the guidelines that it was not for training that could help with their military capacity and/
or if it significantly helped U.S. objectives.327 Although visits appeared to be curbed by
the U.S., it is still in direct violation of U.N. Resolution 282, which stated, “…by ceasing
provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all
other forms of military co-operation with South Africa.”328 It is unclear how many
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members of the SADF visited the U.S. during this time and for what purposes and how
many unclassified Department of Defense training videos were purchased.

The arms embargoes over Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon’s presidencies were influenced
for an implicit concern about apartheid. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very
concerned about the implications of the embargo on the global Cold War, the Executive
branch seemed more concerned with their continued access to the South African ports
and satellite and missile tracking stations and protecting investment within South Africa.
Even CIA analysts recognized that there was a minimal risk of the Cold War rearing its
head in the South African government in the form of black nationalists. Regardless of the
increasing restrictions of apartheid, the U.S. government continued to sell weapons to
South Africa in a vain attempt to influence the government, but more likely to retain its
economic, scientific, and military interests in the region, as they were far more valuable
in the context of the global Cold War than the ill-perceived threat of communism or
Soviet threats spreading in to South Africa via black nationalists.
Ironically, it was the U.S. under Kennedy that began to scrutinize the South
African policy of apartheid after Sharpeville and ultimately propose an arms embargo.
However, the U.S. allowed for loopholes to exist within its embargo so that the sale of
conventional weapons, such as planes, tanks, and spare parts, could be sold, thus giving
the South African government the illusion that the U.S. was at least temporarily okay
with the enforcement of apartheid. The stipulation was that the weapons had to be for
international security and not to be used for domestic implementation of apartheid,
however this was never seriously upheld, except in times when weapons sales were
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leaked to the press. This clearly was violated as Nixon addressed it within the Grey
Areas Committee and produced NSDM-81, which allowed weapons to continue to be
sold to civilians so long as intention for weapons were not to wind up with the
government and used for domestic enforcement of apartheid. There was also concern
that the British, French, and Italians were so flagrantly violating the UN arms embargo
that why shouldn’t the U.S. do the same? The U.S. Executive branch saw the advantages
to selling weapons but feared public reprisal for violating the arms embargo, so they
continued to be subversive in their weapons sales, selling weapons to civilians and third
parties and selling components to be used in British, French, and Italian planes, arms, and
tanks.
The loopholes within the embargo are due to the global Cold War context. South
African leaders when requesting weapons would reference themselves as being on the
front line of keeping the communists at bay. In addition the loophole specifically called
for weapons to be sold for international conflict. It could be argued that the loophole
existed to allow for weapons sales should, for example, the Soviets actually made
headway into the newly formed African nations and became a major threat on the
continent. However, this was unrealistic and was not the probably rationale behind
loopholes existing in the UN and U.S. embargoes. Rather, weapons served as a means to
maintain access to ports and satellite tracking stations.
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Conclusion
The three case studies examined in this thesis reveal a complex and dynamic
relationship between the U.S. and South African governments, between the different
branches of the U.S. government, and within the U.S. Executive branch itself within the
context of the global Cold War. Previous notions of the U.S. foreign policy decisions
being based solely on the tradition Cold War structure must be reexamined for accuracy.
The United States sought to maintain normal relations with South Africa by making and
breaking arms embargoes to keep its access to ports, tracking stations, and economic
investments despite the enormous human rights violations that were occurring in South
Africa. South Africa was an ally for the U.S. during a global war, despite the political
implications being a regional ally with an overtly racist country could bring, particularly
during the Civil Rights era. However, the reasons for South African remaining an ally in
the face of apartheid were not as simple as promoting democracy in the face of an
aggressive Soviet charge in Africa or South Africa representing a proxy war in Africa.
Rather, South Africa was a vital ally in the global Cold War and maintaining friendly
relations with them resonated past the borders of South Africa.
Prior historical work on U.S.-South African government relations suggest a
multitude of conclusions, depending on the historian consulted. Whereas Thomas
Borstelmann and Robert Kinlock Massie contextualized the U.S. Executive branch
decisions in the context of fear towards Soviet-backed communist expansionism, other
historians, namely Sue Onslow and John Daniel, found that this contextualization
oversimplified relations between the two countries during the Cold War. To address the
practicality of a communist threat, Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin argued that
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the ANC and SACP only received modest support from the Soviet Union and where
therefore never a threat to the South African government. Although in agreement that a
communist revolution was impractical in South Africa Vladimir Shubin saw the Soviet
influence as a threat that was thwarted by logistics, such as getting the soldiers trained in
guerilla combat in Odessa back into South Africa undetected.
This thesis set out to understand the depth of the significance of South AfricanU.S. governmental relations in the context of the Cold War. While it aligns itself with
the conclusions of Onslow and Daniel, it adds to the historiography by contributing to our
understanding of why the Executive branch chose to support apartheid despite growing
domestic and international concern for doing so in the U.S. The case studies selected for
this paper from the National Archives clearly highlights the importance of having good
relations with the South African government to maintain a vital ally in sub-Saharan
Africa in the context of the global Cold War.
South Africa as part of the global Cold War was not a simple U.S. versus the
U.S.S.R. conflict. This research revealed how many ambiguous layers made decision
making difficult for the U.S. government in all of its branches. In many ways, the South
African government was a perfect ally for the U.S., particularly in the face of the threat of
the domino theory in Southeast Asia and Africa. They were a modern country situated in
a region traversed by U.S. naval ships. They had ports that could be highly beneficial to
them should the Suez be closed to U.S. access again. They were a crucial location for
monitoring space flights and satellites. However, they employed apartheid, a ruthless
manner of ruling the black majority. How could any of the branches of the U.S.
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government support apartheid South Africa, particularly given the domestic framework
of the Civil Rights Movement that was reaching its peak during this time period?
The answer is not simple, nor is it clear. The U.S. Executive branch often framed
their policies based on prior decisions. If the U.S. chose not to dock ships in South
Africa, what would this mean for the use of other ports, in particular the ones used for
satellite and missile tracking? If the U.S. stopped collaborating with South Africa
scientifically, what did this mean for advancements in the ambitious goal of landing a
man on the moon by 1970? If the U.S. stopped selling weapons to South Africa, what did
this mean for maintaining access to shipping yards that could handle the high-level needs
of U.S. naval ships that needed clean access to the Indian Ocean? In reviewing
diplomatic papers during this time period, it is clear that policy choices involving South
Africa were slow and hypocritical.
Decisions about ports usage, support for NASA, policy papers such as NSSM-39,
and the continued sale of weapons despite the arms embargo reveal the disregard the U.S.
had towards apartheid in making its decisions. Ethics played little, if any, part in
decision-making. Public image, on the other hand, was of a high concern for the U.S.
State Department, Department of Defense, Executive branch, and Congress, particularly
with the domestic issues of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War hampering
many of the decisions they made towards the region.
Access to the naval and outer space stations was tied to the sale of weapons to the
South African government. While there is no solid document that states as much, it is
eluded to in several policy memos in the State Department. The sale of weapons is the
glue that held access to the South African government together for the U.S. The U.S. did
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not sell weapons to South Africa to keep the Soviets from penetrating; rather, weapons
were sold to the South African government to maintain amicable status to ensure access
to bases and tracking stations, which was more vital to U.S. efforts in the global Cold
War. This notion goes above and beyond previous scholarship that regards U.S. foreign
policy choices based largely (or solely) on concerns related to the Soviets in the Cold
War.
Further research on U.S.-South African relations during the global Cold War is
necessary. Whereas this thesis looks closely at the State Department, Congress, and the
Department of Defense based on Record Group (RG) 59 of the National Archives
(Department of State papers) and the Congressional Record, future research pertaining to
U.S. foreign policy decisions should look at papers concerning the Department of
Defense (RG 330), U.S. Senate (RG 46), House of Representatives (RG 233), Joint
Committees of Congress (RG 128), National Security Council (RG 273), the CIA (RG
263), Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218), the Department of the Navy (RG 340, 341), and the
Department of the Navy (RG 38, 80, 340, 428). These were all selected because of the
prominence their departments were afforded in State Department documents regarding
South African relations. Looking into these archives may help illuminate further
complexities among the branches and wings of government involved with determining
foreign policy towards South Africa. Further research in the Archives will hopefully
reveal further case study history that illustrates U.S. policy choices and the conflict, or
agreement, various segments of the U.S. government had in producing policy towards the
South African government.
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In addition, to create a clearer South African perspective, it is imperative to access
South African archives to view Presidential, Presidential Cabinet, and Parliamentary
papers to discern the complexity of the global Cold War from the South African
government’s perspective. Papers of the ANC would also help create a more substantial
and holistic picture of South Africa’s domestic conflict in relation to the global Cold
War. Finally, to look more in-depth at port availability and the impact of weapons sales
to the South African government on southern Africa, access to other African state’s
archives, such as Kenya, would be necessary.
This thesis expands on current scholarship that has only begun to suggest that
U.S.-South African relations is not merely structured on traditional definitions of the
Cold War, those often being heavily influenced by the role of Soviet expansionism or the
fear of communism spreading throughout South Africa. Rather, it is important to look at
specific examples of the two governments interacting to illuminate the complex
relationship between them. Through these examples, it becomes much clearer that the
U.S. sought to maintain a positive relationship with the South African government so that
they could keep an important ally in the global Cold War. Further research conducted on
the premise of this thesis will hopefully reveal more examples of South Africa’s
importance to the U.S. as a global Cold War ally and clarify the exact intentions, goals,
and perceptions the U.S. government had with the South African government.
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Appendix A: Timeline of South African History:
Below is a timeline of major South African events beginning with the founding of the
Cape Colony at Table Bay by the Dutch East India Company to the April 1994 elections
in South Africa. The timeline contains selections from the chronology as printed in The
Making of Modern South Africa by Nigel Worden.

1652-

Dutch East India Company establishes settlement at Cape Town

1806-

British establish permanent control over Cape Colony

1828-

Ordinance 49 imposes pass controls on African workers in Cape Colony

1836-

Settlers leave eastern Cape (‘Great Trek’)

1867-

Discovery of diamonds in Kimberley

1886-

Gold discovered in Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

1894-

Glen Grey Act establishes a separate land and tax system for Africans
(eastern cape)

1899-1902-

South African (‘Boer’) War: British conquest of Transvaal and Orange
Free State

1903-1905-

South African Native Affairs Commission recommends blueprint for
segregation

1910-

Union of South Africa established

1912-

Foundation of SANNC (predecessor to ANC)

1913-

Native Land Act segregates land ownership and restricts African land
ownership to the ‘native reserves’
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1923-

Native (Urban Areas) Act provides for urban segregation and African
influx control

1934-

South African Party (under Smuts) and National Party (under Hertzog)
form coalition government

1936-

Native Trust and Land Act consolidates reserves

1950-

Population Registration Act; Immortality Act; Group Areas Act;
Suppression of Communism Act

1951-

Bantu Authorities Act

1952-

Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act extends pass
laws; ANC launches ‘Defiance Campaign’

1953-

Separate Amenities Act; Bantu Education Act; Criminal Law Amendment
Act

1955-

Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act extends urban influx control

1959-

Foundation of Pan African Congress (PAC)

1960-

Sharpeville shootings and State of Emergency; Banning of ANC,
Communist Party and PAC

1961-

Umkhonto we Sizwe guerilla movement founded; South Africa leaves
Commonwealth and becomes a republic

1964-

Rivonia trials sentence ANC leaders to life imprisonment

1969-

Foundation of South African Students’ Organization (SASO) under Biko

1976-

Revolt in Soweto and other townships

1977-

Detention and murder of Biko; banning of Black Consciousness
organizations
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1978-

P.W. Botha introduces ‘total strategy’ policy

1984-1986-

Widespread resistance; State of Emergency and troops moved into
townships

1986-

Repeal of pass laws

1989-

Botha replaced by F.W. de Klerk

1990-

De Klerk unbans ANC, PAC, and Communist Party; Nelson Mandela
released from jail

1991-

Repeal of Group Areas, Land, and Population Registration Acts;
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) formed to
negotiate democratic constitution

1994-

329

ANC wins first non-racial election; Mandela becomes president329

Worden, ix-xv.
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Appendix B: Operation Mayibuye
Operation Mayibuye- “The Return”- was a sabotage campaign designed by Umkhonto
We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC. The idea behind this sabotage campaign was to
force the white South African government to negotiate with the ANC. The six-page
proposal found during a raid on the leadership of the ANC at Lilliesleaf was a complex
plan that outlined a detailed process to conduct a sabotage campaign against the South
African government. The plan caused a split in the ANC leadership because some
members felt it was unrealistic, whereas others argued not only was it realistic, but it was
already underway.330 Below is the text of Operation Mayibuye in its entirety.

PART I.
The white state has thrown overboard every pretence of rule by democratic process.
Armed to the teeth it has presented the people with only one choice and that is its
overthrow by force and violence. It can now truly be said that very little, if any, scope
exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by means of mass revolutionary
action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to victory by military
means.
The political events which have occurred in the last few years have convinced the
overwhelming majority of the people that no mass struggle which is not backed up by
armed resistance and military offensive operations, can hope to make a real impact. This
can be seen from the general mood of the people and their readiness to undertake even
desperate and suicidal violent campaigns of the Leballo type. It can also be gauged by
330

Frankel, 107-109.
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their reluctance to participate in orthodox political struggles in which they expose
themselves to massive retaliation without a prospect of hitting back. We are confident
that the masses will respond in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real
possibility of successful armed struggle .
Thus two important ingredients of a revolutionary situation are present: a. A disillusionment with constitutional or semi-constitutional forms of struggle and
a conviction that the road to victory is through force;
b. A militancy and a readiness to respond to a lead which holds out a real possibility
of successful struggle.
In the light of the existence of these ingredients the prosecution of military struggle
depends for its success on two further factors: A. The strength of the enemy. This must not be looked at statically but in the light of
objective factors, which in a period of military struggle may well expose its
brittleness and
B. The existence of a clear leadership with material resources at its disposal to spark
off and sustain military operations.
The objective military conditions in which the movement finds itself makes the
possibility of a general uprising leading to direct military struggle an unlikely one.
Rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organised and well
prepared guerrilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be
drawn in and armed.
We have no illusions about the difficulties which face us in launching and successfully
prosecuting guerrilla operations leading to military victory. Nor do we assume that such a
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struggle will be over swiftly. We have taken into account and carefully weighed
numerous factors and we mention some of them:
a. We are faced with a powerfully armed modern state with tremendous industrial
resources, which can, at least in the initial period, count on the support of three
million whites. At the same time the State is isolated practically from the rest of
the world, and if effective work is done, will have to rely in the main on its own
resources. The very concentration of industry and power and the interdependence
of the various localities operates as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the
enemy. It operates as a disadvantage because effective guerrilla operations can
within a relatively short period create far greater economic havoc and confusion
than in a backward, decentralised country.
b. The people are unarmed and lack personnel who have been trained in all aspects
of military operations. A proper organisation of the almost unlimited assistance
which we can obtain from friendly Governments will counter-balance its
disadvantage. In the long run a guerrilla struggle relies on the enemy for its source
of supply. But in order to make this possible an initial effective arming of the first
group of guerrilla bands is essential. It is also vital to place in the field persons
trained in the art of war who will act as a nucleus of organisers and commanders
of guerrilla operations.
c. The absence of friendly borders and long scale impregnable natural bases from
which to operate are both disadvantages. But more important than these factors is
the support of the people who in certain situations are better protection than
mountains and forests. In the rural areas which become the main theatre of
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guerrilla operations in the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of the people
will protect and safeguard the guerrillas and this fact will to some measure
negative the disadvantages. In any event we must not underestimate the fact that
there is terrain in many parts of South Africa, which although not classically
impregnable is suitable for guerrilla type operations. Boer guerrillas with the
support of their people operated in the plains of the Transvaal. Although
conditions have changed there is still a lesson to be learnt from this.
Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not lose sight of the fact that the
political isolation of South Africa from the world community of nations and particularly
the active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African Continent and the
Socialist world may result in such massive assistance in various forms, that the state
structure will collapse far sooner than we can at the moment envisage. Direct military
intervention in South West Africa, an effective economic and military boycott, even
armed international action at some more advanced stage of the struggle are real
possibilities which will play an important role. In no other territory where guerrilla
operations have been undertaken has the international situation been such a vital factor
operating against the enemy. We are not unaware that there are powerful external
monopoly interests who will attempt to bolster up the white state. With effective work
they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the last few years have shown that the
issue of racial discrimination cuts across world ideological conflict albeit that the West
proceeds from opportunistic premises.
The following plan envisages a process which will place in the field, at a date fixed now,
simultaneously in pre-selected areas armed and trained guerrilla bands who will find
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ready to join the local guerrilla bands with arms and equipment at their disposal. It will
further coincide with a massive propaganda campaign both inside and outside South
Africa and a general call for unprecedented mass struggle throughout the land, both
violent and non-violent. In the initial period when for a short while the military adv. [sic]
will be ours the plan envisages a massive onslaught on pre-selected targets which will
create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp and which will inject into the
masses of the people and other friendly forces a feeling of confidence that here at least is
an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory. In this period the
cornerstone of guerrilla operations is "shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee
from the strong".
We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulfillment. But only if the whole apparatus
of the movement both here and abroad is mobilised for its implementation and if every
member now prepares to make unlimited sacrifice for the achievement of our goal. The
time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice.

PART II.
AREAS.
1. Port Elizabeth - Mzimkulu.
2. Port Shepstone - Swaziland.
3. North Western Transvaal, bordering respectively Bechuanaland & Limpopo.
4. North Western Cape - South West.

PART III.
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PLAN.
1. Simultaneous landing of 4 groups of 30 based on our present resources whether
by ship or air - armed and properly equipped in such a way as to be self sufficient
in every respect for at least a month.
2. At the initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are split up into platoons of 10 each
to operate more or less within a contiguous area and linking their activities with
pre-arranged local groups.
3. Simultaneously with the landing of the groups of 30 and thereafter, there should
be a supply of arms and other war material to arm the local populations which
become integrated with the guerrilla units.
4. On landing, a detailed plan of attack on pre-selected targets with a view to taking
the enemy by surprise, creating the maximum impact on the populace, creating as
much chaos and confusion for the enemy as possible.
5. Choice of suitable areas will be based on the nature of the terrain, with a view to
establishing base areas from which our units can attack and to which they can
retreat.
6. Before these operations take place political authority will have been set up in
secrecy in a friendly territory with a view to supervising the struggle both in its
internal and external aspects. It is visualised that this authority will in due course
of time develop into a Provisional Revolutionary Government . 7. This Political
Authority should trim its machinery so that simultaneously with the
commencement of operations it will throw out massive propaganda to win world
support for our struggle, more particularly: -
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a. A complete enforcement of boycott,
b. Enlisting the support of the international trade union movement to refuse
handling war materials and other goods intended for the South African
Government,
c. Raising a storm at the United Nations which should be urged to intervene
militarily in South West Africa.
d. Raising of large scale credits for the prosecution of the struggle
e. Arranging for radio facilities for daily transmission to the world and to the
people of South Africa.
f. If possible the Political Authority should arrange for the initial onslaught
to bombard the country or certain areas with a flood of leaflets by plane
announcing the commencement of our armed struggle as well as our aims,
and calling upon the population to rise against the Government.
g. Stepping up transport plans, e.g. a weekly or bi weekly airlift of trainees
outside the country in order to maintain a regular, if small flow of trained
personnel.
h. In order to facilitate the implementation of the military aspect of the plan
it is proposed the National High Command appoint personnel to be
quartered at Dar under the auspices of the office there.

PART IV.
INTERNAL ORGANISATION.
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In preparation for the commencement of operations when our external team lands,
intensive as well as extensive work will have been done. For instance, guerrilla units will
have been set up in the main areas mapped out in Part I above as well as in the other areas
away from the immediate scene of operation.
Progressively sabotage activity throughout the country will be stepped up before these
operations. Political pressure too, in the meanwhile will be stepped up in conjunction
with the sabotage activity.
In furtherance of the general ideas set out above the plan for internal organisation is along
the following pattern: 1. Our target is that on arrival the external force should find at least 7,000 men in the
four main areas ready to join the guerrilla army in the initial onslaught. Those will
be allocated as follows: a. Eastern Cape - Transkei 2,000
b. Natal - Zululand 2,000
c. North Western Transvaal 2,000
d. North-Western Cape 1,000
2. To realise our target in each of the main areas it is proposed that each of the four
areas should have an overall command whose task it will be to divide its area into
regions, which in turn will be allocated a figure in proportion to their relative
importance.
3. The preparation for equipping the initial force envisaged in I above will take place
in three stages, thus:
a. By importation of Military supply at two levels:
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i.

Build up of firearms, ammunition and explosives by maintaining a
regular flow over a period of time.

ii.

By landing additional [supplies] simultaneously with the arrival of
our external force.

b. Acquisition and accumulation internally of firearms, ammunition and
explosives at all levels of our organisation.
c. Collection and accumulation of other military such as food, medicines,
communication equipment etc.
4. It is proposed that auxiliary guerrilla/sabotage units in the four main areas be set
up before and after the commencement of operations. They may engage in
activities that may serve to disperse the enemy forces, assist to maintain the
fighting ability of the guerrillas as well as draw in the masses in support of the
guerrillas.
5. It is proposed that in areas falling outside the four main guerrilla areas MK units
should be set up to act in support of the activities in the guerrilla areas, and to
harass the enemy.
6. In order to draw in the masses of the population the political wing should arouse
the people to participate in the struggles that are designed to create an upheaval
throughout the country.

PART V.
DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION.
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In order to implement the plans set out above in Parts I to 111 we establish Departments
which are to be charged with duties to study and submit detailed reports and plans in
respect of each of their Departments with the following terms of reference: 1. Intelligence Department
This Committee will be required to study and report on the following: a. The exact extent of each area
b. The portions of the country that are naturally suited for our operations and their
location within each area.
c. Points along the coast which would be suitable for landing of men and supplies
and how these are going to be transferred from the point of landing to the area of
operations.
d. The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus: i.

the military and the police as well as their strength

ii.

military and police camps, and towns, and the distances between them,

iii.

system of all forms of communication in the area,

iv.

the location of trading stations and chiefs and headmen's kraals.

v.

air fields and air strips in the areas.

e. Selection of targets to be tackled in initial phase of guerrilla operations with a
view to causing maximum damage to the enemy as well as preventing the quick
deployment of reinforcements.
In its study the Committee should bear in mind the following main targets: i.

strategic road, railways and other communications

ii.

power stations
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iii.

police, stations, camps and military forces

iv.

irredeemable Government stooges.

f. A study of climatic conditions in relation to seasons, as well as diseases common
to the area.
g. The population distribution in the areas as well as the main crops.
h. Rivers and dams.
i. And generally all other relevant matters
2. External Planning Committee which shall be charged with the following tasks: a. Obtaining of arms, ammunition and explosives and other equipment
b. In co-operation with our internal machinery, making arrangements for the
despatch of items in I above into the country
c. Obtaining of transport by land, sea and air for the landing of our task force and for
the continued supply of military equipment.
3. Political Authority
We make a strong recommendation that the joint sponsoring organisations should
immediately set about creating a political machinery for the direction of the revolutionary
struggle as set out in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Part 11 and to set up a special committee to direct
guerrilla political education.
4. Transport Committee.
This Committee is assigned the following duties: a. The organisation of transport facilities for our trainees
b. To organise transport for the re entry of our trainees
c. To undertake any transport duties assigned to them from time to time .
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5. Logistics Department - Technical and Supply Committee
Its Functions are: a. To manufacture and build up a stock of arms, ammunition from internal sources.
b. To organise reception, distribution and storage of supplies from external sources.
c. To organise the training of personnel in the use of equipment referred to in (a) and
(b) above.
d. Obtaining of all other relevant supplies necessary to prosecute an armed struggle,
to wit, inter alia, medical supplies, clothing, food, etc., and the storage of these at
strategic points.
e. Acquiring equipment to facilitate communications.
f. To undertake all duties and functions that fall under the Department of Logistics.

PART VI
MISCELLANEOUS
1. Immediate Duties of the National High Command in Relation to the Guerilla Areas:
a. To map out regions in each area with a view to organising Regional and District
Commands and NK [sic] units.
b. To achieve this we strongly recommend the employment of 10 full time
organisers in each area.
c. The organisers shall be directly responsible to the National High Command .
d. The NHC is directed to recruit and arrange for the external training of at least 300
men in the next two months.
2. Personal
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a. Intelligence Alex Secundus Otto
b. External Planning Committee Johnson, Thabo and Joseph together with a senior
ANC rep. as well as co-opted personnel, seconded to us by friendly Govts.
c. Transport Committee Percy secundus Nbata.
d. Logistics Dept. Bri-bri secundus Frank
3. Special Directives to Heads of Departments.
The Heads of Departments are required to submit not later than the 30th May, 1963,
plans detailing: a. The structural organisation of their Department
b. The type and number of personnel they require to be allocated to them and their
duties and functions.
c. The funds required for their work both for immediate and long term purposes.
d. Schedule of time required to enable them to fulfill given targets and what these
are.
e. Other matters relating to the efficient execution of the Departments Plans.
4. Organisation of Areas. Organisers and Setting up of proper Machinery Rethau and
James for this task331
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